Part 3. I just addressed Plantinga’s ontological and metaphysical arguments (A through I) and his epistemological arguments (J through Q). Here I conclude with his moral and other arguments (R through Z; and finally, his whopper of all arguments, the Argument from Reformed Epistemology):

III. Moral Arguments

• R. Argument from All the Moral Arguments

Plantinga pretentiously claims there are endlessly many “Moral Arguments” that prove God exists (“actually R1 to Rn”). Sure. There are always endlessly many fallacious arguments to a conclusion. I’ve already demonstrated the reverse is the case: the facts of morality as observed to date, prove God does not exist (or most specifically, that Plantinga’s God is extremely improbable).

History, indeed even Pantinga’s precious Bible, proves that morality is a tool humans invented and improved over time. There is no evidence any superbeing communicated any true moral system to us. Ever. Far less so in antiquity. The Biblical God thought slavery, torture, rape, genocide, sexual and religious oppression, and the subordination of women were moral goods. The Biblical God had never heard of democracy or human rights. Liberty and autonomy are never moral values in his saga. That’s proof enough the Biblical God is a fake. He was just the projected vanity of the ignorant humans who invented him to rationalize their own ignorant and backward morality. And that proves there is no moral God at all. For had there been, it would never have allowed this fake God to supplant it and its wiser advice to us. The truth is otherwise…

Humans, gifted with the accident of self-consciousness and the power of deliberative thought, simply want to feel right by themselves and enjoy a functional society with fellow humans. That has led to our developing on our own various systems of ways to behave that will obtain those goals, which systems, like everything other (our ways of knowing about the world, our knowledge of the world, and our medicine, our engineering, our agriculture, our governing), started out ignorant and inept, and slowly got better over hundreds and thousands of years, as the failure of past systems became increasingly evident and harder to deny, and new systems were experimented with and better ones thus discovered. Morality is thus demonstrably a human invention. It is also, like every other goal-seeking human invention (like medicine and engineering and agriculture and governing), increasingly more true, insofar as it is increasingly actually obtaining the goals we seek.

No God is needed for that to be the case. That some moral systems will better obtain those two goals than other systems, will always be an inevitable fact of any universe whatever. It will likewise be a fact of all universes whatever, that self-conscious beings will tend to be discontent being the sort of people they themselves loathe, and will tend to thwart, hinder, or endanger all their own goals the more they antagonize and ruin with dysfunction the social system they must always depend on. Consequently, insofar as thwarting, hindering, or endangering all your own goals (including by pursuing your own discontent rather than contentment) is by definition irrational, being immoral is by definition irrational. In every possible universe. Including all universes uncreated, ungoverned, and unoccupied by any gods.

There may be exceptions. There logically could be, somewhere, extremely sociopathic aliens that don’t depend on social systems, that don’t care about being the sort of beings that even they agree ought to be killed, and that can’t in any way be harmed or thwarted. But we can observe already that we aren’t such a being. So how “they” ought to behave is irrelevant to how we ought to behave. We ought to behave as best actualizes our own nature and achieves our goals. And that means precisely the moral systems we have gradually been tinkering toward. Which is precisely why we have been tinkering toward them, and not something else.

What does Plantinga have against any of that? More science illiteracy.

• R1. His first version reads:

(1) One might find oneself utterly convinced (as I do) that morality is objective, not dependent upon what human beings know or think, and that it cannot be explained in terms of any “natural” facts about human beings or other things; that it can’t ultimately be explained in terms of physical, chemical or biological facts. (2) One may also be convinced that there could not be such objective moral facts unless there were such a person as God who, in one way or another, legislates them.

This ignores all that the sciences of anthropology and history and sociology and psychology and cognitive science have found regarding the actual reality of human moral decision-making. What have the sciences taught us?

• The sciences have shown that morality is dependent on what human beings know or think, which is why we have had so many diverse and awful moral systems. The only sense in which true, as in best, moral systems don’t depend on what humans know or think, is in the exact same way functional and dysfunctional governments are decided by factors humans can’t wish away. What behaviors best obtain humanity’s goals are a fact of themselves and the universe regardless of what they don’t know, or might want to be the case, or mistakenly believe is the case.
• The sciences have shown that morality is reducible to natural facts: that morality is simply a behavior people wish others to engage in and expect they themselves must engage in, in order to live in a less frustrating and more pleasant world. It is simply a natural fact about what humans want (to not have what frustrates us and thwarts our goals; and to have what pleases us and assists our goals), and what behaviors must be engaged in to obtain it (just as with every other practical science, from medicine and agriculture to engineering and government).
• The sciences have shown that we evolved moral calculators in our brains precisely because they aid our survival as a cooperative prosocial species, which feature of us (being a cooperative prosocial species) is the only thing that has made possible the creation of civilization, and thus eventually the very intellectual enterprise of moral philosophy Plantinga is ineptly engaging in.
• The sciences have shown that those neural systems we evolved seek to harmonize two methods of producing behavior conducive to cooperative prosociality (without going so far as to fatally magnify the danger of becoming vulnerable to freeloaders, deceivers, and non-cooperators): a tit-for-tat reciprocal “justice-based” reasoning that focuses on consequences and outcomes (particularly toward favoring strategies that have been proved with computer models are always the most effective at obtaining this goal); and a meta-cognitive empathy-based reasoning that focuses on ascertaining and judging an agent’s motives. Because motives are a reliable predictor of future danger or aid.

On all of the above, see, just for starters: Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality; and Ordinary Ethics: Anthropology, Language, and Action; and Personality, Identity, and Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology; and The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Just to get a gist of what history, anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience have discovered about this. All of which Plantinga (and all the apologists he cites) are pretty much completely ignorant of, and totally ignore.

So we know Plantinga’s first premise is simply false. And it is a scientific fact that it is false. Not some mere conjecture that it is. So we don’t even need consider the second premise; and yet, that premise also is necessarily false. God could not legislate any true morality, that wasn’t already true independently of anything he wished to be the case, and even independently of his existence. Otherwise it would merely be his arbitrarily subjective whim, and not actually objectively true, in any relevant sense.

So that tanks. As soon as we put back in all the evidence the Christian apologist left out.

• R2. What’s Plantinga’s second try?

The argument that moral facts must be “queer,” as in “weird” (the Argument from Queerness). The basic idea is, as J.L. Mackie once put it, “If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.” That statement is simply, completely false. Hypothetical imperatives are entities or qualities or relations of a very ordinary sort, inevitably common in any universe containing sentient beings that must obtain goals, such as interacting socially in productive ways. And moral facts are simply, by definition, the superlative hypothetical imperatives, which renders them utterly ordinary, and obviously reducible to natural facts, about ourselves and our relations to others in a social-physical system.

So that tanks. As soon as we put back in all the evidence the Christian apologist left out.

• R3. What’s Plantinga’s third try?

He just punts to A.E Taylor’s The Faith of a Moralist. But that rests on a false conditional: “if the moral life is one of endeavour towards an eternal good…” Stop right there. No. The moral life is not one of endeavour towards an eternal good. He just made that up. None of the science or history of morality supports any such bizarre contention. It’s just fiction. Moral propositions are no more an “endeavour towards an eternal good” than imperative propositions in medicine, engineering, agriculture, government, or even car repair. Their goal is ordinary and temporal: the achievement of a satisfying life, given our biological self-awareness of what we become in what we do, and how social systems behave, upon which we depend.

So that tanks. As soon as we put back in all the evidence the Christian apologist left out.

• R4. What’s Plantinga’s fourth try?

He just punts to Clement Dore’s “Kantian argument from the confluence of morality with true self-interest.” Hmm. Moral facts just coincidentally coincide with well-considered self-interest huh? Gosh. You’d almost think that makes moral facts a tautologically necessary feature of any conscious being in any possible universe. Wait. Yes. Actually that makes moral facts a tautologically necessary feature of any conscious being in any possible universe. It’s what I’ve been saying all along: if there is no God (or indeed even if there is!), then moral facts will always congrue with an agent’s best interests, when fully and rationally informed and considered. Immoral action is always in some way self-defeating. By definition. That’s why we have no need of a God for moral facts to exist and be true.

So that tanks. As soon as we put back in all the evidence the Christian apologist left out.

• R5. What’s Plantinga’s fifth try?

He just handwaves to “some of the other arguments considered by Bob Adams in the above mentioned paper,” the one Plantinga listed as the basis of his first argument (he doesn’t say what those other arguments are), “and arguments by Hastings Rashdall in The Theory of Good and Evil and by W.R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God.” Dude. Rashdall published in 1907. Sorley in 1855! Holy shit man. You are living in the past. You’re like George Costanza in Seinfeld, “Hung up on some clown from the 50s, man!” Or the 18-50s in this case. Science has blown waaaayyy past you in the understanding of moral facts. Get up to speed. Please. I’m not going to bother addressing century-old, and thus necessarily ignorant, obsolete, pre-scientific opinion pieces in theology here. Come on.

• R6. What’s Plantinga’s sixth try?

Plantinga closes with a lengthy, blathering sixth attempt. One you will be familiar with as often spouted by the typical amateur village evangelist: that unless God exists, we can never judge anything to be evil—or indeed “horrific” or anything else negative.

That’s just stupid. Negative judgments are simply that: expressions of how we feel about a thing. “Evil” is just a word we assign to that which is malevolent or malignant: that which brings us harm (see Sense and Goodness without God, V.2.2.7, pp. 337-39). It is plain stupid to say nothing can be judged as causing us harm, unless a god exists to explain to us that it’s causing us harm. That assertion doesn’t even require a response. And even insofar as we are reacting to harms caused to others, that’s simply the biological capacity for empathy and meta-cognition, evolved in us to produce the prosociality and keen planning we need to outperform other species—eventually by building a civilization: thereby recreating our environment to suit us (including a better-suited social environment), rather than waiting for our genes to adapt to whatever environment we are accidentally given.

Even apart from the internal fact (that the benefits of our prosociality are aided by empathically feeling what others feel, which is thus why all healthy people feel that way), harms caused to others, we consciously know, can be caused to us. Thus, murderers horrify us; and that horror motivates us to take steps against the problem (of there being murderers), so we are not subject to murder ourselves (nor will anyone else we care about or need in our lives). Natural evil is likewise a judgment about what dangers lurk in the natural world, from cancer to tsunamis, that we must avoid, thwart, or aid each other in resisting. Plantinga’s argument amounts to saying, “Cancer is natural; so why should we think it’s bad?” And we get to call stupid on that. Obviously it’s bad. Because it hurts us and we don’t like that.

IV. Other Arguments

• S. Argument from Qualia

Atheists can’t explain qualia. Therefore God did it! Which is just another “God of the Gaps” fallacy. I’ve more thoroughly discussed this in Sense and Goodness without God (III.6.4.4, pp. 146-48). And I quickly break down the ill-logic of the argument in my chapter on design arguments in The End of Christianity (p. 300). Plantinga calls it the “Argument from Colors and Flavors.” The basic idea is, scientists haven’t yet answered the question, “What is the explanation of the correlation between physical and psychical properties?” But they have not answered that question because they cannot (hence, a false premise in Plantinga’s argument). Rather, they have not answered it because they don’t have the technology yet to get at it by forming and testing hypotheses. Such as fMRI resolutions at the synaptic level. Or an AGI we can tinker with and ask questions of.

Start with the science we have. We know qualia are produced by physical circuits in the brain, and that these circuits can even get crossed (so that you smell colors and see sounds and other confusions; the varieties of synesthesia are many), or destroyed (so that you lose the ability to experience the corresponding qualia); likewise, artificially stimulated (you can cause a quale to be experienced by electrically stimulating the brain circuit that produces it). All previous claims about what science would be unable to explain about the mind by reference to the brain have turned out false. As soon as the technical means was achieved to test hypotheses, the phenomenon of the mind theists insisted naturalism could never explain, naturalism explained. Those are now established facts of brain science (see, for example, Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology and The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat). So odds are high that that will continue to be the case. It cannot be argued the other way around. Therefore the Argument from Qualia is a nonstarter. Indeed, it may be logically impossible for qualia to not exist in any naturalistic system producing conscious thought.

• T. How Does Love Exist?

Plantinga clumsily attempts an argument here. I’ll try to charitably steelman. The basic idea is that, if atheism is true, then love could only be a chemical process for motivating parents to mate and raise children; we observe love is so much more than that; therefore atheism is false. His premise is false. Atheism does not entail or even render likely that “love can only be a chemical process for motivating parents to mate and raise children.” Once again, Plantinga is science illiterate. He clearly hasn’t picked up a single book or study, ever, on the science of love. My treatment of the subject, unlike his, is science-based: see Sense and Goodness without God III.10.3, pp. 197-202. And that was over a decade ago. Scientific advances since then have only further confirmed what I then said about it: see, for example, What’s Love Got to Do with It, and Friendship: Development, Ecology, and Evolution, and A General Theory of Love; or even, Buddha’s Brain.

As I noted in Sense and Goodness, a lot of the science of love is actually terrible, filled with fallacies and bias and short on facts, so one has to explore the studies and research with critical caution. But with that caveat, the inquiry still bears enough fruit to realize love is not God’s gift. It’s a practical empathic function of a prosocial brain. Plantinga naively thinks atheists consider love as simply what occurs between Mommy and Daddy and its only function is Raising Babies. That’s already known to be scientifically false. And accordingly, no atheist thinks what Plantinga uncreatively imagines. First of all, oviously, love is more commonly an emotional relationship between non-romantic partners: friends and kin; and commonly exists even in relation to non-persons: we love science, history, art, democracy, and all manner of things and abstractions. Secondly, even in respect to romantic relationships, its evolved functions extend way beyond mere parenting goals, and include all manner of cooperation enhancements that benefit the individuals in love as well as their communities—hence there is nothing unnatural about childless romantic love; nor anything useless about it, for those in love or their other relations. And its utility has in turn caused the co-evolution of its pleasurability. Hence we like it.

The science actually establishes God doesn’t have anything to do with love. In fact, he is unlikely to exist in the face of the actual evidence. If a God existed who valued loving relationships, he wouldn’t have made it possible for people to be deceived in love, for example; and, for example, if “monogamous” love were important for child rearing, he would have designed us so we would only ever feel sexual desire and romantic love for one chosen partner so long as they lived. Instead, we observe exactly what we expect if there is no God: the evolution of an available state of intense satisfaction and desire (as some have aptly described it, an intensification of admiration and compassion), that thereby motivates attuning oneself to, promoting, and aiding the object of one’s feeling. The evolutionary utility of this broad application and deep feeling hardly needs explaining. That it would be attuned to our well-being, and thus a good pleasure-maker to have been accidentally bestowed with, is expected. Without any intelligent design required. (In contrast with, for example, the now-mismatch between our evolved pleasure response to sugar and our well-being; or, for African Americans, salt.)

• U. Why Is Music Beautiful Rather Than Random Noise?

Plantinga ridiculously calls this the Mozart Argument. I wonder what he thinks of rap. Or death metal. He thinks “heavy metal” is “miserable and disgusting” and “could as well have been what we took to be beautiful.” Apparently it escaped him to notice that…um, evidently, we did evolve to take heavy metal to be beautiful. That’s why it exists as an art form. And why Mozart is regarded by others as so “miserable and disgusting” that it literally operates as an effective repellent. Plantinga’s subjective preference for Mozart is an entirely idiosyncratic happenstance of his cultural contacts and life experience. It is not a “cosmic universal truth.” It’s a human construct. Although it is based on common evolved principles related to social bonding—such as the ability to detect and enjoy rhythm and harmony, which are fundamental to human communication and ritual. Ever wonder why parrots are one of the few other species that can appreciate music?

Once again, someone forgot to tell Plantinga, who is still living in the Middle Ages, that we already have a developing science of the evolution of human aesthetics. Including the one domain he mentions, music. Other domains are likewise well-studied (e.g. for smell, taste, even drugs; for vision, see my survey in Sense and Goodness without God VI, pp. 349-66; and for an updated survey of the whole science of human aesthetics, see The Artful Species). Plantinga doesn’t seem aware of even one jot or tittle of it. Science illiteracy, once again, is a defining feature of his failure as a philosopher.

• V. Why Are Playfulness and Exploration Fun?

Plantinga admits our enjoyment of “play” is “an adaptive means of preparing for adult life” and that that’s all we need to explain why we should have evolved to enjoy it. But he longs for there to be something more to it; and he says his longing would be answered if he posited God (the Mary Sue of philosophy) as just wanting play to be fun. For some reason. (Plantinga never gives us a reason.) This is just shit philosophy from start to finish. He has no coherent argument (wanting there to be more, is not evidence there is more). He consults no scientific facts on the matter. And he has no actual alternative hypothesis to propose—it’s just handwave, handwave, handwave, “for some reason I’m sure God would choose to gift us with enjoying Grand Theft Auto.”

Hey. You know what? Bingo! There is a whole science of this. Plantinga the Science Illiterate Strikes Again. Get up to speed. Read Play. At the very least. That summarizes the science that’s been published on this matter since at least the 1970s. So it’s not like it’s new. What we know is in fact a lot more than the simplistic idea Plantinga thinks science has proposed. Because he didn’t check. Checking scientific facts on the subjects he pontificates on, is apparently not ever a thing he does. In actuality, play is observed in animals of all ages. So it is not particular to humans (and since animals can’t be cognizant of “giving glory to god through the enjoyment of his gifts,” the God Did It hypothesis really underperforms here). And it is not particular to “preparing for adult life.” We know this in humans as well as animals, where play continues to be pleasurable and serve useful functions all the way through adulthood.

As the marketing summary to Play simply puts it: “play is essential to our social skills, adaptability, intelligence, creativity,” and “ability to problem solve,” among much else, including relieving stress and improving morale; indeed “it’s the very means by which we prepare for the unexpected, search out new solutions, and remain optimistic.” All evolutionarily advantageous. And therefore requiring no god to explain why we enjoy it. Even when Plantinga claims he is unable to imagine a reason we’d evolve an enjoyment of mountaineering, it seems patently obvious how exploration would evolve to be pleasurable (because useful), how challenging exercise would evolve to be pleasurable (because useful), how developing and honing skills would evolve to be pleasurable (because useful), and so on. Even getting away from crowds and congestion and the artificial environments of civilization for a while we can expect would evolve to be pleasurable—because we have a lagging mismatch between our new environments (which are more crowded and urban than most of our ancestors lived in) and the ones we evolved to find familiar.

This is a much more coherent, clear, specific, and effective a hypothesis than whatever nonsense Plantinga is imagining. One needs no other response.

• W. Argument from Providence & Miracles

Plantinga leaves this blank. I’m sure he could conjure examples if plied. But this whole category of arguments is fallacious. So examples wouldn’t matter—unless and until a real example became available. Because it’s the complete absence of one that tanks this argument before it even gets started. In fact, the actual evidence regarding miracles, disproves the existence of God. See my analysis of the Argument from Miracles. Once again, science illiteracy likely also plagues Plantinga here…read up on the science of coincidences, for a start. My discussion of the example portrayed in the Lee Strobel biopic will suffice to illustrate what happens to all such attempts at this. Similarly my piece on prophecy as miracle.

And don’t bother citing Keener. All he did was gullibly collect every modern miracle story he could find. He scientifically investigated none of them. Documenting that stories exist, is not documenting that those stories are true. What happens when those stories get investigated, is that they always fall apart. So far, without exception (e.g. see the works of Joe Nickell and James Randi, for a start). And that tells you all you need to know. If God existed, we would not have this dismal evidence of the miraculous or providential. We would have much clearer and indisputable evidence of it (barring some ad hoc excuse you are bound to invent on the spot to explain why God conveniently never would do that, thereby repudiating Plantinga’s claim that he did). So in fact, the actual state of the evidence, argues against Plantinga’s God, not in favor.

• X. Why Are Landscapes and Seascapes Beautiful?

Here Plantinga absurdly says:

[C.S.] Lewis speaks of the nostalgia that often engulfs us upon beholding a splendid land or seascape; these somehow speak to us of their maker. Not sure just what the argument is; but [I] suspect there is one there.

I love how he is sure there is an argument for God in there somewhere, even though he can’t figure out what it is. That’s practically the Christian mind in a nutshell. No. There isn’t an argument in there. It’s not “nostalgia” we are experiencing when we behold with awe “a splendid land or seascape” (unless it actually is, in which case we already know why: it reminds us of a past experience or association; a misfire in this brain circuit is responsible for the feeling of déjà vu). It’s a reaction to the abundant stimulation of sensory cues we evolved to react positively to. I actually discuss the science of this in Sense and Goodness without God (see my discussion of art above). The stimulus of sight and sound, vastness and power, and naturality combine to overwhelm so many “acceptance” triggers at once that the effect is felt as awe. There will always be some stimulus that does that, for any evolved sentience; it’s a statistical inevitability. No god is needed to explain that. Nor to explain why someone (like C.S. Lewis) culturally programmed to see gods in things, will see gods in things.

• Y. Meaning of Life

Standard “you can’t explain how life has meaning without a god” rigmarole. I’ve already refuted this. See the Argument from Meaning in Life. The short of it is, if God wanted our life to be specially meaningful, he would not have made us mortal, nor made it so difficult to build a good life. “Life only has meaning because you value it, and because of the things you value about it. It’s meaning comes from you.” Hence “throughout history [we] have always invented our own meaning for life, and always different people have valued different things about it,” which is “exactly what we expect if there is no god.” Not so much if there is.

• Z. Why Is a Singular Theory (God) Able to Explain So Many Things (A to Y Just Enumerated)

This is the Argument from Ancient Aliens. “Gosh. With a single hypothesis of ancient aliens, we can explain every mystery of ancient history that exists! That’s just too improbable a coincidence! All hail the ancient aliens!” It’s really the stupidest argument to ever find coming from someone who is supposed to have a Ph.D. in philosophy. The reason you can get your God to explain so many things, is that you deliberately constructed your God to be a Mary Sue. “Oh, he also does this. Oh, and that.” “Why did he do that, and why did he do it that way?” “It’s a mystery.” Yeah. That’s not an explanation. That’s just garbage collecting.

It’s only the worse that you can only propose such an argument by ignoring all the things God doesn’t explain well. Take a look at the ten arguments enumerated in that last link: each shows that a god is less likely to have done things the way we observe them, whereas a godless universe will always do those things that way; so the universe weirdly looks exactly like a universe with no God in it. If you “invent” a reason why God would still nevertheless do it that way, in each one of those ten cases yet again, you’ll see what’s going on here. You’ve just Mary Sue’d your God.

You actually have no evidence that God has any of the desires, motives, or properties you had to make up to get him to fit each poorly-fit collection of evidence. You just “make them up.” And that’s just ten examples. I’ve pointed out even more in this series on Plantinga. But because each one of those arrays of assumptions you need to get your God to fit and explain the evidence again is itself backed by no evidence, each one has a low probability, and that then multiplies against the total probability your hypothesis is true. That actually reduces the probability of your now ever-more-complicated-Rube-Goldbergesque God. The fact that you need this constant crazy array of all those assumptions to explain away the evidence is why your hypothesis is false. It is not “why your hypothesis is true.”

V. Is Belief in God Properly Basic?

And finally, of course, Plantinga is infamous for insisting we can believe in God without any arguments, simply by asserting we feel he exists and our feelings can’t be wrong…er, I mean, simply by asserting that belief in God is “properly basic.” Which is Highfalutin Con Artist Speak for “we feel he exists and our feelings can’t be wrong.” Plantinga would probably insist at least one other criterion be met: that you can come up with any possible way to make all your other beliefs cohere with it. In other words, if it’s even so much as merely logically possible for your feeling that God exists to be consistent with everything else you experience and know, then you are warranted in believing God exists. Right.

So…is belief in God properly basic?

No.

But it wouldn’t matter if it was. Evidence still confirms it’s false. Which teaches us a lesson: any epistemology that allows a proposition that can be false to be properly basic cannot claim to be reliable. No epistemology you expect to trust can be allowed to do that. Because any belief based on such an epistemology will always fail The Outsider Test. It’s just another version of the Argument from Religious Experience. And fails for the same reason. Every belief that can be false, has to be capable of justification, and must have evidence as its warrant. Otherwise you can’t know when it’s false. The only belief that requires no evidence (besides itself) in order to warrant confidence that it’s true, is a belief that literally cannot be false (such as affirming the existence of a present, uninterpreted experience). Everything else needs a reason. No reason, no warrant. And insufficient reason, insufficient warrant. Period.

Every claim to the contrary is sophistry.

Previously:

• Part 1: Plantinga’s Onto-Metaphysical Arguments
• Part 2: Plantinga’s Epistemological Arguments

VI. Conclusion

What have we learned from all this? Alvin Plantinga is science illiterate. He has a weak imagination. And he never fact-checks any question he has about why the world is the way it is. Basically, he’s a lazy, wannabe scientist, making factual assertions about the world without any evidence or inquiry, who resembles more some silly theologian from the 18th century who accidentally fell through a time hole and missed the last three hundred years of advances in human knowledge. The rest of us are caught up on where we are now. It’s the 21st century. Time to move on.