Feser keeps trying. And keeps failing. Indeed, he is now making things worse, by demonstrating he doesn’t even understand what is going on here. To catch you up: I wrote a critique of his book. He wrote a reply. I wrote a response to that reply showing how he didn’t understand my critique and still hasn’t actually responded to anything I actually said. And now he has replied to that, with a new blog article, Carrier Carries On. Here is what’s wrong with that.
In his new response, Feser ignores pretty much everything I said. Again. And makes only three points, all of which only demonstrate he doesn’t understand anything I’ve said.
Problem A
First, Feser says:
[H]ere is the passage from my book that he is quoting from, at p. 37:
40. So, the forms or patterns manifest in all the things it causes must in some way be in the purely actual actualizer.
41. These forms or patterns can exist either in the concrete way in which they exist in individual particular things, or in the abstract way in which they exist in the thoughts of an intellect.
End quote. As you can plainly see, Carrier really did do exactly what I said he did and what he now strenuously denies doing – he collapsed steps 40 and 41 into one step without telling the reader that that is what he was doing.
No. That’s not what I did. I simply completed Premise 41 by inserting his definition. When he says “these forms and patterns” in Premise 41 he means (and logically can only mean) “the forms or patterns manifest in all the things it causes.” If he does not mean that, then he has committed a basic fallacy in the structure of his syllogism. I can only suppose that Feser doesn’t understand how logic works, and thus doesn’t understand what he was hiding behind the word “these.” Filling out what the word “these” means is not conflating two premises; that’s spelling out the premise. As in, correctly stating what his Premise 41 must assert (and is asserting), in order for his syllogism to be valid. That Feser does not understand this is disturbing.
Problem B
Second, Feser falsely claims he deals with Aristotelian Forms Theory in his book. No. He doesn’t. And I explained in my first article why the pages he devotes to Aristotle don’t even mention much less address Aristotelian Forms Theory. So for him to just re-cite those pages does not respond to what I said. Because he instead spent those pages talking about abstractions as properties only of a mind. For example, he writes “Aristotelian realists emphasize that abstraction is essentially a mental process, so that abstractions are essentially tied to a mind” and “abstract objects…do not so exist in mind-independent reality” (pp. 99-100). That’s not what Aristotle said. And that is not Aristotle’s Theory of Forms.
I even quoted “the peer reviewed Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [stating that] ‘Aristotle…argued that forms are intrinsic to the objects and cannot exist apart from them’.” That’s Aristotle’s theory of forms. Feser never addresses Aristotle’s actual theory of forms. He confuses Aristotle’s discussion of how humans perceive those forms (how we “abstract” from particulars), with what makes those forms real (what makes them a thing we can perceive). And that mistake is what causes Feser to construct a false disjunct in Premise 41 of his First Argument. Exactly as I originally argued. Feser still has no response.
Here is what I wrote:
Aristotle took Plato to task for the mistake Feser is making, pointing out that it is not necessary that potential patterns actually exist in some concrete or mental form. They only have to potentially exist.
…
Potential things are by definition not actual. So obviously we don’t need them to be actualized to exist. That’s a self-contradictory request. It’s thus self-contradictory of Feser to insist that potential things must be “actualized” somewhere (a mind; concrete things). Obviously there is no logical sense in which they must be actualized in that way.
Aristotle argued that potentials exist inherently in everything, without anything further needing to be the case. A cube contains the potential to be a sphere (by physical transformation); but not as if that potential is some sort of magical fluid contained physically inside the cube. It’s simply a logically necessary property of any material that it can be reshaped; if it can have shape, it can have any shape. Period. It is logically necessarily always the case.
…
The only thing new here is that Feser fabricates the premise that “Aristotelian realism” holds that “abstract objects exist only in human or other contingently existing intellects.” That’s not true. Maybe some Medieval interpretation of Aristotle concluded that. But that is certainly not Aristotle’s actual account of abstractions—or more properly, universals. Feser seems to have confused what Aristotle said about how we discover and employ universals in human thought, with what he said about what universals are. Once we correct the mistake, Feser’s entire third argument collapses.
This, Feser simply has not responded to. He keeps responding to things I didn’t say. I said his notion of Aristotle arguing universal properties exist only in minds, is false. He responds, by citing all the pages where he addresses Aristotle arguing universal properties exist only in minds. That’s a complete failure to respond to me. My argument is that those pages are completely irrelevant, because Aristotle didn’t argue that. My argument is that Feser’s book contains no argument against what Aristotle did argue (or at least, no argument against what some modern Aristotelians argue). And that statement remains true. And it remains the problem I was identifying in his Premise 41. And Feser still hasn’t grasped that’s what my point was. And thus still hasn’t responded to my actual argument.
Think this through. I argued that when Feser says abstract objects, to exist, must exist in “a mind” (or “concrete things”) the only two options Feser claims exist (apart from Platonism), his claim of “a mind” here, refers to his mistaken ideas about Aristotle’s Theory of Forms, a mistake my original article took him to task for, and which he still has not responded to. He still thinks Aristotle argued that abstract objects (i.e. universal properties) only exist in minds. But even if that’s what Aristotle had argued (it’s not, but never mind that, he’s thousands of years old and so obsolete anyway), there are modern Aristotelians who argue differently. Like me. And standard references in the field. Exactly as I explained. And Feser’s book contains no response to us. In fact, by failing to even consider our theory of forms, his Premise 41 is a false lemma. That’s a fallacy. And his entire first argument collapses from there. Just as I said.
Feser continues to fail to understand this point. And still has developed no response to it. Not in his book. Nor in any of his responses to me.
Problem C
Third, Feser ignores all the rest of both my articles, and complains instead about an offhand comment I made in a thread on one of them, wherein I said Feser tries in his chapter six to get to “a traditional Christian God of some sort.” To which he responds, “not only do I not address any specifically Christian claims in the book, I explicitly decline to do so.” Here I think he just misunderstood what I said. There is a difference between “an [x] of some sort” and “a specific [x].” I never said Feser defended a specifically Christian God (like, for example, the resurrection of Jesus, or a specific theology of salvation). I said he defended a God with a wider array of traditional attributes like the one Christians believe in. And he does. For example, he tries to go from God being “good” in a sense having no moral meaning (in his Five Proofs, it is simply the assertion that God has no unactualized features), to it meaning moral goodness. He likewise gives arguments for this God ensuring we will have an afterlife. And so on. All things Christians want in their God.
I can nevertheless understand how Feser could be confused by my saying he argues all the way “to Christianity” (as in, he must have thought, some specific theory of Christ as God’s instrument or the Christian gospel). I didn’t mean to imply that. Rather, I only meant that he argues to the kind of God Christians want to exist, and not just the abstract entity his Five Proofs aim for (which as such has no actual characteristics of moral goodness or concern for our salvation in an afterlife, for example). This at least I can chalk up to an honest misunderstanding. And about nothing stated in either of my articles, but just a casual conversation on one of them. The confusion is now corrected. So he has no grounds to continue complaining about it.
He has no other responses to me.
Conclusion
Feser still can’t read. He still doesn’t understand what my argument against Premise 41 in his First Argument is. And still offers no reply to it. Nor has he replied to my refutation of any of his other four arguments. And he even claims now to not understand what his own Premise 41 is asserting, by claiming I am conflating it with Premise 40. Evidently not understanding what the word “conflating” means or how terms must be consistently defined in a syllogism. He is really not thinking any of this through. And consequently he is not even responding to anything I’ve said. Still.
-:-
For more on Feser’s travesties see Thomism: The Bogus Science and Joe Schmid’s excellent collection of related critiques.
Dear Dr. Carrier,
Thank you for your response. After carefully reading Dr. Feser’s book, and carefully re-reading his and your blog posts, it seems to me that you are misunderstanding some of the philosophical subtleties that are present in Feser’s arguments. This is seen especially in your latest reply to Feser here in this very post. This constant, and annoying, tendency on both sides to claim that the opponent is illiterate and stupid isn’t helping the situation, and is foreign to the spirit of philosophy.
Allow me to reply to each of your three points.
A.
Feser’s point is that you’ve collapsed two different phases (not steps) of his argument into one, which you’ve clearly done (granted, his lists of premises don’t easily bear out this phase-shift, but it’s there if you look for it). He isn’t taking offense at you merely inserting his definition. Rather the problem comes from you inserting your definition and then going on to claim that he’s committed a false dichotomy. As Feser states, premise 40 is the conclusion to a sub-argument aiming to show that “the forms or patterns in question exist in the purely actual actualizer.” Premise 41 begins a new phase in his overall argument (in which Feser attempts to show the manner in which the forms and patterns in question exist in the purely actualized actualizer), and takes this sub-conclusion as established. And as Feser rightly points out, “I do consider and give arguments to rule out alternatives to those two [alternatives of premise 41]… Since the purely actual actualizer is not an abstract entity, that already rules out a third alternative such as the Platonic realm.” Thus, premise 41 is not speaking of the way in which forms and patterns might exist taken broadly, but only the way in which they might exist in the pure act actualizer. Indeed, in collapsing these phases of Feser’s argument, you’ve opened it up (wrongly) to a charge of presenting a false dichotomy (which, although wrongly charged, it still is not guilty of).
B.
You seem to be selectively quoting Feser, especially at page 100. There he makes it clear that he is speaking of abstractions qua abstractions: “Hence, though [abstract objects] do exist in mind-independent reality, they do not exist there as abstract objects, but only as tied to concrete particular individuals.” This is completely Aristotelian, through and through, and when this distinction between abstract objects as such and abstract objects as instantiated is kept in mind, the rest of Feser’s discussion (on Aristotle’s theory of forms) is in line with Aristotle’s thought and Aristotelian realism.
(Around page 100 of his book he constantly speaks in terms of this distinction. Another example: “Animality considered in abstraction from these things exists only in the mind.” pg. 100.)
In sum, you claim that Feser spent his pages “talking about abstractions as properties only of a mind.” But this is plainly false, as page 100 alone shows numerous times.
C.
You say that “I never said Feser defended a specifically Christian God,” and yet in the comment in question you do say that. “One could perhaps write a critique of just how he gets from the God of his Proofs, all the way to Christianity, but I found that a tedious waste of time.” Clearly if Feser is arguing “all the way to Christianity,” he is arguing for a specifically Christian God. You cannot backpedal and twist your words to mean that Feser only “argues to the kind of God Christians want to exist.” If you really implied this, you would have realized that Feser’s arguments apply equally to the “kind” of God that Muslims and Jews “want” to exist.
Rather than putting something into the arguments that isn’t there., consider the possibility that Feser is arguing, and that his arguments lead to something that has the attributes that are traditionally associated with the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim God (rather than just Christian).
More over, you claim that Feser “tries to go from God being “good” in a sense having no moral meaning… to it meaning moral goodness.” I would certainly like a source for this claim, since for Feser, and indeed the entire classical theistic tradition, God is not a moral agent. Again, I challenge you to find a quote from Five Proofs in which Feser argues that God is a moral agent, or, in your words, that God is morally good. (I leave aside your misunderstanding as to what exactly it means for something to be purely actual, and therefore good.)
In sum, it is clear that you are reading things into Feser’s arguments that aren’t there (or in some cases, reading things out of them). While some, more vocal, commentators on these posts might disagree, I do not think you’ve done this on purpose. A careful, honest, and charitable reading, on both sides, is called for. I think such a reading will show that your critiques, especially the ones I’ve replied to here, are unfounded. As to your numerous other critiques, there is only so much time in the day, and I for one have no desire to write a book in Feser’s defense. It might be profitable to narrow the discussion further, assuming the discussion continues.
All the best to you Dr. Carrier,
René Ardell Fehr
Feser’s point is that you’ve collapsed two different phases (not steps) of his argument into one, which you’ve clearly done.
No, I have not. I simply unpacked his word “these” in Premise 41. If he is now claiming the word “these” refers to some other thing, he is admitting his argument is fallacious and therefore invalid at precisely that point.
See the problem?
You can’t ignore what the meaning (the content is) of the word “these” in Premise 41. And it is only responsible to unpack it correctly. So I did.
…and takes this sub-conclusion as established.
Exactly. Therefore “these” means what I quote it meaning.
That’s not conflation. That’s completion. Essential for the logical validity of his argument.
You seem to be selectively quoting Feser, especially at page 100. There he makes it clear that he is speaking of abstractions qua abstractions: “Hence, though [abstract objects] do exist in mind-independent reality, they do not exist there as abstract objects, but only as tied to concrete particular individuals.” This is completely Aristotelian, through and through, and when this distinction between abstract objects as such and abstract objects as instantiated is kept in mind, the rest of Feser’s discussion (on Aristotle’s theory of forms) is in line with Aristotle’s thought and Aristotelian realism.
No, it isn’t. When he says “they do not so exist in mind-independent reality” he is excluding the actual Aristotelian explanation of universals.
Accordingly, he never offers any rebuttal to how Aristotelians explain universals. Exactly as I said.
Nowhere does Feser ever explain why we are to reject Aristotle’s conclusion that universals require no metaphysical substrate (neither mind nor “concrete objects”), other than a possibility-space (like space), because they are inherent as possibilities in that space itself.
Instead, his syllogism only eliminates Aristotelianism by claiming it relates to there being minds to contain universals and thus explain them, or because it only allows universals to exist when their manifesting particulars exist. That is simply not Aristotelianism. Nowhere in his premises in the syllogism does he even mention, much less eliminate, actual Aristotelianism, which does not say universals require a mind, nor that they exist only when manifest in an object. Feser completely ignores Aristotle’s point that universals are potentials. Not actualities. Feser also consistently assumes Aristotelian realism requires minds to justify the existence of universals.
Try. Go find the numbered syllogism in his argument that mentions Aristotle’s actual explanation: that universals don’t exist as the patterns of actual things, nor as concepts in minds, but as potentials logically inherent in what does exist. They require no mind. And require no “concrete thing” as Feser defines the idea. Nothing need exist at all, but the potential for a pattern to exist. That is the sum all of Aristotle’s explanation of universals.
For example in Premise 42 Feser simply asserts that universals cannot exist in “the purely actual actualizer in the same way they exist in individual particular things.” And then moves on. But Aristotle never said they exist “in individual particular things.” He said they exist as the potentials of everything there is. No individual particular thing need exist at all, for Aristotle’s universals to exist. All that need exist is the potential for them to exist. Which requires nothing more than a spacetime to shape them out of (the same way Aristotle explains human souls, for instance). Exactly as my original article explained.
So it is not true that universals “cannot” exist in “the purely actual actualizer in the same way they exist in individual particular things.” That begs the question of what the purely actual actualizer is. If it’s Aristotle’s “matter in space” (or just the modern “spacetime”), clearly they can exist in that, in the very same way they exist in anything whatever. Because Aristotle’s theory of forms does not require an actual object (like a sphere) to contain the corresponding universal (sphericity). It only requires the potential for a sphere to form. Which even Feser’s God contains. As does any other “purely actual actualizer” that can potentially manifest a sphere.
So you still end up with the same problem: Feser has no response to this alternative. And by excluding this from his syllogisms, he has committing a fallacy of false lemma, and violated the law of excluded middle by leaving out an alternative. One that, incidentally and most curiously, happens to have more backing from the sciences than his own theory does, or any other he considers.
You say that “I never said Feser defended a specifically Christian God,” and yet in the comment in question you do say that.
This confusion is now corrected so it’s a moot point.
More over, you claim that Feser “tries to go from God being “good” in a sense having no moral meaning… to it meaning moral goodness.” I would certainly like a source for this claim, since for Feser, and indeed the entire classical theistic tradition, God is not a moral agent.
I can only assume you are using some bizarre, nonstandard definitions of the words “moral” and “agent” here. If God acts, he is an agent (hence, he acts: Feser pp. 174, 201, 206-08, 214-15; and has a will: Feser, pp. 221-27). If he acts in accordance with moral principles (as opposed to amoral principles), he is a moral agent specifically (and so indeed, Feser: pp. 217-22). By definition. If God never acts, he cannot have created anything (Feser, pp. 196-98, 215-16), nor can he effect salvation (Feser, pp. 228-29, 298-99). But not only does he act, he acts morally (e.g. Feser, pp. 297-99). Hence, God loves us (pp. 228-29), ensures justice for us (pp. 298-99, 301-02), performs miracles for us (pp. 237-46), etc.
Dr. Carrier,
Thank you for your reply. There are some points I wish to address:
A.
As I stated in my original reply, Feser is not objecting to you having “inserted” his definition in place of the word “these.” He is objecting to you collapsing two different phases of his argument, which, contrary to your protests, you have done. I quote myself here: “Thus, premise 41 is not speaking of the way in which forms and patterns might exist taken broadly, but only the way in which they might exist in the pure act actualizer.” But you neglect this fact, instead preferring to attack premise 41 as if it were arguing how forms or patterns might exist taken broadly (which was the subject of the previous phase of the argument). This is collapsing an argument.
B.
You defend a rather strange notion of Aristotle’s philosophy of universals which I have nowhere read in Aristotle, nor have I read it in any secondary literature. Thankfully, your reading of Aristotle can easily be shown to be in error. Let’s take just one line of yours: “But Aristotle never said they [universals] exist “in individual particular things.””
There are many passages that one could point to in Aristotle’s Physics or his Metaphysics. The most obvious example comes from the latter, wherein Aristotle shows that forms are not generated, but nevertheless do exist in the concrete individual, where “one part of the thing is matter and the other form.” (VII, 8, 1033b19.) Now, forms are, by their natures, universals. Thus, Aristotle clearly believes that universals can exist in individual particular things.
I’m not sure where you got the contrary idea. This notion of Aristotle’s is all over his writings (one could even point to passages where he claims that numbers exist in individual particular things! Numbers!). Aristotle’s view is that universals are real, and that they depend for their existence on particulars. (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle%27s_theory_of_universals for a very simplified version of his theory.)
More over, you neglect to defend your quote that I pointed out, and which I said summed up my point, where you said that Feser “[talks] about abstractions as properties only of a mind….” and which I subsequently showed to be false.
C.
With regard to the “Christian God” point, you say “This confusion is now corrected so it’s a moot point.” But you’ve only begged the question, since I very clearly and succinctly addressed your “correction,” showing it to be anything but. Thus, to refer back to that same “correction” is only to beg the question. If you disagree with my arguments, show me how.
With respect to God being a “moral agent,” you say that “I can only assume you are using some bizarre, nonstandard definitions of the words “moral” and “agent” here.” But in fact we’re (Feser, myself, and every classical thesist) using the same definitions you are. We simply deny that God is moral in the univocal sense. To do otherwise would be to hold God to some moral law and to introduce potentiality to him (among other things). You are equating the classical theist’s conception of God with the theistic personalist’s, but this error is something that is very, very well documented in the secondary literature.
Anyways, this point is admittedly abstract, and requires some time of serious study to grasp. Regardless, as Feser points out in his book, God is perfectly good (p. 216-223). Please note that nowhere in those pages (or indeed anywhere in the book) does Feser say that God is moral, as you would have us believe. You say “he [God] acts morally (e.g. Feser, pp. 297-99)….” but here you are only reading things into Feser, as nowhere in those pages does Feser say this.
And yes, God loves us, ensures justice for us, and performs miracles, but these are not to be understood (and never claimed to be understood as) God being morally good.
Warm regards,
René Ardell Fehr
But you neglect this fact, instead preferring to attack premise 41 as if it were arguing how forms or patterns might exist taken broadly (which was the subject of the previous phase of the argument).
No. My argument has always been that he left out a possible actualizer. Period. He violated the law of excluded middle by not accounting for, and thus not eliminating, options contrary to his.
You defend a rather strange notion of Aristotle’s philosophy of universals which I have nowhere read in Aristotle, nor have I read it in any secondary literature.
I cited a standard reference and quoted it.
I also cited my own account of an actualizer Feser did not eliminate (published all the way back in 2005).
Aristotle shows that forms are not generated, but nevertheless do exist in the concrete individual…
Of course they do. They also exist when that concrete individual hasn’t been realized. You are confusing “can exist in particular things” with “can only exist in particular things.” Aristotle did not make that mistake. But you evidently are. And so, I must now suppose, is Feser.
Thus, as for example Aristotle argues in his account of human persons (“souls”), when a person forms, their soul is a possible form that existed all along as a potential in the matter so-formed. Aristotle does not say “new forms” are created with each human being born (just as you said: forms are never generated; they are eternal). His point is that all forms exist as potentials even when not manifest in a particular thing; and that forms can only causally interact with the world (e.g. a person can only actually exist, rather than merely potentially exist) when manifest in a particular. In other words, you are confusing Aristotle’s account of how forms manifest causal power, and forms existing qua forms (and not qua manifested forms).
But regardless of the side question of whether you aren’t reading Aristotle correctly, it remains a fact that my account (e.g. my own metaphysics, as detailed in Sense and Goodness without God) remains an alternative Feser did not address. It also happens to be the same theory of forms Aristotle developed. But even if you don’t believe that, you still aren’t defending Feser. Because he still didn’t address and thus didn’t eliminate an alternative actualizer. Just as my original article explained. Thus his logical syllogism is fallacious.
That’s been my point from minute one.
(BTW, I cited a peer-reviewed field-specialized encyclopedia; you cite Wikipedia, and even admitted that was over-simple; maybe you should pay attention to the proper order of expert sourcing, and actually read an expert source.)
You said that Feser “[talks] about abstractions as properties only of a mind….” and which I subsequently showed to be false.
No. You didn’t. I showed Feser only talks about abstractions as either requiring concrete things or being properties of a mind. I addressed both. Neither is Aristotelian.
If you disagree with my arguments, show me how.
I did. I provided a whole paragraph of page citations.
We simply deny that God is moral in the univocal sense.
That’s not how I use the word. Nor how hardly anyone speaking English ever does. That’s by definition weird. I’m speaking English. You are not.
You can’t criticize me for speaking your weird language incorrectly. Because I do not speak in your weird dialect. So I can’t be held to task for saying anything incorrectly in it. Because I’ve never said anything in it.
Regardless, as Feser points out in his book, God is perfectly good (p. 216-223). Please note that nowhere in those pages (or indeed anywhere in the book) does Feser say that God is moral, as you would have us believe.
You are now claiming Feser never means by “moral” what every other English speaking person means. That’s weird. And I don’t speak your weird dialect. I only speak ordinary English. And in ordinary English, a God who cares about justice and our welfare and even our eternal salvation (as Feser argues God does) is a moral being. He is certainly not amoral or immoral on any ordinary meaning. And weird meanings are irrelevant. Because I don’t speak Weird. And have never written a single sentence in that language.
You say “he [God] acts morally (e.g. Feser, pp. 297-99)….” but here you are only reading things into Feser, as nowhere in those pages does Feser say this.
I am translating what Feser does say into English. Ordinary meaning, of ordinary words. Not Weirdspeak. In ordinary English, a being who would never permit us to suffer evil and injustice without a non-evil or just reason, is by definition a moral being. A being who loves us, and never fails in expressing that love, by any standard English-language meaning of the word loves, is by definition a moral being. Maybe not in Weird. But I have never written a sentence in Weird. So you can’t take me to task for mispeaking something in Weird. I’m only speaking in English. And in English, everything I said about Feser is 100% true.
“This constant, and annoying, tendency… to claim that the opponent is illiterate and stupid isn’t helping the situation, and is foreign to the spirit of philosophy.” Nailed that one! This nastiness only DETRACTS from whatever sound argument they are making. Sad how intelligent people act very childish, like playground bullies screaming at each other. I guess being well informed and articulate doesn’t make one a better human being. Sigh.
Pointing out true facts isn’t childish. I never said anyone was illiterate and stupid. The person who reads my articles, and straw man’s what I said into that, is the one behaving like a child. Because it remains an actual fact that Feser still never reads my articles or correctly apprehends (and thus never responds) to what they say. Making complaints about childishness, by fabricating childish things I didn’t say, is just a rationalization to ignore what I actually said. And that’s actually childish.
Just a heads up. In problem A, where you quote with substitution from premise 40, though you are clearly addressing 41, and the fact that it isn’t strictly “verbatim”, is exactly the kind of pedantic nitpick Feser looks for to discredit any interlocutor. It’s an entirely insubstantial point, but he’ll try to play it to make you look foolish. That’s just the level Feser operates at. You’ve been warned.
Other than that, great job. I’ve been waiting for someone to competently check Feser for a while.
I get the impression that Feser now thinks his arguments are ironclad. Sorry, Ed, that’s not how philosophy usually works. Feser used to say that one can escape his arguments for God by rejecting the metaphysical assumptions. Now, Feser says those assumptions are just obvious and he has argued for them. Well, if they are obvious, I don’t see why they would need further argument. Not to mention, anyone familiar with Ancient and Medieval Philosophy will know Feser is largely blowing smoke.
Given the history of bad arguments for God, Feser is climbing a steep hill. I actually think some of the arguments Feser presents are somewhat original, which is a problem if one hasn’t bought any of the other arguments for God. We have good inductive evidence that the arguments for God are not sound, so it’s not like we have to look at every argument or future argument.
I also think it’s curious that he refuses to say what we would expect to see if theism were true. He just says, “That’s Scientism. Dur!”. Like, what? Apparently, scientism is now equivalent to ‘science like’. His argument from change reminds me of the argument from fine-tuning in that it gets things completely backwards. If God is changeless, why in the world is there this reality that is subject to change in the first place?!
Is this the end of your correspondence with Feser regarding his book?
I just found this blog post and it looks like there are other blog posts I have to read before I can get the full picture of what is happening.
If you find any more from Feser than I’ve already addressed, let me know.
I can’t even believe what I have read from these articles of yours and your absolute misrepresentation of Dr. Feser. I will demonstrably show that you are false regarding Feser and Aristotelian realism. Your misrepresentation of Feser’s explanation of Aristotelian Realism is astonishing. You say that:
“Second, Feser falsely claims he deals with Aristotelian Forms Theory in his book. No. He doesn’t.”
This is so demonstrably false that I can’t even believe you would type this. Reread his book. He discusses Aristotelian Realism on pages 99-102. And the fact that you have said “‘Aristotle…argued that forms are intrinsic to the objects and cannot exist apart from them’.” That’s Aristotle’s theory of forms. Feser never addresses Aristotle’s actual theory of forms”
This is again DEMONSTRABLY false. You only quote him NOT talking about that and refuse to quote where he actually does talk about it. On page 99 he writes:
“It [the consequences of Platonic Realism] is certainly absurd, anyway, from the point of view of the Aristotelian realist, who has independent reasons to regard a tree or a human being as a substance — something existing in its own right…and having an intrinsic source of its properties and characteristic activities…Aristotelian realism therefore denies that universals exist in a “third realm” of Forms. How do they exist then? Consider once again, the example of the universal [that is] animality. In the world outside the mind, animality exists only in actual animals…”
He continues on page 100:
“Animality considered in abstraction from these things exists only in the mind…This Aristotelian realist position is not nominalist, because it holds that universals exist. But neither is it conceptualist, because while it holds that universals considered in abstraction from other features exist only in the mind, it also holds that universals exist in the extramental things themselves…”
There it is, universals exist within the extramental things that exemplify them (dogs, triangles, etc.) while they can also exist as abstractions in the intellect. That’s Aristotelian realism or as you say “Aristotelian Forms Theory.”
Here’s where you intentionally misrepresent him. You quote him here saying:
” For example, he writes ‘Aristotelian realists emphasize that abstraction is essentially a mental process, so that abstractions are essentially tied to a mind” and “abstract objects…do not so exist in mind-independent reality’ (pp. 99-100).”
You intentionally chopped up the quote to make it seem like he is saying something he isn’t. I will complete it for you and everyone else to see. On page 100 Feser writes:
“Aristotelian realists emphasize that abstraction is essentially a mental process, so that abstract objects are essentially tied to the mind. Hence, though animality, triangularity, redness, humanness, and so forth do exist in mind-independent reality, they do not exist there as abstract objects, but only as tied to concrete particular individuals. And though animality, triangularity, redness, humanness, and so forth can nevertheless exist as abstract objects, they do not so exist in mind-independent reality.”
He clearly says here that universals exist in mind-independent reality as part of the particulars that exemplify them, but also exist in mind-dependent reality as abstract objects due to the abstraction of an intellect! He’s saying that when they exist in the mind they exist there as abstract objects, but when they exist outside the mind then they aren’t existing as abstract objects since by Scholastic terms abstract objects are necessarily mental! Outside the mind they exist in concrete particulars.
Clearly on pages 99-102, including the finished quote above, Feser explains Aristotelian realism as the position that universals exists in concrete particulars and in the intellects of minds that abstract those universals from particular instances of them. This is simply what classic Aristotelian realism is, that universals only exist in concrete particulars and in the intellects that abstract them. Your claims are false.
Q.E.D.
You just proved my point:
Feser only rebuts a Medieval Aristotelian position that forms exist in minds; that is not Aristotle’s position. Feser never rebuts Artistotle’s actual position (as in, he never includes it in his trichotomy of options in Premise 41, and never makes an argument for not including it in Premise 41).
As that position is coherent, his Premise 41 is a false trichotomy, as it omits not only a logically possible position that undermines all five of his arguments, it omits Aristotle’s actual position. That’s what “addressing” it means. He never addresses it. That you think he “mentions” it is irrelevant.
Just as I said.
Can you find anywhere in Feser where he gives a reason to exclude Aristotle’s actual position from the options in Premise 41 or anywhere else in his syllogisms for any of his five arguments?
“Feser only rebuts a Medieval Aristotelian position that forms exist in minds; that is not Aristotle’s position.”
Response: by the “position that forms exist in minds” do you mean only exists in minds or exist in minds while also existing in particulars? Because the position Feser explicates is the latter while the former is just conceptualism, and he explains the difference between Aristotelian realism and conceptualism on page 100.
If you agree that it is the latter position he is talking about, then yes that is Aristotle’s actual position. He didn’t think forms only existed as constituents of particulars. Aristotle talks about the distinction between the active and passive intellect, where the passive intellect receives the forms and the active intellect turns potential knowledge into actual knowledge, and so forms would also exist as apprehended objects of knowledge. This is essentially the abstraction process Feser brings up.
Also, I don’t know what “Premise 41” you’re referring to. Feser’s Augustinian Proof is only 29 premises, so the rest of your reply about Premise 41 I don’t know how to respond to.
“Can you find anywhere in Feser where he gives a reason to exclude Aristotle’s actual position..?”
Response: Yes, pages 101-103. Universals cannot be grounded in the material world or material things, which your definition of Aristotelian realism would presuppose.
You are confusing “explicates” with “rules out.” Addressing a position means addressing it, not just mentioning it. You are also confusing what Aristotle actually argued, with a completely different position he didn’t argue.
So you seem not to understand what my criticism is. In fact, you seem not to have read my original critique of Feser at all. Maybe you should go back and do that.
Feser’s arguments depend on Premise 41 (in the first argument; he replicates this premise by a different number in his other arguments, every one that requires ruling out abstraction without minds), which presents only two options, and he rules out one to land on the other (the one that sustains his argument thereafter).
But that dichotomy of options does not include the (actual) Aristotelian option.
He never at any point rules out that position, or even attempts to. And he doesn’t even mention it in Premise 41 (or any of the versions of Premise 41 he inserts into his other arguments).
Since the option he leaves out is actually the correct one, his arguments are all based on a fallacy of excluded lemma (it’s a false dichotomy). And this can’t be salvaged. Because there is no argument to be made against Aristotle’s actual position.
The argument Feser deploys on pages 101-103 does not address Aristotle’s actual position. It is addressing a completely different position Aristotle never advocated. That’s precisely my point.
To wit:
Feser begins that section by falsely stating “Aristotelian realists emphasize that abstraction is essentially a mental process, so that abstract objects are essentially tied to the mind.” False. Aristotle never said that. That is not Aristotle’s theory of forms. Then Feser infers from the false Aristotelianism he just invented that abstractions like “animality” or “triangularity” “do not exist in mind-independent reality.” False. That is exactly the opposite of what Aristotle said. Minds play no actual role in Aristotle’s theory of forms.
Then when Feser gets close to actually mentioning Aristotle’s actual view (regarding potentiality of forms), he incorrectly says abstractions “cannot be grounded in the essence or nature of any material object.” That’s exactly the opposite of what Aristotle said. Aristotle said abstraction is grounded in the essence and nature of every material object: as soon as you have a ball of matter, you have the potential to shape it into a triangle of matter. Thus every ball of matter inherently contains all possible shapes. One does not have to have any triangles in the universe, for triangularity to exist in the universe. It is a logically necessary consequence of the shapability of matter: if it is possible to squish a ball into a triangle, then triangularity exists. Period. There is no way to prevent triangularity from existing, unless you can render reshaping of matter logically impossible, which you cannot do. This is how Aristotle dispensed with Plato’s extra Forms. (And Neo-Aristotelianism extends the point to matter itself, insofar as matter is simply the result of the shapability of spacetime, leaving spacetime the ultimate ground of reality.)
Feser never at any point addresses or responds to this theory of forms. It’s not in any of his premises. It’s not in any of his arguments. Not even in pp. 100-03.