A new study that ran the Drake Equation with a proper sampling of uncertainty (something no one had done before, oddly) has found there is credibly a 38% chance humans are the only civilization in the entire known universe; and a 52% chance we are the only civilization in our own galaxy. Not ever, to be clear. But, alive, within a detectable window for us. In other words, there could be many other dead civilizations we missed the opportunity to see, and many others whose light can’t have reached us yet. But excluding those, the most likely probabilities on current scientific knowledge and established uncertainties, are that there is only a 62% chance another civilization exists anywhere in the universe whose signal could be reaching us; and only a 48% chance of there being one in our own galaxy.
This work is interesting and worth discussing. It has implications for methodology as well as naturalist philosophy and Christian apologetics. Here’s a breakdown…
The Basic Idea
The paper, currently being considered by the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A, is “Dissolving the Fermi Paradox” by Anders Sandberg, Eric Drexler and Toby Ord (of the “Future of Humanity Institute” at Oxford University). Peer review may lead to updates or revisions in the final published version (so keep your eye out for that), but their paper is solid, straightforward, and contains all the correct caveats, so I doubt it will be rejected.
What they did was take the Drake Equation, which allows boundary conditions to be entered for all the requirements for there to be a detectable civilization currently cohabiting the galaxy with us, and then calculate what the probability is that we are alone in the galaxy given our uncertainty about the variables. And then repeated the procedure for the observable universe. In other words, given that we don’t know where each parameter falls between two values, we can randomize where it does fall within the range of possibilities, and average out the resulting probabilities, to get a “so far as we know” probability of where that parameter is.
There are other forms of the equation than the standard one they use (see for example Wikipedia’s sample of some). But as they note, their results generalize to all of them. Unless some factor one wishes to add plausibly varies by more than an order of magnitude, and odds are none do—and even if they did, most would in consequence increase the probability we are alone in the visible universe.
I have to be additionally clear, though. The Drake Equation (hence their results) only pertain to living civilizations. You’d need a different equation to calculate how many civilizations there have been in this galaxy or the known universe up to now (and yet another to calculate how many there will have been by some point in future time). And the probability that there are one or more dead civilizations in each zone, is necessarily higher than that there is a still-active one. Although “still active” is not quite the right term here either: Drake gives us the number of civilizations whose signals or activity we should be able to see (leading to some then adding a factor to the equation regarding whether or how long civilizations send signals or leave evidence at all); and it’s possible a civilization died out after sending any such signals or light evincing such evidence, but the difference there is just a time lag, so it doesn’t affect the “how many we should see by now” factor.
Which is what generates the Fermi Paradox this paper is actually about: we don’t see any. Why? There are really only two possible answers: advanced civilizations are invisible; or there are none to see. This paper supports the latter conclusion. And it doesn’t come to that conclusion arbitrarily. It looks at what would have to be the case for there to be any to see (if they were visible), and finds that we have no evidence those conditions have been met, and what we do know strongly suggests in fact they haven’t been. So we don’t need to posit that they are invisible.
Invisible Civilizations
Of course by “civilizations” here we mean not merely integrated networks of cities, but actually EM-radiating societies. So earth only counted as a “civilization” in this equation when we started beaming radio signals, some of which inevitably leak into space. Thousands of years from now, some distant world as many lightyears away (if it has sensitive enough equipment) could detect our signals. Ergo the other way around. Hence SETI. (Nevertheless I will use “civilization” more broadly, unless I am referring to the Drake.)
This becomes all the more the case if we suppose we will inevitably begin colonizing the galaxy. The galaxy has been around for billions of years, yet it would take mere millions of years to colonize most of it, so there has been a thousand times more time than is needed for any species that arose ahead of us to already be occupying the whole galaxy. Unless such species are so rare, none arose millions of years ahead of us, anywhere in the whole galaxy. But for that to be the case, such civilizations must be so extremely rare there might not be any at all (other than us). Hence this new study’s results.
Some don’t like this conclusion. So like Christian apologists, they try making up excuses for why the evidence doesn’t fit expectations. Though not always implausibly.
Maybe civilizations don’t colonize galaxies. But we have to suppose this is so extremely commonly the case, that we must expect virtually 100% of the time that no civilization will. Not even we will. Even if our civilization lasts forever. Maybe we will be content to just sit around in one place, even after the sun burns out. Though this is possible, it really doesn’t look like anything near a certainty. To expect that every civilization, even hundreds or thousands of them, every single one, would make this same weird decision, requires a faith implausible (or so it would seem…we’ll revisit this assumption in a moment). And even then, an EM-radiating civilization sitting in one place should still be detectable eventually (another assumption we’ll revisit in a moment). Though we now know our own signals barely escape our heliosphere, it is quantum mechanically inevitable that an instrument sensitive enough will always pick up any signal (up to certain limits); so detection is simply a function of instrument sensitivity (or being too far away). So maybe we don’t have sensitive enough instruments yet?
Or maybe civilizations all reach a point when they don’t radiate. This is actually a more credible hypothesis. One can show that certain forms of progress in technology are inevitable, that they have a virtually 100% certainty over, say, a million year timeline—and remember, our civilization has only been around for a few thousand years, and radiating for barely a hundred, so when you stop to think where we will inevitably be in a million years, you will get my meaning. Even if we experience several more dark ages in that span, the outcome of a super-advanced civilization is simply unstoppable—but for extremely rare accidents, which will barely put a dent in the number of civilizations that get there (civilizations are a lot harder to kill than people think).
We can show, for instance, that, averaged over time, it’s reasonable to conclude civilizations always inevitably advance in EROI: their ability to exploit and leverage energy. As I’ve discussed already, we’ve gone from human and animal energy (EROI in the low single digits), to environmental energy (water, wind, and biofuels: EROI in the high single digits), to fossil energy (coal in the 1800’s got our EROI above 10; fossil fuels probably max out now somewhere around 30), to nuclear (EROI above 100). When we get to antimatter and other forms of advanced power exploits our EROI will skyrocket. But notice it took us not even 10,000 years (a pittance of time in a galaxy over ten billion years old) to get from an EROI of 1 to 100. It’s reasonable to assume all civilizations inevitably make that same curve. Even if they take longer to do it—because even at “ten times longer” that’s still just 0.1 million years, a mere drop in the bucket of galactic time.
The only way for this not to be the case is for the civilization to get wiped out (meaning, the whole species extinct), which is extremely improbable (despite what doomsdayers keep saying); or for the civilization to choose to revert to lower EROI’s (like the planet in the Star Trek TNG episode “Devil’s Due”), which must also be extremely improbable—as it requires a coordinated choice among (likely by then) billions of individuals to all revert to less effective and more expensive ways of accomplishing their goals. And never going back. Like that civilization that just sits around even after its own sun burns out. Civs that do that, are just not going to be that frequent.
Sandberg et al. decry the idea of positing “all civs go dark” to resolve the Fermi Paradox—instead of admitting (as they would prefer) that it’s resolved by there being no other civilizations—based on the notion that it seems incredible to suppose that this outcome is so likely as to always happen, even across hundreds or even thousands of civilizations. But though that’s a reasonable objection (as I’ve just noted), it might carry less weight in this case than they think. Would it be reasonable to suppose post-space-age school children (e.g. American children today) will still be using wax tablets to do their homework instead of digital ones? Not really. That virtually 100% of all civilizations will make that switch, is actually what we should expect.
And here is where “all civs go dark” might be just as certain an outcome. If civilizations always advance in EROI, they will certainly advance in efficiency, and thus their radiation will get less and less dirty (comms will more often be by laser, for example, than just throwing radio waves everywhere; consider how we are already transitioning from broadcast television to cable, as another example). That’s pretty much 100% certain. And would they want to draw attention to themselves by deliberately producing directed high energy signals? Arguably no. It seems a waste of resources, all just to advertise to potential invaders where you are. The few who try it even now, aren’t getting signals anywhere more than to a microscopic fraction of the galaxy.
But beyond all that, any fashion for it that may arise will soon wane…when we lose interest in this universe altogether. Remember, we are thinking about where we will be as a civilization a million years from now. And thus where all civilizations likely will as well. By then we will certainly have the ability to ditch this messy, brutal, murderous, disobedient, and uncooperative universe and go live in a far more hospitable one of our own making—one that will not be brutal, murderous, or disobedient, but that will conform exactly to our wishes, resolving all EROI limitations altogether. Paradise, in other words. We will live in simulated universes of our own design. Why would anyone prefer anywhere else? The odds that they will—and will continue to for thousands of years—are surely dismally low (though contrary to Bostrom, odds are, we aren’t in one of those…yet).
If you are going to transition your civilization to a simulated universe, you need to park it somewhere where it will last forever, and that means far away from all the shit that explodes and blasts you with deadly particle beams and the endless mess of deadly rocks and dust that will inevitably crash into you and fuck up your shit. Which leaves only one place to park: the intergalactic void. You will be starved for energy out there, but that’s not a problem, because in a simulated universe you can set your clock at any speed. You can let your servers tick a second of time over every few billion years in realspace, using the intervening period to soak up all the photons and energetic particles there are and use them to power the system. And radical efficiency here will be a must—something far beyond current technologies of efficiency, of course. Which means no such simverse-server-array will be radiating anything. Not even heat; at least beyond trivially (or observably, if they found a realm of energy transfer that doesn’t even interact with normal matter).
Frankly, IMO, this all follows with near 100% certainty. Nearly all civs will do this—because they can, and once they can, why on earth wouldn’t they? All who do will leave the galaxy, not colonize it. And all who do that will minimize all radiating signals. So actually, odds are, all civilizations are invisible. They went dark. They are just coasting in between galaxies, impossible ever to detect. Which doesn’t help us resolve how many there are.
Rare Earths
Sandberg et al. notice that of all the parameters of the standard Drake Equation, we actually know them all to within a reasonable margin, except the probability of abiogenesis. All the terms before that, science has constrained pretty well by now. And all the terms after that, are constrained by basic principles of probability, in particular, the rule that, absent evidence to the contrary, “you are always more likely to be typical than exceptional,” which is a tautology, but an important one. When you look at the final terms in the Drake Equation, we have an observation datapoint to work with, to which that principle would apply: our planet’s history.
How long will a Drake civilization last? Probably forever, or at least trillions of years (contrary to the doomsday crowd, it is, again, extremely hard to kill one), in any case well longer than the universe itself has even been around by this point. How many intelligent species will develop Drake civilizations? Probably all of them, or near enough. Once we had an intelligent species, we got a Drake civilization in a mere quarter million years, a microfraction of time. Life had been evolving for over three billion years, and yet as soon as an intelligent species arose, it almost immediately developed a Drake civ. “We are more likely typical than exceptional,” therefore this is almost certainty within an order of magnitude of how long it takes on average. For instance, to suppose it was ten times faster than average, is to suppose we were bizarrely—which means very improbably—lucky.
Almost the same could be said for the evolution of intelligence: it took only 3.5 billion years, and this can’t to any credible probability be even as much as ten times faster than average. And it’s vastly less probable still that we got lucky on both measures at the same time (intelligence and civilization). Although here, maybe not:
- It’s possible most life dies out well before even reaching the average timeframe for evolving intelligence. In other words, all biospheres would eventually generate intelligence…if all biospheres lasted forever. With evolution you are basically running a semi-random search routine for intelligence. So it’s statistically inevitable to find it. But since biospheres don’t last forever, most might go extinct before finding it. So the rate at which planets harboring life will produce intelligence is partly a function of the rate at which planets harboring life die off before getting that result.
- Therefore, if the average timeframe for life developing intelligence is longer than planets usually even remain habitable, then selection bias will ensure our timeframe is far faster than average. Because that will always be the case for every intelligent species and civilization observing itself (per the weak anthropic principle). The Drake Equation would reflect this with a low frequency of inhabited planets producing intelligence—since (under this supposition) most would burn out before they get there, while the rest will fall within the time-frame of habitability. Which for the earth is about 6 to 8 billion years, but can be for some planets many times longer.
- Civilization clearly does not meet this condition. It arose far too quickly, once intelligence existed, for selection bias to explain that. It is therefore improbable that the pace of its development deviated very far from average. It’s very unlikely to have been even as much as ten times faster than average. But the evolution of intelligence does meet this condition: it took a timescale here, on earth, pretty close to the limit (roughly half the lifetime of the planet, thus right smack in the middle of where it had to occur). Which looks more like selection bias, rather than indicating its actual frequency.
So the highest probability is that we are close to the hump of the bell curve on the transition from intelligence to a Drake civilization: that rate is probably pretty normal; but we might not be close for the previous stage, the transition from life to intelligent life: that pace might be pretty unusual (we can’t tell with just the one data point). So it is reasonable to conclude that it’s usually the case that once intelligent life exists, if nothing stops it, it almost always becomes a Drake civilization in under a million years. And there aren’t a lot of things likely to stop it that can happen in so short a cosmic time-frame. But the evolution of intelligent life probably takes at least billions (as here) if not on average tens of billions of years (averaged across every instance there may be). Maybe more.
We could try to argue for the contrary conclusion. Intelligent life on earth certainly required multicellularity; and this is probably universally true (we can’t honestly think of any other way nature alone could do it). But look at the clock: as soon as multicellularity was achieved, after running a sampling program for over three billion years, it then produced intelligence in only half a billion years. That’s extraordinary if it isn’t ordinary. So odds are, once that innovation arises, intelligence is rapidly inevitable, occurring on average in under a billion years. Anything else would make us very unusual, and without any obvious selection bias to otherwise explain it, unusual is improbable. So maybe multicellularity is what earth life discovered unusually early? Selection bias could still explain that; as then no intelligent beings would ever observe being anywhere else but on such lucky planets.
But time isn’t the only factor. It may be that life arising is so easy, that it arises usually in places where it can’t evolve into intelligence. For instance, if life originated on Titan, odds are the extremely low energy flows there would never be significant enough even to power the evolution of an intelligent species. You need a more energetic location. Like the earth.
This is essentially the thesis of Ward and Brownlee, who keep getting cited by Christian apologists as proving life is too rare to have arisen by chance, even though they never argued such a thing and in fact argue quite the contrary. They argue that probably life originates quite often in the cosmos, maybe hundreds or thousands of times per galaxy, but the conditions where it could arise are so variable that most worlds would never be hospitable to what they call “complex” life. Consequently, complex life would never evolve in most cases, even as life itself is found all over. And intelligent life is a very complex form of life. It requires a lot of energy to run, and it requires environments that aren’t too radically varying or extreme. Think of the bacteria that survive in Antarctic ice or deep in the crushing depths of the earth’s crust: life can thrive there, but could anything complex even move, much less survive in such conditions? Probably not.
[Ward & Brownlee] argue we may be the only intelligent species in this “quadrant of the galaxy” (pp. xxiv & 283), and are therefore only “virtually unique,” not literally unique. They do speculate whether we may be alone in this galaxy altogether, or the visible (not the entire) universe, but their actual thesis only extends to our galactic quadrant. There are over a trillion known galaxies. Therefore, their idea of ‘rare’ still allows for billions of planetary civilizations.
So I would agree, given the uncertainty of both the time problem and the environment problem, the frequency of life that becomes intelligent must surely be low. But the variances I don’t think could be too wild. Could it even differ by an order of magnitude? Are there ten times more places in the cosmos life can arise than can evolve the complexity of intelligence? Did intelligence arise on earth ten times faster than on average it would? Either seems a bit of a stretch to imagine. Particularly as life is far more likely to evolve in places where such room to evolve is also available. Nevertheless, Sandberg et al. look at the variance in published estimates of this and find (and thus employ) a variation of four orders of magnitude. That seems a tad absurd to me. But it’s reasonable a fortiori. They are, after all, averaging professional scientific estimates. They likewise find a variability of two orders of magnitude in the probability of intelligent life building a Drake civilization, which I also consider absurdly pessimistic—because it violates the basic rule that, absent evidence to the contrary, we are more likely typical than exceptional, and estimates that are that variable entail we are absurdly exceptional. But again, I’ll take it a fortiori.
The Sandberg team ends up, though, with the largest variability in the singular parameter of the probability of life arising anywhere at all. This they find varying in the literature by as much as 200 orders of magnitude! (p. 9) Even their next most widely varying estimate, lifespan of Drake civilizations, ranges over a space of only 9 orders of magnitude. Every other parameter varies by no more than 1 to 4 orders of magnitude in the literature. So the most important observation here is the huge uncertainty in the probability of abiogenesis. Which is what Christians love to focus on.
All this, Sandberg and gang conclude, once you plug all these uncertainties in, gives us a Bayesian prior probability that there is at least one other space-faring civilization besides ours that we’d currently be able to observe (if we could observe every one there were) of only 62% for the observable universe. That’s over a radius of about forty-six billion lightyears (objects that emitted the light now reaching us thirteen billion years ago having moved a considerable distance further since then), encompassing over a trillion galaxies. And it’s just 48% for our own galaxy. In other words, roughly speaking, for all we honestly know, there’s only a 50/50 chance there is even one other civilization like ours in our galaxy (that we could see). Extending to the whole known cosmos, it’s not much better. We could very easily be the only one in the observable universe (all others having died out ages ago, or arisen before any light from them could yet reach us).
Of course, the actual universe is vastly larger than the observable part of it. In fact the universe might be infinitely large; but observations fix its minimum size at 250 times larger than the observable part by volume (several times the observed radius). And that’s just the minimum. The currently most credible cosmological theory—the inflationary Big Bang model—entails the actual cosmos has a radius 10^23 times greater than observed. That’s a 10 followed by 23 zeroes. An absurdly vast size. So the probability of there being other civilizations like ours does start to approach 100% once you start counting regions of the cosmos beyond our visible horizon. And even counting just the observable universe it’s close to that, if we talk about all civilizations. When you remember the Drake equation is only counting observable civilizations (not long dead ones or relevantly new ones; which may actually be most civilizations), the probability of there having been many civilizations in the universe up to now (and not just us) is certainly well near 100%—we just won’t have received any light from them to tell by, it either all having long passed us, or not gotten to us yet.
You might still ask why the incongruity between the cumulative probabilities. If there is a roughly 50/50 chance of a civilization per galaxy, why is there roughly only a 2 in 3 chance of a civilization in any visible galaxy? The answer has to do with the uncertainties (shown on their Figure 2, partially reproduced above), which they explain (on pp. 10-11):
[T]he mean for N [the number of observable civilizations] is very optimistic, at 27 million, but the median is now only 0.32—less than one civilization per galaxy like our own. The probability of N < 1 is now 52% … Most markedly, the very uncertain life formation rate produces a heavy left tail, giving a nearly 38% credence that N < 10 [to the power of] -10, making us alone in the observable universe.
In other words, they are giving the median value rather than the mean value. So when we factor in how uncertain we are—particularly with respect to the frequency of abiogenesis—we end up with a high probability the cosmic civilization density is extremely low. For instance, if we put error bars around these numbers, they would be extremely wide, and hugely overlap, and probability consistency would be maintained at the margins, not the medians. This is a “for all we know” probability based on highly uncertain variables.
They then complete the Bayesian equation by using the Fermi observation as evidence that can now update our priors. Although there, again, margins of error are wide. So they only end up with this evidence raising “our 52% credence for being alone in the galaxy to somewhere between 53% and 99.6%” and “our 38% credence for being alone in the observable universe to somewhere between 39% and 85%” (p. 13). So at the margins, not a huge change. The evidence of no observable civilizations is just highly consistent with their prior. Odds are, there aren’t many to observe. [Update: A new paper has come out supporting their conclusion from a different angle, which is also worth considering: The Timing of Evolutionary Transitions Suggests Intelligent Life is Rare,” Astrobiology (Mar 2021): 265-78.]
et al., “There is a serious significance to all this that actually reverses the Christian’s desired argument…
The Abiogenesis Nonproblem
Notably, the bottom of the scale of probabilities assigned by Sandberg at al. for the probability of a life-forming event on a given planet is 1 in 10^200. The top of the scale is 1 (meaning, life forms on every habitable “planet”). That’s about as wide open an error margin as you can assign here! Both are surely false. As in, their top is way too probable; their bottom, way too improbable. Which well encompasses the full range of our uncertainty.
Their top margin reflects current scientific hopes. The quest for extraterrestrial life in our solar system, involving actual funded missions to Mars (and there’s talk of hope for finding life on Titan, Europa, and elsewhere), presumes this frequency is indeed fairly near 1—such that on every moon-or-planet it could have happened, we might expect to find life at least got started even if it didn’t last. Their bottom is based on the random assembly of a folded protein in modern biology: the number of times per roughly 14 billion years that we would see “the folding of a moderate-size protein” anywhere in the universe without the biological mechanisms we know now accomplish this, i.e. for this to occur just “at random,” and presumably thereby produce a self-replicating prion, on which evolution by natural selection then operates. That’s as absurdly low a probability as abiogenesis could ever have.
All actual peer reviewed theories of self-replicator assembly are nowhere near that random, nor require self-replicators of such complexity as a “moderate-size protein.” They involve known and documented processes that order that assembly, from the spontaneous assembly of self-replicating RNA on the surfaces of clays, to the autocatalytic assembly of PNA molecules evolving into RNA molecules evolving into DNA molecules (and thence into the protein-folding cellular machinery found everywhere on earth today). And self-replicating PNA and RNA molecules are already known, that are far simpler in construction than a “moderate-size protein” (and countless more may be possible).
Reasonable estimates place even the random assembly of the simplest known self-replicating peptide molecule at around 1 in 10^41, according to the reasonable calculation of Johnjoe McFadden, in his otherwise ridiculous Quantum Evolution (2000: 98). That peptide was first described by David Lee in “A Self-replicating Peptide,” Nature 382 (1996): 525-28. Involving just 32 amino acids, with a simpler and more variable backbone than either RNA or DNA require, this molecule is far simpler than pretty much any protein known, much less of “moderate-size.” And McFadden’s calculation is conservative, because it operates on assumptions (such as that there are only or always 20 amino acids to select from in a random assembly, and that none can be substituted for each other) that, when replaced with more accurate science, make the random assembly more probable.
I’ve written on biogenesis before. Including a peer reviewed paper for the journal Biology & Philosophy. Where I mention the Lee peptide and McFadden’s calculation; and discuss the invalid assumptions usually made by creationists in coming up with more ridiculous improbability estimates. It was creationists who popularized the very idea of calculating the improbability of the random assembly of “proteins” as somehow bearing on abiogenesis, even though proteins themselves are not replicators but the machinery produced by replicators (which are usually nucleotides, e.g. RNA and DNA, or similar molecules like PNA, which all attach amino acids to a base or backbone of some other chemical to maintain their order and structure).
The Sandberg team basically repeat that same curious assumption to build their own lower bound. But we can be charitable, as I was in Biology & Philosophy when I spoke of the creationists’ imagined “simple self-replicating proteins,” and assume they (and the creationists) mean prions, a particular kind of protein that can self-replicate, and actually could have evolved into the other molecules over time (a back-bone thus being an evolved structure rather than a spontaneously original feature). Many examples of this theory have been explored (most recently, for example, in two different articles in Medical Hypotheses, and in the Journal of Theoretical Biology, Virus Research, and the Journal of Biological Chemistry). This had been posited even as far back as 1969: volume 3 of Mammalian Protein Metabolism presents a table showing a possible scheme of molecular evolution into life (p. 8), reproduced above-right.
That probability of 1 in 10^41 is only for one self-replicating molecule to arise at random that we know for sure exists. As there are countless others (in all three domains, of prions, PNA, and RNA), the probability of any one of them arising by chance is vastly higher than 1 in 10^41. Just as the probability that a lottery will be won by someone is always much higher than the probability that a specific person will win that lottery. And yet if we took even those total odds as just 1 in 10^41, the observable universe is so large and old that even creationist mathematician William Dembski admits at least one event will occur in it by pure chance that has a probability of 1 in 10^150 (No Free Lunch, p. 22). And remember, that’s just for the visible cosmos, which is a tiny fraction of our universe. But even for the visible universe, that means on average we could expect up to 10^109 self-replicating molecules have been spontaneously created! Probably far fewer, as those chances may have gone to making other improbable things; but the fact remains: so many things of such improbability is a certainty just on chance alone. That’s how huge and old the universe is—that even an event with odds of 1 in 10^41 could have happened billions of trillions of gazillions of times by now, purely by chance.
Which means it cannot be argued that the spontaneous origin of life was too improbable to occur without intelligent intervention. It was, rather, so likely that it is certain to have occurred without intelligent intervention. The Argument from Biogenesis is a corpse by now (as I already thoroughly argued in my paper for Biology & Philosophy). Only science illiteracy keeps it alive—a zombie argument, animated by ignorance.
A Doom Upon Both Houses
This still isn’t good for SETI fans. Or all those scientists who want funding to go digging around for life on Mars or other places in our solar system. Odds are, honestly, that life is so rare it won’t have arisen more than once in any given galaxy, or even once in a thousand galaxies. And even if it arises randomly several times per galaxy, the odds of it arising twice in a single solar system are, well, let’s be honest, astronomical. I do think the Sandberg analysis is too pessimistic: their lower bound of odds against abiogenesis at 1 in 10^200 is simply no longer plausible in the face of known discoveries like the Lee peptide, which sooner should fix their lower bound at 1 in 10^41. But it could still be argued that spontaneous assembly of such peptides (or whatever else) requires more than just volumes of stirred molecules under the right temperatures and whatnot. Most such molecules may die out before producing any stable evolving biosphere (thereby failing to generate “evolutionary competent life” as the Sandberg team says). So we can still grant their mininum.
Sure, also, “the right conditions” may be rarer than we think—one parameter that the current search for alien life is still useful for constraining. But as Ward and Brownlee point out, all recent science has gone the other way. Such conditions seem to be far more common than we thought, particularly as we now know life is far more resilient than we once thought. It can survive in frozen ice, scathing heat, even outer space. (Though they’re also right these conditions still aren’t conducive to evolving intelligent life.) Nevertheless, the conjunction of conditions capable of jumpstarting life at random (such as randomly assembling a self-replicating peptide or nucleotide), combined with the odds against that needed assembly (e.g. even the Lee peptide is a remarkably improbable chemical outcome), ensure that it is astronomically unlikely life would arise on two planets or moons in the same system. Or indeed even in nearby systems.
Which actually disproves the existence of God.
Oh yes. Because God would not make a universe so vastly devoid of life—unless we posit quite an improbable reason for him to do so. Whereas if we got here without any god, we can expect to near 100% certainty that when we look, we will observe a vastly large and old universe almost entirely lethal to life. I’ve summarized this point before. And I articulate it in detail in my chapter on the design argument in The End of Christianity, concluding:
This universe is 99.99999 percent composed of lethal radiation-filled vacuum, and 99.99999 percent of all the material in the universe comprises stars and black holes on which nothing can ever live, and 99.99999 percent of all other material in the universe (all planets, moons, clouds, asteroids) is barren of life or even outright inhospitable to life. In other words, the universe we observe is extraordinarily inhospitable to life. Even what tiny inconsequential bits of it are at all hospitable are extremely inefficient at producing life—at all, but far more so intelligent life ….
One way or another, a universe perfectly designed for life would easily, readily, and abundantly produce and sustain life. Most of the contents of that universe would be conducive to life or benefit life. Yet that’s not what we see. Instead, almost the entire universe is lethal to life—in fact, if we put all the lethal vacuum of outer space swamped with deadly radiation into an area the size of a house, you would never find the comparably microscopic speck of area that sustains life (it would literally be smaller than a single proton). It’s exceedingly difficult to imagine a universe less conducive to life than that—indeed, that’s about as close to being completely incapable of producing life as any random universe can be expected to be, other than of course being completely incapable of producing life. (TEC, pp. 295-96)
[And yet…]
That is exactly what we would have to see if life arose by accident. Because life can arise by accident only in a universe that large and old. The fact that we observe exactly what the theory of accidental origin requires and predicts is evidence that our theory is correct. (TEC, p. 290)
Add to that the fact that if life started without any god’s planning or involvement, we would have to have arisen as tiny monomolecular machines, which took ages to evolve into single cells, which took ages more to evolve into cooperating bodies of cells. If atheism is true, we can predict with near 100% certainty we would be based on something like a molecular computer (such as DNA). We cannot predict that from any plausible model of God, who would have no need of such messy and pointless machinery. If atheism is true, we can predict with near 100% certainty we would be colonies of single-celled organisms, who learned to cooperate that way only after billions of years of randomly sampling the possibilities. We cannot predict that from any plausible model of God, who would have no need of making us out of cells, much less of taking billions of years to figure out how to do it.
In short, the evidence points to life having nothing to do with God. Because it looks nothing at all like what anyone who had the knowledge and powers of a god would do. It looks exactly like the only way it could look if there were no God. And it is a strange God indeed who deliberately makes the universe look exactly like a universe would look with no God in it. Either he did that on purpose (and thus is the most cosmic of liars who definitely doesn’t want you to believe he exists), or the weirdest sci-fi shit must have improbably happened that overpowered God and destroyed all his options except peculiarly the one single option that makes it look like he doesn’t exist.
What are the odds against that? Pretty tall, my friend.
Update: One thing that could be said about the “going dark” thesis is that technically it is already accounted for in the Drake Equation, or could be, in the last term of the equation, L. As long as we treat L not as the lifetime of the civilization itself, but how many years a civilization radiates significantly in the EM before “going dark.” With that interpretation, excluded civs in N are not just dead and coming civs, but also dark civs (which upon going dark would radiate no differently than any other random objects in space).
The CMB is in much debate and would be interested in your view of flat versus otherwise – a Beach Ball with a surface of 3 mm x 1 meter expanded in XYZ until the surface appears flat and thickness of the surface exceeds by multiples of the visible universe – is that a model being considered?
I only follow mainstream cosmological models. All of which are nearly or actually flat, and entail an actual universe orders of magnitude larger than is visible.
When cosmologists change their consensus on that, let me know and I’ll see if it affects anything I conclude.
Update: A specialist observed it’s probably not true that a signal could be seen at any distance with a sensitive enough instrument. Once it fades below background (owing to what’s called the Cramér-Rao bound), it may be lost. So I have rewritten a sentence where I said otherwise to instead say “it is quantum mechanically inevitable that an instrument sensitive enough will always pick up any signal (up to certain limits); so detection is simply a function of instrument sensitivity (or being too far away).”
Update: After a fascinating conversation and running some math with an astrophysicist, I have to report that barring unforeseeable technologies, computing a simverse would probably require the generation of waste heat on a stellar scale, rendering it impossible to go dark (you can noodle around with this example to see perhaps why). Which is why Kardashev civilizations might be more likely (and would always be observable, if we know what to look for). So that would be an argument against the “gone dark” hypothesis.
However, there are many counter-considerations. Aliens might be sleeping for that very reason; or computing in an advanced civilization might not be so energy inefficient; indeed, quantum computing could massively reduce the waste heat cost per computation; and making all needed machinery out of microscopic graphene is vastly more efficient; etc.
There are other possibilities: we might even be seeing ultra-civilizations’ waste heat, in the form of dark energy (which we have yet to identify the cause of, or why it seems to appear in our universe’s history only around when ultracivilizations would be accumulating); or seeing the civilizations themselves, in the form of dark matter, which might process forms of energy that don’t interact with normal matter (thus explaining why we observe dark matter to be non-interactive apart from gravity); or any number of possibilities of a similar kind.
[All updates here have been folded into the comment above.]
I think this needs to be taken very seriously. I would prefer you to be wrong, but you are very probably right. I can’t cherry pick. When the weekend comes, I’ll have to go over this very carefully. Presuming I am competent to draw my own >>valid<< conclusion, I think the writing is clear enough for me to do so. But it is quite worrying, for someone like me who has taken part in SETI and who occasionally writes SF. 🙂
It’s not clear to me that the ratio of time for the emergence of intelligence (from the origin of multicellular life) to the lifetime of the earth is the frequency/probability of the emergence of intelligence.
There seems to be an implicit idea that the eukaryotic cell isn’t every bit as complex biochemically as any human brain is physiologically. I’m skeptical of that.. Isn’t it possible the better way to estimate this probability is to compare the number of intelligent species to the number of species deemed not to be intelligent in the sense we mean here?
And, shouldn’t we also multiply the number of species by the temporal span of the species? After all, what we are trying to estimate really is the adaptive value of intelligence. If intelligence is highly adaptive, it’s probability is a result of natural selection. Natural selection is why we think the passage of time would lead to intelligence. The thing is, natural selection is not the only force at work in the history of life. It is easy to lapse into thinking we are the goal. But in reality we may be an accidental confluence of natural selection, random genetic drift and maybe even rarer phenomena, such as group selection or hybridization.
My impression is, from that perspective, the emergence of intelligence is fairly rare. Cephalization isn’t, but seems to be more strongly correlated with longevity. Further, the question also is whether we limit intelligence to something like people or chimpanzees. Dolphins and octopuses are pretty intelligent but they’ll never be technological, and wouldn’t count for the Fermi paradox. Not going dark, but never lighting up? At any rate, I’m not sure that the odds of us being the only observable civilization in the known universe aren’t higher than 38%.
There is a humorous take on the question of why God would create such a vast universe: Humans having rejected God, disobeying Him in Eden, do not get to talk to God. Nor do they get to read God’s Word written in miracles in creation. All of the world we see is seemingly the outcome of natural processes, seemingly impersonal. Providence is as hidden as God’s face. Thus, to ensure the emergence of human beings despite the literally astronomical odds against abiologenesis, God creates such an enormous universe, that the emergence of man is inevitable. All those stars are the equivalent of enough monkeys and typewriters and paper to produce the collected works of Shakespeare. The universe isn’t a bit bigger than it needs to be, to hide God’s handiwork.
On the factual question: Those considerations are all included in their math. For example, duration of survival of an intelligent species is already accounted for in the estimated rate at which they evolve into civilizations. That is, our estimate of the latter, is based in part on our estimate of the former. And these have realistic boundary conditions. Which are accounted for here.
On the theological question: heed Captain Kirk, “What need does God have of a starship?” A god doesn’t need that weirdly elaborate Rube Goldbergesque contraption to get life. He’d just make life. Whereas the only way life could be observing itself now without a God, is if this is how it happened. Thus, the universe looks exactly like it would have to look if there was no God. For God to choose that weirdly specific way of making us, entails his intention was to deceive us into thinking he didn’t exist and wasn’t responsible for life, or that some bizarre sci if superforce overpowered and chained God up so thoroughly all of God’s options were taken away from him and the only way he could do it is bizarrely in that one peculiarly suspicious way. Neither scenario is remotely plausible (they have extremely low prior probabilities); and certainly there is no evidence for either. So why would you believe a thing that’s bizarrely improbable and not in evidence? Your motivation has to be something other than facts or logic.
The motivation was to be mildly humorous, and mildly provocative, just like Captain Kirk’s line. The idea that the enormous universe exists so that no one can know for a fact that the mere existence of life was a miracle, no matter how improbable, is a variation on the claim fossils were deceits. (In some version created by the Devil?) The interesting prior probability in either case was the idea God is a tricky devil.
Recommendation:
There’s an excellent scifi trilogy by a Chinese writer, Cixin Liu: https://www.amazon.ca/Remembrance-Earths-Past-Three-Body-Trilogy-ebook/dp/B01N198VU5/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&qid=1532216035&sr=8-5&keywords=liu+cixin
It actually goes into a lot of this stuff, and it’s a lot of fun.
Richard Martin
Colonization supposes that space travel for being (assuming biological) is possible – this isn’t actually presently known. Human lifespans are far too short to travel even our galaxy. Space radiation poses significant and possibly insurmountable problems for biology.
If (assuming) space actually isn’t colonizable – that means we cannot expect “many” possible Em-signals, except from those very few who manage to reach this level of technology.
The outcome of a super-advanced civilization isn’t “unstoppable” – it’s actually unlikely. Our own civilization is facing environmental collapse (worsening daily), resource depletion, and even the possibility of pandemics, etc., that would prohibit our advancement.
For the one civilization that we actually do know about, our chances of future survival are lessening, even at this level of technological advancement. Using this as an example, what does that mean for other alien civilizations? Can we assume they face the same ecological and/or biological restrictions? Certainly so (resources are finite, biology isn’t immune to toxicity, pollution, depletion).
Our EROI advancement isn’t guaranteed either. Not even. All forms of energy (except photosynthesis) are products of fossil fuels (even nuclear, solar, wind, hydro, wave, etc., it takes fossil fuels to create, build, maintain, repair, transport these other energy sources) and when / if we run out of oil, we’re done building, maintaining or transporting what we still have in short order, we’ll have a very difficult time even surviving.
This Earthly example of energy isn’t a fair representation either – other planets may have far fewer or lesser energy sources then Earth once did. But we are using up our alottment very quickly. Civilization will not advance further without it.
Just using the above bottlenecks – if space travel really isn’t solvable for the vast distances, planetary / environmental / civil / asteroid / biology collapse is more likely then not, limited convertable energy sources are also more then likely then not – if even just one of these is true, we have a far less likelihood there being very many advanced civilizations that may or may not still be “detectable”.
Moreover, Jevons Paradox indicates that technological advances may improve efficiencies, but they also mean that any savings realized are swiftly used up, negating the alleged efficiency claims. Civilizations are not laboratories where any gains can be careful designed for and managed. They’re ugly biological garbage heaps where predatory practices rule (even among humans).
We also can’t save ourselves with technology. Technology is one of the root causes of environmental destruction – the more we embrace it, the worse things environmentally are. It could be that in our quest to leap to the stars (or wherever), we send our planet into a biological / environmental catastrophe. We’re well on our way there now. We cannot assume that this isn’t also true for alien civilizations.
There isn’t any evidence to support that we will survive a million years from now, or create a utopian world. We’re too predatory most likely for any of that to happen.
I can’t help but wonder how often does the assumed math (probabilities) actually deceive us? Have we consider all the variables? How did we reduce human nature down to a mathematical value? What about alien natures – how did we do that, lacking any observable or verifiable evidence?
Fortunately, science is often wrong – and is willing to correct itself. There’s no need to assume at this point that these conclusions are correct. It’s just as likely, they’re wrong and we’re all alone. And if we’re not, they either already died out or smartened up and stayed quiet.
It’s actually a lot harder to kill a civilization than your arguments assume. Given millions of years, space colonization capability is statistically inevitable. No matter how many apocalypses and dark ages occur from such things as environmental mismanagement. And no matter what the lifespan difficulty may be. Not only because life extension is an inevitable tech and therefore “biological lifespan” not even relevant here (e.g. we are not talking about current tech, but tech a million years from now), but also because, even if some bizarre physical law existed that made life extension impossible, multigenerational arc ships are a tech we could build even now. Much more so when our tech is millions of years more advanced.
So, no. These are not relevant considerations to the math here.
There is a 100% chance that we are the only rational animals in the universe. How you managed to find God to be ridiculous idea but aliens like in Star Trek a serious idea baffles me.
Only someone who was science illiterate would think life arising by chemical accident on a planet somewhere in the universe and evolving by natural selection into a spacefaring race is “ridiculous.” And if it’s not ridiculous for us, it isn’t for anyone else either. It’s merely a question of how often it happens. By contrast, a wildly-convenient-yet-never-evident, disembodied superghost, is ridiculous by every definition of the term.
Richard, you said:
To get more specific, would you say that the latter one (“10 followed 23 zeroes”) is more likely, or that it is MUCH more likely? Perhaps it could be described like, “I’m leaning towards this being true” vs. “I’m extremely confident that this is true”.
Because a universe that big would offer a great deal of possibilities for extra terrestrial life, I’d think. Almost as if it would be hard to deny that at least one other advanced alien civilization really is out there at the present time.
I don’t know what you mean. More likely than what? And why do you think my article says anything other than “[it’s] hard to deny that at least one other advanced alien civilization really is out there at the present time”? That’s literally my article’s entire thesis. So I fail to understand what your question is.
Perhaps you missed the sentence immediately after the one you quote: “So the probability of there being other civilizations like ours does start to approach 100% once you start counting regions of the cosmos beyond our visible horizon.” I then articulate my thesis in that paragraph: “even counting just the observable universe it’s close to that.” That’s called an argument a fortiori: even if the universe is much smaller than we are certain it is, the conclusion follows; therefore the conclusion follows with even more certainty when you adjust the premises to actuality.
If all you want to know is the relative order of probabilities for larger-than-observable universes, all physicists will tell you the lower assessment, as a minimum, is known with effectively 100% certainty (the laws of physics entail the actual universe is hundreds of times larger than the observable part of it), while the higher assessment is known with near 100% certainty. Most physicists are fairly certain Inflation Theory is true. I’ll bet most would put the odds of that at or above 95%; and if it’s true, then the universe is dozens of orders of magnitude larger still.
So the order of probability is:
And yet even on assumption one (“the radius of the universe is only just over ten billion lightyears”) the conclusion follows. It therefore follows with even more force when the most probable sizes of the universe are calculated in. I therefore don’t “need” to believe those larger estimates. They just happen to be quite likely true. Hence why I mention them.