Christian historian Dr. Wallace Marshall and I are debating whether or not enough evidence points to the existence of a god. For background and format, and Dr. Wallace’s opening statement, see entry one. For subsequent entries, see index.
That the Evidence Points to Atheism (II)
by Richard Carrier, Ph.D.
Dr. Marshall now focuses on the KCA: originally presented here; I responded here; with his follow-up here.
The Problem
Marshall claims his premises are more probably true than not. But he did not respond to my demonstrations to the contrary. To save space, please refer to what I already said and cited in support of these points:
- Time cannot logically have a cause. Causes are by definition located in time. Therefore Marshall’s proposed cause is logically impossible.
- A cause cannot exist nowhere and still exist; nor can a cause exist at no time and still exist. Therefore Marshall’s proposed cause is logically impossible.
- Evidence our universe began is not evidence time began. Marshall confuses these.
- Causal laws cannot exist in the absence of a structural cause of such laws; ergo it’s logically impossible for such a structure to itself require a cause. Therefore, Marshall’s claim that all existence must have a cause is false; only after something exists, can it manifest and thus obey causal laws.
- A disembodied mind is the least likely cause of anything, being (1) scientifically implausible, unprecedented, and nowhere in evidence; it’s even contradicted by evidence (enumerated in my prior reply); and being (2) far more complex than scientifically plausible causes that are far simpler in content. Therefore, the latter are more probable.
Without any rebuttal to these points, Marshall’s argument fails.
Nothing as Cause
Neither Hume, Slezack, or Marshall gave any valid reasons justifying their assertions that only nothing can come from nothing. By contrast, I’ve demonstrated it’s logically necessarily the case that if there was ever any logically possible nothing-state (call it a “minimum state”), it would not be governed by causal laws, as when there is nothing, there are by definition also no laws governing what will happen to it.
As I also show, when this is the case, a virtually infinite multiverse necessarily follows as an inevitable consequence. Because “nothing,” being governed by no laws, is unstable; lawless and therefore random.
A lawless “minimum state” at an empty zero point of spacetime is vastly simpler a cause than a disembodied supermind; it predicts more observations; and the effects follow necessarily as a consequence of the model, requiring no further postulates, unlike God, which requires postulates as to structure, abilities, and motives nowhere in evidence. This minimum-state is therefore more probable.
All of Marshall’s reasons for maintaining his principle to the contrary are just restatements of the same one: that it “is a universally verified, and never falsified, principle of experience.” But that is experience within a structured universe subject to causal laws (the very reason why we don’t see spontaneous creation anymore and adopting the principle to explain things within our universe is so fruitful); therefore this observation does not apply to states lacking such structure. His evidence is thus invalid.
A Quantum Vacuum As Cause
Marshall argues the first cause “cannot be a prior or early (quantum) state of the universe, because the above philosophical arguments would apply.” But those arguments only related to past eternal models. The quantum vacuum theory is a past finite model. Marshall presented no arguments against it. In fact all Marshall’s cited authorities agree it’s viable (including Vilenkin). [1] As it posits far fewer, and all far simpler, initial conditions than any god theory requires, it’s far more probable.
A Past Eternal Existence
Marshall misquotes Krauss and Hawking; he mistakes their statements about the visible universe as about states prior; they actually say the opposite of what Marshall claims. In Marshall’s own linked examples, Krauss explains why Vilenkin is wrong, and answers “No” to Craig’s question whether the only viable cosmological models today are past finite. [2] Even the Hartle-Hawking model lacks a beginning: it is loop eternal. [3] Marshall also misquotes Guth; mistaking something Guth said about one model, as about all models; e.g., the Guth-Carroll model is bi-eternal. [4]
But more importantly, Marshall falsely claims “none of [the currently viable cosmological] models has been successfully extended to past eternity.” Many do. Such as the Ali-Das model [5] and the Wetterich model. [6]
All arguments (such as by Vilenkin) that a sequence of universes must be past finite actually entail the existence of nearly infinite universes and thus are multiverse theories, as demonstrated by Leonard Susskind; Vilenkin agrees. [7] (Refuting Dr. Marshall’s Fine Tuning argument.) They also all depend on an assumption not in evidence: that the laws of physics would remain constant between transitions (we have good reason to believe they don’t); and they all ignore a basic principle of probability theory: that as events approach infinity, all probabilities approach 1.
It is a known fact that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is only probabilistically true: given time, a Boltzmann event (a massive reduction in entropy) will inevitably occur—resetting the entropy state, refuting Vilenkin’s claim this is impossible (Vilenkin never addresses this). [8] This is also inevitable as a consequence of quantum mechanics: the quantum probability of a spontaneous Big Bang event regardless of entropy state is minute but not zero; and since all nonzero probabilities approach 100% over time, an infinite series of quantum Big Bangs is logically unavoidable by any argument Vilenkin can deploy. [9]
Marshall is also wrong about mathematics. Silverman only said infinities “need not exist in reality,” not that they cannot; that infinity is not called a real number (it is not a member of the set of reals) does not mean infinite sets do not exist. And because the existence of infinite sets does not depend on anyone’s ability to count them, Marshall’s argument from counting is invalid. Marshall also incorrectly says “mathematicians have long understood that you run into all kinds of contradictions if you try to suppose the actual existence of an infinite number of things.” False. Hilbert failed to demonstrate his paradoxes entailed contradictions; and Bertrand Russell had already demonstrated such conclusions invalid.
Hence most mathematicians no longer support Hilbert’s conclusion. Even Marshall’s own cited source repudiates it. [10] As Bertrand Russell explains, “the similarity of whole and part could be proved to be impossible for every finite whole,” but “for infinite wholes, where the impossibility could not be proved, there was in fact no such impossibility.” After providing the requisite proofs, Russell concludes that the usual “objections to infinite numbers, and classes, and series, and the notion that the infinite as such is self-contradictory, may thus be dismissed as groundless.” [11]
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Such is my second reply.
Continue on to Dr. Marshall’s response here.
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Endnotes
[1] See the interview with Alex Vilenkin in “Before the Big Bang 9: A Multiverse from Nothing?” (particularly timestamps 8:21ff. and 15:04ff.).
[2] Look at the exchange between Craig and Krauss at timestamp 55:50.
[3] Read Hawking’s paper in its entirety.
[4] See the interview with Alan Guth in “Before the Big Bang 4: Eternal Inflation & The Multiverse,” timestamp 34:28; and Lee Billings, “2 Futures Can Explain Time’s Mysterious Past,” Scientific Ametican (8 December 2014).
[5] Ahmed Farag Ali and Saurya Das, “Cosmology from Quantum Potential,” Physics Letters B 741 (4 February 2015): 276–79.
[6] C. Wetterich, “Eternal Universe,” Physical Review D 90.4 (2 April 2, 2014).
[7] Leonard Susskind, “Was There a Beginning?” MIT Technology Review (27 April 2012); and see, again, the interview with Alex Vilenkin in “Before the Big Bang 9” (particularly timestamp 21:07ff.).
[8] As explained in Sean Carrol, “Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad,” to appear in the forthcoming Current Controversies in Philosophy of Science (2019). See also my discussion in The God Impossible.
[9] See Sean Carroll and Jennifer Chen, “Spontaneous Inflation and the Origin of the Arrow of Time,” ArchivX 2004, leading to Sean Carroll’s book on the subject, From Eternity to Here (2010).
[10] Indeed Hilbert’s position is refuted in the very introduction to the collection of essays Dr. Marshall cites, as co-written by the renowned mathematician and philosopher Hilary Putnam (see Philosophy of Mathematics, pp. 6-11; Hilbert’s essay therein is an old speech from 1925 included only as a foil).
[11] Current mathematical opinion: Rudy Rucker, Infinity and the Mind: The Science and Philosophy of the Infinite (1982), e.g., p. 296; N. Ya. Vilenkin, In Search of Infinity (1995), e.g., pp. 50-69; quotation and demonstrations: Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (1938), esp. § 3.23 and all of § 5 (e.g. 5.43). See also the expert commentaries cited in endnote 6 to my first reply in the Carrier-Wanchick debate, and the reference entries: “Is there really such a thing as infinity?” from the University of Toronto Mathematics Network; “Infinity” from the History of Mathematics Archive; and “The Infinite” from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and “Continuity and Infinitesimals” from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
I like the concept of an “empty space time point”. One can imagine that as a simple and plausible point mathematically. Of course we can discuss what goes forward from this:
Going forward in time, that is adding time to an empty space time point, causes a “Big Bang” and an increasingly expanding universe that will collapse on itself.
Looking backwards from the empty point, one has moved across a boundary where there is no recognizable “space” of similar dimensions as found in our known universe. We don’t need to understand, yet what occurred before the simple empty space time point. Rather the existence of such a point is mathematically more conceivable than the conjuring up, (in a realm of nothingness, a sentient all powerful “being”, namely a “God” who decides to command into existence, a universe with billions of galaxies and then, after billions of years waiting, and then millions of years, (just watching passively with arms folded), as his prime invention, the human being, suffers murder, rape, wars, torture before he, (I.e., “God”), reveals himself to one man, Abraham, from Ur of the Chaldeans, in the Iron Age, to instruct him that man must praise his creator and plead for mercy, even while the cruelty that the Deity invented persists as part of man’s built in God-provided nature. Worse, when this doesn’t turn out, folk can get forgiveness by worshipping a temporary mortal “Son of God”, and prevent eternal torture and suffering even after death!
Such a complex cruel sick alternative to an empty point in space time is hardly plausible by any stretch of the imagination of a rational person with a minimum quantum of empathy and adulthood!
Re: mathematics. The question is whether the infinity used in set theory can be transposed into the real world. If the same number of guests in Hilbert’s Hotel check out in two different scenarios, and yet one does not arrive at identical results, doesn’t this suggest something problematic with an actual infinite in the real world?
Nope. The problem only arises because you are operating from assumptions about how a finite hotel would operate. When we actually jump into another universe with infinite hotels, it actually does operate just as Hilbert concludes! That that is “weird” is simply because infinite hotels are weird. No law of logic is violated by their operating that way; which means, a coherent model exists. And if it exists on paper, it can exist in reality (merely by one-to-one correspondence of fictional element to actual element).
This was formally proved by Bertrand Russell (op. cit.).
Accordingly, most cosmological models today involve actual (real) infinite systems of physical things (e.g. infinite spaces, infinite masses) including infinite timelines. On B-Theory, which is the mainstream consensus in physics now, all time exists simultaneously; there is therefore no such distinction between a potential and actual infinite future; indeed, Einstein’s theory of Relativity entails this: if there can be a potentially infinite future there already is an actually infinite future. It is merely a matter of what reference frame you are in (cf. here).
And if there can be an actual infinite future, there can be an actual infinite past. Particularly since the distinction between future and past in B-Theory is itself ontologically relative (e.g. Guth’s bi-temporal cosmological model, which has infinite timelines in both directions, and which is past or future is simply relative to where you are in the system).
Dr Carrier, you state “jump to another universe with an infinite number of hotels”. Where in that universe would you find room to put an “actual” infinite quantity of hotels?
Next, I often hear comments that you can’t get causes in a timeless state. I think the phrase “timeless God” is often misunderstood. God would be timeless with respect to this universe. The way I understand God’s existence is in some sort of omnitemporality, if there is such a word (well there is now) from which our universe sprang or was created. If you could imagine an omnitemporal plane from which many time states/universes could come this may help to explain a universe with a time dimension that has an actual beginning. Hugh Ross’s book “Beyond the Cosmos” would help to get your head around that idea. Do I have proof of this omnitemporal plane? Nope.
But, often, difficult to detect realities (like the cosmic background radiation) start with ideas that might seem rediculous to others. Skeptics constantly ask “what was God doing for the billions of yrs before humans arrived?”. If there is a God that exists in an omnitemporal state then He wouldn’t perceive billions of yrs as a problem. Anyway, this could show that (your item #1) time COULD logically have a cause. Skeptics often conceptualize God “with His arms folded”. That would make God a spacially limited being. When we say God is immaterial we just mean that He is not made up of the “stuff” of this universe. Not as some space ghost floating around somewhere. That again would make Him a spacially limited being. I don’t see God as a spacially limited being. I can’t help it if others do. I’ll stop here for now.
Most cosmological theories today already conclude our universe is infinite in size. Infinitely large spaces are not a problem in cosmology. Because cosmologists are real mathematicians; not just pretending to be to market a religion.
If you now have to invent an omnitemporal plane to make god work, you just admitted spacetime can exist without being caused, much less by God. And if that’s so, why do we need a god to cause ours? If God can have one that’s uncaused, so can we.
The same follows if God is made of stuff. It doesn’t help to say “but it’s not our stuff, it’s special other stuff.” You still have to explain why that other stuff exists and how it came to be assembled into your proposed god. Or else admit nothing is needed to cause stuff to exist and assemble; which gets us back to not needing the god.
P.S. I should also note, that there is no such thing as a “number” of rooms in Hilbert’s hotel in the sense you think. Infinity is not a number in a commonplace sense, i.e. there is no point on a number line labeled “infinity,” hence no room with the number “infinity” written on its door. (And indeed there are multiple infinities, each larger than the next: this is called cardinality.)
So part of your confusion is mistakenly acting like there even is “a number” of rooms in that model in that sense; as if you can get to “the last” room, “room infinity.” No such thing exists. Thus once you get past that mistake, you might start to realize what I’m talking about. We aren’t shuffling around “numbers” of things in Hilbert’s hotel. The room quantity is infinite. That’s a fundamentally different thing than a finite quantity. It consequently behaves entirely differently. Your intuitions will thus fail you, because your intuitions were built to deal with finite systems; like most realities, infinite systems are counter-intuitive.
But they aren’t incoherent.
One problem I’ve noticed with the Fine Tuning Argument is that I’ve never seen it demonstrated that the parameters mentioned could have any value other than that which they currently have. Until it can be shown that they parameters could be different, that they have a possible range, and that the range of life permitting values falls in a narrow band on that range, then even the name of the argument seems to be question begging as we know neither that the universe could be tuned nor that its tuning is fine.
That is indeed an unknown, and worth noting it’s unknown, but most physicists deem it unlikely they can’t have other parameters. And it would itself be an extremely weird coincidence that those extremely weird values were the only ones possible.
In some cases we already know they are invariable, e.g. the Gravitational constant is actually just a unit converter; it doesn’t actually exist (when you put length and time into Planck units, which are the smallest meaningful units, G vanishes from all equations). But in others we’re not sure why they would be, e.g. alpha (which essentially defines the relative strength of the em and gravitational forces), which is unitless, and its size inexplicable at present—though being unitless, one can rightly suspect it is a necessary consequence of geometry in some fashion, that geometry is what is variable.
And that gets us to the big question: are all fundamental constants really just the consequences of the number of available dimensions? That is the case on String theory. But then, we have to explain why we have only the ones we have and not others, e.g. why aren’t there infinite dimensions of open space, but only three? Why would there be only only seven compacted spatial dimensions (as String theory shows entails the constants as we have them) and not eight or fifteen or eighteen gazillion? And so on.
I think you are right to question the assumption that all these constants are even variable. But there clearly has to be something weird going on to explain the Standard Model and our universe’s peculiar dimensionality; it’s very unlikely to be the only logically possible universe constructable (although that would solve a lot of problems for theology…it would get God off a lot of hooks!).
We can just say, for the forward travel in time from the easily imagined “zero point of space-time” to “our” Big Bang, we got the kind of universe we have.
Other points in space-time might “Big-Bang” differently. We could conjecture, but how many and what kinds have no bearing on sheer farce of theists conjuring up, as a grand benevolent designer of the Universe and all life, a complex and incredible narcissistic sentient God, (who functions even in nothingness), to order into “being” an entire universe and system of life with massive cruelty and suffering and then demands of his creation, man, praise and threatens eternal suffering, but ignores the cries of most lifeforms!
Please entertain amateur’s question. I just reread your first reply and was struck, on second reading, by this paragraph:
“(It’s also not correct that “if premises 1 and 2 are more plausibly true than not, the conclusion follows necessarily.” I shall assume Marshall must have meant: if the conjunction of premises 1 and 2 are more probable than not, then so is statement 3.)”
Is the likelihood of any four part statement being correct reduced by the conjunction of the four parts? If you rank each statement in the KCA as having a only 50/50 probability( I think that’s being charitable), would that not be .5 X .5 X .5 X .5 = only 6.25 percent probable on the best case? If any part had a greater than 50/50 probability wouldn’t it be better to just stop the argument there and not list more steps, which will only drag the final probability down?
Note, I did not address that question. Whether it is or not can vary. So all we can ask is what the total probability of that conjunction is. Hence, Marshall has to argue for the probability of their conjunction (whatever result that ends up with). Only that probability commutes to become the conclusion’s probability (since the probability of the conjunction of a deductive conclusion and its premises is by definition 100%; that’s actually what deductive logic is about).
In general, note that “dependent probability” is not the same as “independent probability.” The math you suggest holds for independent probabilities (variables whose truth or falsity has no effect on the truth or falsity of other variables). But sometimes premises are dependent variables (e.g. the truth of one premise can itself affect the probability of the other premise). The relationship of conclusion to premises in a formally deductive argument is an extreme example: where the dependent probability of a conclusion given the premises is a full 100%.
Ah, thanks for the clarification. I see the difference now.
Dr Carrier says: ” Marshall’s claim that all existence must have a cause is false”
To me it’s seems logical that everything must have a cause and I don’t mean God. It’s hard to wrap your head around ‘from nothing comes something’ without a cause. What would cause a fluctuation? But then if something caused a fluctuation that’s means something existed prior to the fluctuation. So we’re back at the beginning “where did the cause come from?” So logically everything had to spring from nothing.
Alas, it is not a logically necessary fact that every conceivable thing must have a cause. We intuit that, but our intuitions evolved and were trained in a causal system, misleading us when we try to apply those intuitions outside the systems they were trained in. Our intuitions have no skill with things outside such systems; so we cannot trust conclusions based on what “seems right” to us. So conclusions we infer about causal systems, will not hold for other systems.
As to the rest of your reasoning, maybe. There are a lot of ins and outs to consider. The possibilities are not quite so simple or clear.
“A cause cannot exist nowhere and still exist.”
I am very sympathetic to this principle, but I have some reservations. For example, on the B-Theory of time the the block universe is not situated in a spatial context; rather, it provides the spatial context. So the universe is not “in” space, and therefore is not located “anywhere. So there is no “place” where it exists. Does this mean there can be spaceless entities? Ehh, I don’t think so because the universe is still spatial even if it’s not in space.
Furthermore, this still wouldn’t refute your principle that causes must be in space, because the block universe itself, even if nonspatial, is not itself a cause. Rather, it provides the context in which causes must take place (i.e., space).
So I think you’re right ultimately. When it comes to time, it seems self evident that time is a prerequisite for causation, but I can’t quite put my finger on why I’m less sure about space.
The universe is the space. It’s location is everywhere: it exists at all points of space (and does not exist anywhere else). That is the opposite of existing nowhere.
One does not need to propose an endless pile of turtles here. Once a place exists for something to exist, a place exists for something to exist. We do not need to posit a place for the place to exist.
A place to exist does not need another place to exist. It is the foundation of placement itself. That’s why spacetime does all the work Christians want god to do. See upthread. We already covered this. The universe does not need an extra place to exist. It is the place it exists. The universe exists at all points of time and space that exist; it does not exist elsewhere. It could not exist elsewhere.
The block universe is spatial. It is a block of space. And of time. Causation is linear within that spacetime. That’s what makes causation possible. Nothing could exist outside a block universe to cause it to exist. Therefore it is an example of a thing that requires no cause and probably has none. Even assuming it has a beginning (that it has limits, rather than being an infinite block). Which is also not established by any known evidence.
Thus the Christian argument can’t even get started. It requires things to be the case that cannot be the case; and things that are not at all known to be the case.
Thank you for this entry. I appreciate the way that you engage directly with the opposing arguments, and I hope your colleague will follow suit. I also think that I understand your reasoning better: When you assess the probability of a theory, you always do so in relation to a competing theory that is set alongside it in comparison. That was not clear to me before I looked at some of your other materials, but now that I have, I acknowledge that your method makes sense.
However, some of your objections are not probabilistic but logical, and I would like to pose a challenge on that front. You say: “A cause cannot exist nowhere and still exist; nor can a cause exist at no time and still exist. Therefore Marshall’s proposed cause is logically impossible.” That is a very strong statement–“logically impossible”–and when you make this point elsewhere, you are careful not to go that far. In your debate with Wanchick, which you link in your first entry, you do not say that it is “logically impossible”–in fact you explicitly leave the possibility open–but only that we have “no reason to believe it,” a phrase you use twice: “From any intelligible definition of being, in order for anything to exist, it must exist somewhere–even if that somewhere is everywhere, or some location other than space. So God in BT must have some location other than space. But there is no place we know of except space, so we have no reason to believe any other place exists (even if one does) . Therefore, if God does not exist in any location in space, we have no reason to believe God exists. ”
Your statement to Wanchick strikes me as the sounder and more sensible formulation. The Christian view is that there is another realm of existence–immaterial and non-temporal–which is separate from our world. They do not say that god exists “nowhere” and “at no time” but rather that god exists supernaturally. You might say that there is no evidence for such a realm or such a kind of existence, and you might be right. But in that case you are charging–at most–that the Christian view is based on unevidenced assumptions, not that it is impossible logically.
It also seems to me that, with this claim, you are applying a double standard. In your own arguments, you are perfectly willing to acknowledge that the principles and features of the world we observe might not apply beyond it. For example, in your first entry, you say: “But we also don’t have any evidence that laws of causation observed to operate inside a developed universe, also operate in the absence of one.” Yet you attack the view that god is an immaterial, uncaused cause on the grounds that it is inconsistent with what we always observe to be the case inside the universe. Why isn’t that special pleading? Christians explicitly postulate a god that is outside of the natural world, a god that is exempt from all the constraints and patterns that we observe in physical reality. A god of that kind, like Aristotle’s “unmoved mover,” functions differently from everything else in nature. Such a god is outside of nature and that’s the whole point.
The same issue dogs your arguments about specified complexity, which are all based on what we observe about complexity inside the natural world. They don’t seem to apply here–to a god that is stipulated to be outside the natural world–at least not when you are making a logical case (as opposed to a probabilistic one). The Christian conception of god might be unlikely and inconsistent with what we observe in the world, but that doesn’t make it impossible or incoherent.
That isn’t true of all Christians; so I cannot assume it’s true of Dr. Marshall. He will have to present his own response; if it is that, then we proceed from there.
But note, that solution acknowledges my premise: by inventing an extra place for God to exist. That evokes quite a few problems. But I won’t devote word count explaining why until or unless Marshall tries this tactic.
Because these are different arguments: one is deductive (about what is logically possible and impossible); the other is inductive (about what is probable). In addition, one is about what is probable given what we know; and the other is about what happens if we assume certain things are true we do not know to be true. Thus, there is no inconsistency here.
Which is a hypothesis with no evidential precedent. Therefore, there is no reason to believe any such thing is true. Therefore, if there are explanations of the same fact that depend on things we do have evidential precedent for (and there are), then those explanations are always more probable. As in, their epistemic probability is always higher (and vastly so), i.e. the probability we would be correct to affirm a given explanation, given what we currently know, is far higher for precedented explanations than for totally unprecedented ones (that gremlins cause planes to crash is always less likely than other explanations of crashes; until we have actual evidence of gremlins).
This cannot be reversed by pretending things we don’t know are true are true; because we don’t know that. Thus, such things cannot be included in “what we currently know” and therefore cannot affect the probability we are correct.
This is an inevitable consequence of inductive logic.
Note this is a proposed possibility not a confirmed probability. “Possibly, therefore probably” is a fallacy (Proving History, pp. 26-29). Only evidence (precedents) can establish a probability.
By contrast, that causes are unnecessary or even illogical outside causal systems is a deductive certainty. It is not something I am arguing for “from evidence.” It is an inevitable consequence of the conceptual model proposed. It’s probability is always 100% everywhere and at all times. That is not an inductive conclusion; it’s a deductive one.
Do you see the difference?
Actually they do, as my article explains: the world you are in is not relevant; complexity is a logically necessary (i.e. plainly descriptive) feature of any system that is not simple. In other words, a God is complex by definition. It does not matter in what world he exists. This is true of a God in all possible worlds. (And an impossible thing by definition is a thing that never exists.)
So one cannot escape the complexity objection by positing God exists in some other realm. You can only escape it by re-defining God not to be complex. But that necessarily entails removing all features that distinguish the entity as a god. Just as my article explains.
In his reply to this post, Marshall states affirmatively that the cause he has in mind is outside of space and time, so I will wait for your rebuttal to see what your response is on that point.
As for the rest, it seems that I’m having difficulty registering whether the form of a given argument is inductive or deductive. The problem could be on my end—I’m not trained in philosophy—but in some cases, like the specified complexity example, I’m still not following.
Your complexity article, as I read it, makes this argument (among others): whenever we see complexity in the world, we see that it is generated by a physical mechanism. Therefore, it is logical to conclude (inductively) that complexity requires physical machinery to create and sustain it, and that, where such machinery does not exist, complexity likewise will not exist. Is that a fair summary? If it is, then so far, so sensible: you’re arguing from observations and stating conclusions in terms of likelihoods. What I don’t understand is how you get from that (inductive) argument to the (deductive) conclusion that immaterial complexity is therefore logically impossible, that is, impossible everywhere and all the time.
In other words, it seems to me that your claim is much more than merely probabilistic: you’re saying that all complexity everywhere has to be physical as a matter of logical necessity. (Please tell me if I’m misreading you). I don’t see how you get from one—what we observe to be true about complexity in our world—to the other—what has to be true of complexity always and in all worlds (some of which, I admit, are not in evidence and therefore unlikely). To me, it seems fair to object that this is question-begging. Yes, complexity in our world works this way, but that fact doesn’t compel the conclusion that complexity must always work as we currently observe it to work. A complex, primary being that exists in an immaterial realm may be unlikely, but why is such a being impossible logically (as far as your your argument about specified complexity is concerned)?
Again, just to be clear, the only thing I’m objecting to is your claims about what is logically possible or impossible. Even if you’re right about the probabilities, the Christian would have an answer for you: that one arrives at religious belief not simply through evidence and argument but through personal faith. This debate, of course, is about the evidence. But even if the religious view turns out to be less likely than the atheistic on, so long as it’s not fully disproven, there will always be room for faith. Logically impossible is another story—I don’t think one should have faith in logical impossibilities—and so I’m simply pushing back on the idea that religious model fails deductively. If it doesn’t, then the issue of faith can be saved for another debate.
Not exactly. The complexity argument does not say anything about whether structure has to be “physical” in any particular sense. Only that it has to exist: the structure must come to exist somehow, and something has to sustain its existence.
Physical materials, and knotted spacetime (which I would call physical but some people forget that matter-energy is not the only physical thing we know), are the only ways we currently know to do that. But even if there is some other way (like what?), it still has to be done. Which means you still have specified complexity you have to explain. Making it “not physical” does not escape that requirement. Even if you can think up some way to do that—I personally have yet to see any proposed that made any intelligible sense (or just wasn’t some other kind of physicality), but regardless, even succeeding at that, does not escape the argument.
So what you are seeing is a logical necessity argument (complexity entails complexity; there is no logically valid way to claim a complex thing is simple), coupled with an empirical inference (the only way we know and can even think of to sustain complexity is with some kind of physical material, whether space-time or matter-energy; or something else, although no one knows of anything else).
The latter is a probabilistic argument for naturalism. The former is a logically deductive argument against any actually believed-in supernaturalism. One can perhaps come up with some bizarre supernaturalism that contains no complex supernatural entities (and thus faces no specified complexity problem, or none any greater than naturalism), but such could not be theism, nor any worldview actually entertained by anyone in history.
On cause from “nothing”. We must emphasize that we only have overall theories for what applies to “our” universe and the theoretical gap behind the occurrence of the “Big Bang of expansion of energy and matter” following time moving forward from a theoretical empty space-time point.
On the other side of “the imaginary point”, we have no idea of the dimensionality of whatever construct or emptiness might be there. So while we are certain that an New event in “our” universe requires prior causality, (based on the rules of the structure of our universe), we cannot say that at any time before the changes that lead to our Big Big Bang (that we know about), causality exists or existed or will exist.
While based on all our experience we could still “surmise” that causality “might” very well exist in any plausible structures universe, that’s only a “conjecture” based on the only Universe we have, this to far, experienced.
But, if we leave that inquiry at thecedgevof the onset of our known universe and simply return to “The Idea of our one God merely ruling “this” Universe”, (who knows perhaps “one” is always provided as an accessory to any new Universe), then “our God”, is not empathetic to life forms, nor humanity because if, as the grand designer, he has built in to each animal cruelty, pain and suffering, shame and despair, (to coax us to venerate him), then what an arrogant monster he is from the perspective of humans, field mice and deer, available to slaughtered, tortured, starved or eaten alive at any moment? Surely that is sufficient to explode any concept of a “God, The Father”!
So, it’s not necessary to look back before the Big Bang to find evidence, or not, of God. We are absolutely certain about what is meant by “love and compassion”. Let’s merely focus on these critical claimed attributes to try to confirm the existence of a God as described by the Bible and ingrained in the Abrahamic Religions.
So must we look for the “sine qua non” essential qualities of love and compassion to validate any beings candidacy for the God of the Holy Books. Our supposed “God The Father” has none such qualities, at least in recorded history. But instead he must be indifferent to suffering which believers say is part of his “beautiful and perfect design”. That is clearly a lie and/or a delusion infected into the non -rational lacunae of our brains, where contagious memes of mythology and prejudice are guarded!
Likely as not, when early hominids trekked for new hunting grounds or pastures, the benefit of banks of fixed concepts of the world, could convey survival advantage when the particular library of “automatically-fixed-in-memory” memes, worked out well for one or more of the countless brave new adventurous communities starting out on their own. Gradually, humans with the most useful collections of fairly rigid, but somewhat elastic meme- transmitted beliefs, out-competed other groups.
However, with the development of rational argument and written texts, we have proto-religions writing down collections of mythologies and logical instructions, side by side, as in the rational “Ten Commandments” (from the code of Hammarubi or something like it), joined to a fictitious account of Hebrews invading Canaan, (to hide the fact that the Hebrews were in fact the Canaanites, but without the shameful idols and Ashera, the consort of the Canaanites Gods El and YHWH)!
Here we are now in the 21st Century and we have given ourselves authority to use our logic to evaluate to what extent “Our God” recognized by Christians as being full of love and compassion, (if he indeed exists) must be considered an evil fraud! Without any resort to “filling infinite hotel rooms”, (or leaving a note on the most infinite door), just based on the claimed characteristics of the supposed grand designer, our divine, “God The Father”, he is self-convicted of perpetual narcissism and evil and failure to take moral responsibility, as we always demand and expect from even the most humble mortal father!
Any such “Father” designing and allowing suffering and rejoicing in unwarranted praise, would hopefully be in jail for life, for crimes against humanity!
But rather than try to expose such an improbable deity, it’s far more logical to just dismiss “The concept of God’s Existence” as nonsensical.
Asher
Free will, is it an illusion? if not, how do you explain its existence? Do we live in several mutating universes from moment to moment? Why do our emotions seem to affect our free will? If predetermined biological processes determine our emotions then do we really have freewill? If there is no free will, how can we judge between right and wrong actions? If there is freewill, how did it evolve?
All answered in my book Sense and Goodness without God.
Observation #1:
You live and observe within in a white 2D world and see a small black point coming into existence gradually becoming a filled black circle and after reaching a certain size limit contracting again to a point and then it disappears.
Now, like in this discussion, suppose there are two theories which compete for the most probable explanation of this phenomenon:
Theory #1 This is done by an invisible hand painting first a black point (a very small circle) and then painting a small black circle around each preceding black circle so quickly it seems to grow continuously; When reaching the size limit the hand changes to white paint and reverses the process ending with the black point to disappear in the white canvas.
Theory #2 The 2D white observable space is part of a 3D white world in which a black ball travels thru this 2D space starting to become visible as a black point becoming a black circle and on its retreat becoming a black point again and then vanish.
Observation #2:
When we could observe the painting process to be progressive showing each circle to be build up from 0-360 degrees in a few seconds we would choose theory 1 as most probable since we can stay in our simple 2D worldview and explain it; That is we don’t need unknown more complex 3D concepts and therefore find theory 1 more probable.
Suppose we don’t have observation #2 how can we ever make a choice between theory 1 and 2?
Is this whole discussion about probability not futile since we don’t know what we don’t yet know (observations still to be made can completely disturb our conclusions)?
History shows that ever more observations are made and every time new theories are created to cope with them only to bring us in a state of less and less probable theories that compete each other.
Great post. It’s similar to examples you see in Hugh Ross’s “Beyond the Cosmos”. It’s difficult for many people to have perceptions beyond the 3D universe (4D when you factor in the dimension of time, and yes I’m aware of the 10 dimension hypothesis).
Atheist deductive logic:
Premise 1: God cannot exist if Christians differ in their explanations of His existence/Christianity etc because He is not the author of confusion.
Premise 2: Christians differ.
Therefore: God cannot exist.
See the problem there? (Premise 1 is false. Christians are often the authors of their own confusion). If yes, then stop being guilty of doing the same thing.
Premise 1: God cannot exist if I can’t think of a reason for Him permitting evil, pain and suffering (EPS) at this time.
Premise 2: I can’t think of a reason.
Therefore: God can’t exist.
I have a list of 12 reasons why God (granting He exists) could permit EPS for now. Here’s one. If my suffering, as horrible as it could be, was instrumental in my daughters’ “free” choice to embrace God’s offer for an eternal relational salvation then in eternity I’d have to admit that it was worth it. I hope that helps many of you out there.
Except that it isn’t. We already know such evils are not necessary for such ends. That’s the whole point.
It’s not just bizarre we can’t think of why all this misery and injustice is necessary (and yet indeed we should be able to by now, if there was one); it’s doubly bizarre God can’t just tell us what that reason is (by which I mean, a reason that actually checks out as correct, not a fantasy Christians invent that does not hold up in the face of reality).
I discuss this in detail and why Christian excuses simply don’t work in Why I Am Not a Christian.
Dr. Carrier wrote:
“The universe is the space. It’s location is everywhere: it exists at all points of space (and does not exist anywhere else).”
Response: Since you said “The universe” (singular) I can only assume that you meant the one and only universe that we know for sure to exist. And since you said that it exists “everywhere” then you leave no room for anything else to exist (e.g. multi-verse or perhaps an even larger universe that our known universe spawned off from).
Is that correct?
No. It would be the same if we mean multiverse. That’s just a bigger matrix of spacetime. It all exists in the spacetime it exists in. It is the spacetime. It exists nowhere else. And requires nowhere else to exist.
“A cause cannot exist nowhere and still exist”
why not where’s the proof- the sunnē muhummudun ash’arē/maturēdē creeds state that
God ixists without place – as place is a creatid entity
https://www.alamanah.nsw.edu.au/allah-exists-without-a-place/
—
U giv short shrift t muhummudun filosufrs
eg Mulla Sadr https://www.alamanah.nsw.edu.au/allah-exists-without-a-place/
Or Ibn Sēna [Avicenna]’s argumunt from cuntinjuncy:
“Since that external cause has to be outside the whole aggregate of contingent things, it cannot itself be contingent. So it is necessary. …And this, of course, is God.”
Is the probabilistic reset in entropy to reach a new big bang a necessary part of your theory? What about the following objection: the probability that a human being self-assembles via a probabilistic reset of entropy is much higher than the probability that a new big bang self-assembles in that way. According to this argument, we should find ourselves surrounded by cold space, or maybe a minimally functional solar system, rather than an excessively large big bang universe full of galaxies. At least you would have to admit that playing one solar system in reverse, against the Second Law of Thermodynamics, is much more probable than playing some trillion of solar systems in reverse to add up for the required lack of entropy of a big bang. I think William Lane Craig uses this objection to the multiverse theory. (I personally do believe in a multiverse, but not in a probabilistic reset of a big bang.)
The reset theory is just one of many godless cosmological theories that fit all current observations and knowledge (indeed, two, as there are two different reset theories, although actually they are currently inevitable facts, as certain as the existence of black holes).
On the question of Boltzmann people, see my article The God Impossible. It specifically addresses your question. In short, you did not spontaneously form in a chaotic void, so you already know you are not a Boltzmann person. The alternatives available to you on present observation are a Boltzmann universe filled with billions of spontaneously assembled people complete with billions years long fake timeline across billions of lightyears (fake fossils, fake evidence of stellar evolution, fake memories in everyone’s heads, etc.); or a Boltzmann Big Bang. The latter always has a vastly higher probability. So it will always happen gazillions of times more often.
And note, on both reset theories, there will be no solar systems by the likely time either reset occurs. Their probability is such (see the Carroll link I gave in my reply above, it gives the number for the QM version) that all macroscopic matter will almost certainly have dissolved into a random soup of bosons and fermions by then. There will be the occasional random formation of a Boltzmann star (which might evaporate some planets by usual processes), but separated by trillions of trillions of of trillions of years. Black holes will be vastly more common (even accounting for their evaporation), and it will ultimately be their random collisions that eventually produce a Big Bang in the thermodynamic reset model (which is different from the QM model, which calculates solely from quantum indeterminacy).
Craig IMO is a liar. So he never honestly represents any theory in cosmology. I wouldn’t trust a word he says. Listen to actual cosmologists first. And follow only legitimately valid and sound arguments from anyone else (which means always vet Craig’s premises; you’ll find they rarely hold up).
But yes, one needn’t count on the reset theories. There are at least six good arguments that a multiverse is more likely than a god. Reset theories only increase that differential probability further and further; especially since they are 100% guaranteed to happen, unless some as yet unknown force conveniently exists to stop them.
One of these as yet unknown forces is cosmological natural selection of self-reproducing big bang universes. Self-reproducing big bangs can be expected to be vastly more abundant than reset big bangs. Unless you believe in a multiverse in which the variability is so small that all possibilities for a self-reproduction are excluded. What is your position with respect to CNS?
You are referring to the Smolin model, which I outline in Sense and Goodness without God. It is actually not mutually exclusive to reset models; in fact, the Smolin model entails a finite past by the Guth-Vilenkin theorem, unless it is coupled with one of the new past eternal models, which it well can be; and the Smolin model entails inevitable infinite resets on current theory in addition to the black hole universe generation sequence. It thus can be past eternal on that coupling alone.
The problem with the Smolin model is that it requires a number of assumptions not yet demonstrated (e.g. that new universes form inside black holes, and that ours is such; that these new universes will vary in properties from their parent universe by some as yet undemonstrated mechanism; etc.). That’s fine; those assumptions are still far more probable than the assumptions required to maintain a god thesis. But the advantage the reset theories have is that they are 100% guaranteed to be true already on present evidence; no additional assumptions are required. At all.
(Other than the empirically based conclusion that no as-yet-undiscovered forces exist that would stop resets; but that is inherently probable as an assumption, because “conveniently assumed forces not in evidence” are always improbable, and the probability there aren’t any is the converse of that.)
In Sense and Goodness I also discuss the Linde model (chaotic inflation, e.g. “eternal inflation”), which actually is agreed by nearly all cosmologists today to be much more likely than the Smolin model, because it also requires fewer assumptions and has already made some successful predictions. It’s just harder to explain to lay people than the Smolin model; so support for the Smolin model is an argument a fortiori: it is among the least likely cosmological models today, and yet is still vastly more likely than any god hypothesis. Ergo the god hypothesis has no chance at all of competing with more probable cosmological models.
What Guth and Vilenkin showed is that on current assumptions the Linde model, like the Smolin model, is past finite, which even Linde and Smolin had proposed; but even the Guth-Vilenkin theorem entails the beginning of either modeled process is vastly far back in time (by an order of a vast number of prior universes approximating infinity, as has been demonstrated by Susskind, per my cited link). So its being past finite doesn’t really help theologians. It’s just the worse that there are also past eternal models that bypass the Guth-Vilenkin theorem (including both reset theories, but also the others I linked to).
Theory #1 “This is done by an invisible hand…”
Concerning Observation #2:
When we could observe the painting process to be progressive showing each circle to be build up from 0-360 degrees in a few seconds we would choose theory 1 as most probable since we can stay in our simple 2D worldview and explain it; That is we don’t need unknown more complex 3D concepts and therefore find theory 1 more probable.
Response: You say “we don’t need unknown more complex 3D concepts”. But one could argue that your other theory already violates that “unknown complexity” concern when right out of the gate it introduced an “invisible hand” into your 2D worldview model.
Since you offered no proof of the existence of such a thing or scientific explanation of how it (the invisible hand) would work in your 2D worldview model (or any other model) you might’ve well have just offered up…
“It’s magic”. Just to keep it “simple”.
If there is no free will, how could we not judge between right and wrong actions? What other choice would we have?
Your question is unintelligible. I think you got tangled in convoluted grammar there. But it is evident you are not aware of any actual philosophy on free will.
I have directed you to a survey answering your questions: my section on free will in my book Sense and Goodness without God. Or take my online course on the science and philosophy of free will next time it’s offered; you can subscribe to my blog, or Facebook or Twitter feeds, or the Secular Academy email list to receive notices of upcoming courses. You can ask these and all other questions you have in that course and get detailed answers and then even follow up with more questions as they come to you etc.
Smolin does not understand the consequences of a really plenitudinous multiverse, in which CNS is inevitably the prevailing cosmological principle. In such a model, every universe arises in a universe that is greater in age, size, complexity, diversity and computational strength. There is no entropy catastrophe, because the plenitudinous multiverse has always been an open system, and will always be. There is no problem of a beginning either. Maybe this view is compatible with your inevitable reset, because the birth of a new universe can be considered to be a reset.
The plenitudinous multiverse is maximal in complexity, computational strength, is omniscient, omnipresent, eternal, and transcends every universe, for which it is the ultimate creator and explanatory ground. Therefore the plenitudinous multiverse IS God (but don’t be afraid that Marshall will bring this up).
I don’t know what you mean by “Smolin” not understanding his own theory. Nor do I understand what you think is inevitable about his theory. It requires several unevidenced assumptions. That’s the opposite of inevitable. Inevitable are both reset theories; they cannot fail to happen on present knowledge—that’s what inevitable looks like.
And there are “problems” with a beginning. They may be solvable; but saying they don’t even exist is not true. So I don’t know what you mean by that either.
You are also using words like “omniscient” in bizarre ways that negate any utility they could possibly have here. So I don’t know what you are trying to do there either.
CNS is Smolin’s theory, plenitude (the maximally large multiverse) is not. The point is that any non-plenitudinous world (universe, multiverse) is fully arbitrary, because it lacks an explanation on why this world is reality and similar but different worlds are not. CNS comes in here to serve as a selection principle on any level: worlds that reproduce more abundantly have higher chances to become the observed world. Omniscience must be rather self-evident in a plenitude: if a piece of knowledge exists that is not present in any mind in the plenitude, then the plenitude is not really plenitudinous. Therefore the maximally knowledgeable mind in the plenitude is omniscient.
Plenitude as in a maximally large multiverse is entailed by Smolin’s model and explicitly articulated by Smolin as being so. So again, I don’t fathom what you think you are talking about here.
I now also don’t know what you mean by “this world is reality and similar but different worlds are not.” In Smolin’s model, similar bit different worlds are real. Indeed, nearly every logically possible world exists on Smolin’s model (to a probability arbitrarily near 1, per Susskind). Are you confusing Smolin with Tegmark? Because it sounds like you are trying to say some confused thing about the Tegmark model, which is an entirely different matter and has nothing to do with Smolin or indeed even cosmological science.
As for your strange attempt to explain omniscience, you still aren’t making any sense.
There is no “mind” to contain all knowledge in the Smolin model. There are minds. Scattered about. None of which will be omniscient. There is in fact no logically possible way to have an omniscient mind in any naturalistic cosmological model (Smolin’s included), because knowledge is “justified true belief” and Boltzmann knowledge is by definition never justified, and yet no other way exists to have true beliefs about inaccessible worlds or regions of even one’s own world. All as a consequence of the model itself; which means, no logically possible way exists for such a thing to obtain.
So what on earth are you talking about?
Dr Carrier, you just made my point in my earlier post and didn’t see it. How can you know some EPSs (evil, pain and suffering) aren’t necessary? Granting, for the sake of argument, God exists you may not have access to God’s specific reasons for permitting some particular EPS you are objecting to. By this, you are admitting to premise 2 of my 2nd argument. You claim “we already know such evils are not necessary”. Tell me of the most horrible suffering you know of then give me some of your proof that it’s not necessary. You claim theists will just make “excuses” (your word). No, we’re just not ruling out God thru fallacious reasoning. You object (don’t like) that God doesn’t “tell us” His reasons. Have you considered, by God telling you His reasons in the way “you” expect, that this may violate the miracle coercion paradox? Does my 12 reasons (I’ve only listed 1 so far) you call excuses for God allowing EPS prove God’s existence? Of course not. I could as easily claim that your fantasy invention (your labels of theists) of a multiverse, for which you have no testable proof, and that your revulsion of the EPS in the world (theists don’t like it either) makes God unlikely is a good way to market your books, your religion.
BTW, if God exists in some omnitemporal reality which already exists then I can’t invent it, I can only perceptualize it. Also, do I need an explanation of God’s substance to postulate that He may be the cause of the universe? Then those asserting the multiverse need to explain the substance of the cause of the multiverse. Maybe it was the spaghetti monster or the multiverse fairy (a little debate humor!)
“How can you know some EPSs (evil, pain and suffering) aren’t necessary?”
I just told you. Perhaps you are confusing probability with certainty? It is extremely improbable that there is something we have overlooked; therefore, that the evils we observe are necessary is extremely improbable. Therefore God is extremely improbable. Not impossible. Improbable.
You seem to be confusing the logical with the evidential argument from evil here. Or else confusing terms in modal logic, conflating improbable with impossible, or possible with improbable.
It is also not about what I like. It’s about what good people do. We observe (have vast evidence of) how good people behave. God is not behaving like that. Ergo, he probably isn’t a good person; or, does not exist. The other arguments we have establish the latter as the more likely.
If you want to “invent” reasons God acts unlike a good person, those reasons have no evidence they are true–you just made them up; ergo, they are improbable. Ergo, any God whose existence depends on them is improbable. And that’s even if you could think up a reason; you can’t even do that. You have to propose that there is a reason even though somehow you can’t even imagine what it is! That’s just worse. As in, even more improbable.
You don’t get a probable god this way. You only get an improbable one. Hence, atheism is more probable.
You are also missing the logic on the cosmological position. It is not that you “can’t” invent imaginary places for god to exist that require no cause or explanation and imaginary stuff he can be made of that requires no cause or explanation; it’s that if you can do that for imaginary stuff, we can do it for real stuff. We therefore don’t need your god to explain anything. If places and stuff can exist uncaused, then we don’t need any explanation for why there are places and stuff. Ergo the cosmological argument fails.
That doesn’t prevent there being some other argument for God existing. But it does eliminate the cosmological argument for God existing.
You seem not to be grasping that point.
Ok, so you think it’s (1) extremely “improbable” that a valid reason God “could” allow some EPSs has been overlooked and (2) none exist. I told you I have 12 reasons God “could” allow EPS and I find those reasons sufficient and extremely loving for allowing the EPS I’ve seen or been asking to consider. But you didn’t even offer an example for me to reply to. Of course if you won’t consider all the “possible” reasons you may conclude in error His existence to be “improbable”. You seem to think that God must act like us good people and get rid of/not allow the EPS for His existence to even be “probable”. I don’t mean to be insulting but that’s shallow thinking. What I find worse than all the EPS combined throughout the short existence of humanity is that if there was a God that exists that He might create us to exist for an eternity never knowing or understanding how to appreciate that eternity w/out the EPS. We first need to be exposed to it. That would seem to be a hellish existence. Ergo your idea of how God should be would actually make Him to be a moral monster. Now, nothing of what I’ve said (yet) is meant to prove God exists or make His existence”probable”. I’m just trying to show that your”improbable” conclusion is unreasonable. My sitting around pondering reasons (you say inventing) God may allow EPS can’t make His existence true or false, possible or impossible, probable or improbable, moral or immoral, etc. And of course God’s existence doesn’t depend on my ability to think up good reasons. Neither does my discovering them make them or Him improbable, but it does seem to bring you discomfort.
All the debates you’ve been in and you still don’t understand the logic of the cosmological argument. Its logic shows that the origin of the universe (if you agree that it has a beginning) warrants an explanation. Nothing more. Ergo it succeeds. Then afterwards we sit around pondering (inventing) what the nature of the cause may be. Some of us succeed in getting to God.
Lastly, for now, you call our pondering “imaginary places” and “imaginary stuff” because we have no explanations but you say your explanations are for real stuff. Sorry but I can’t see any of your multiverse or universe fairies any more real/probable than our flying spaghetti monster (our explanations that we DO offer). Ergo we don’t need your fairies to explain anything. Ergo a properly laid out theistic worldview is more probable than all the atheistic propositions I’ve heard or read.
Bill
None of the excuses you offer are valid. No actual good person would credit such excuses or allow them to obtain if it were within their power (and all things are within a god’s power).
That’s why no one can actually think of an excuse that actually works. Much less give any evidence any such excuse is true. And that’s why all such excuses are improbable.
If Marshall gets to this, I’ll address it then (given whatever excuses he himself tries to forward). But really, you should know better. Your excuses have long since been refuted in the literature. Continuing to repeat dead excuses doesn’t resurrect them. But if you really want to catch up, I give summaries in Why I Am Not a Christian and Sense and Goodness without God (Part IV).
And no, the cosmological argument isn’t about showing the origin of the universe warrants an explanation. It purports to show the explanation must be a magical disembodied supermind. If all it showed was that it has an explanation, it would be an argument for atheism. Because we have plenty of such explanations in cosmological science that lack any notion of a god, and they are all far more probable than magical disembodied superminds. There is a reason no such cosmological theory has ever passed peer review in the actual scientific field dedicated to explaining the origin of the cosmos.
Meanwhile, if you think a Flying Spaghetti Monster is “as plausible” as actual peer reviewed theories in cosmological science, you have a serious problem with science literacy that you need to attend to. Indeed, even philosophy has come up with vastly more plausible theories than unexplained material monsters. You must be terribly uninformed if you don’t know that.
A technical note: On my computer the links in the main text that are supposed to jump to the endnotes are not working.
That was a coding error. It should be fixed. Try it now. If it still isn’t working, let me know. But first make sure you are not using a cached version of the page (clear cache or refresh screen).
The top link is from a working link on a different page. The bottom one is from this page and is not working.
2
2
That should be fixed now.
All those unscientific philosophical notions and their false dichotomies (something, nothing, cause, consequence, etc) are useless to assert the existence of God. Such philosophical notions don’t have a high rate of predicting unimagined but actually existing phenomena at the extremes beyond human perception. They actually prevent us from doing so. On the other hand scientific theories commonly predict phenomena we never conceived existed. For instance the notion that things were either wave or particles made it impossible to describe the behaviour of quantum-scale objects. Such philosophical arguments may have been useful in the past but are outdated now to forward our understanding of universal mechanics.
Dr. Carrier, how do you respond to the Infinite Library paradox?
I really tried to solve it but couldn’t think of a satisfactory answer.
“Suppose…that each book in the library has a number printed on its spine so as to create a one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers. Because the collection is actually infinite, this means that every possible natural number is printed on some book. Therefore, it would be impossible to add another book to this library. For what would be the number of the new book? . . .Every possible number already has a counterpart in reality, for corresponding to every natural number is an already existent book. Therefore, there would be no number for the new book. But this is absurd, since entities that exist in reality can be numbered.”
Basically, he is saying that it is logically contradictory to add more numbers, since all possible numbers have already been added.
Do you mean Hilbert’s Hotel?
Two mistakes are happening here. He is confusing paradox with logical contradiction. There is no logical contradiction in the observed case; contradictions only arise when you apply the axioms validating finite arithmetic, but those axioms cannot be true in transfinite arithmetic, and therefore do not govern. This was shown as early as Cantor and Russell. In short, infinities are not contradictory, they just behave differently than finite quantities. Expecting them to behave the same is the error Hilbert’s Hotel exposes.
As I’ve written before:
And:
Another problem with Hilbert’s Hotel relates to its hidden semantic assumptions; the scenario Hilbert imagines assumes an impossibility: that any room would ever be left empty by shifting all tenants one room over. He tries to avoid that by imagining some “extra space” (and, one should add, “extra time”) outside the rooms where they can wait or something, while a new tenant is added. But if there is always n empty “extra space,” then that eliminates Hilbert’s paradox; and if that “extra space” isn’t empty (if it also always has one tenant and can only contain one tenant), then that eliminate Hilbert’s paradox. Either way the paradox never arises, because no empty space can ever be produced into which to insert an extra tenant. Or else there always is, even at the start of the scenario, and no paradox ever arises.
Andrei Linde, one of the founders of Inflation, also wrote a paper titled “Inflationary Cosmology” (pp.16-17) arguing the BGV does not demonstrate Eternal Inflation is finite in the past. He wrote:
Source: https://arxiv.org/abs/0705.0164 (2007)
Alan Guth conceded that past-eternal inflation is feasible in a paper entitled “Eternal inflation and its implications” (p.16). He wrote:
Source: https://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0702178v1.pdf (2007)
Thank you for those links and quotes. Excellently confirms what I’ve been saying here. I appreciate your work in tracking those down and producing them here.
No problem. It is a pleasure.
Also check this paper by Linde https://arxiv.org/pdf/1512.01203.pdf
Particularly in the end of the page 20 and in the beginning of the page 21.
Here, Linde doesn’t talk about the BGV but he does talk about the alleged beginning of the universe.
More recently (2019), cosmologist Wetterich published a paper titled “The great emptiness at the beginning of the Universe” ( https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.00792.pdf ) discussing the singularity theorems in more details. Here is an extensive explanation of his complex research:
That’s excellent. Thank you for posting that.
Just an update of this previous quote. The author, Wetterich, changed the URL (link); here is the updated one: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.00792v1.pdf
Further, I just found another cool quote that contradicts Craig’s (and Marshall) assertion that the BGV proves the universe had a beginning.
“[The BGV theorem] is an important achievement but, unfortunately, inconclusive like its predecessors: from geodesic incompleteness one cannot infer that inflating universes have a unique beginning.”
Gianluca Calcagni – Classical and Quantum Cosmology (p.276)
http://93.174.95.29/main/036C5B89624DFF9D900C3F45F3B806EF
Pro-quote:
In the article Obstruction of black hole singularity by quantum field theory effects (pp. 1, 15) physicist Jahed Abedi wrote:
“[Singularity avoidance] either relies on arguments based on quantum gravity or Hawking radiation. In particular in the context of loop quantum gravity Rovelli et al. [8] have argued that quantum corrections can impede the collapse of a matter to the extent that it be stopped much before the black hole radius reaches the Planck length, hence preventing the formation of the singularity, forming what is called Planck Star. In addition, in the context of weakly nonlocal quantum gravity the similar behaviour is expected [23–26]. The analysis follows the previous observation by Ashtekar and coworkers [5] who suggested formation of a bounce radius based on gravitational quantum effects for big bang when we go back in time… The question we consider in this note is whether Quantum Field Theory (QFT) effects can substantially modify the process of collapse. The particular effect we consider is the change of the vacuum energy of fields… We consider the back reaction of the energy due to quantum fluctuation of the background fields considering the trace anomaly for Schwarzschild black hole. It is shown that it will result in modification of the horizon and also formation of an inner horizon. We show that the process of collapse of a thin shell stops before formation of the singularity. Thus we demonstrate that without turning on quantum gravity and just through the effects the coupling of field to gravity as trace anomaly of quantum fluctuations the formation of the singularity through collapse is obstructed… Similar analysis can modify the behavior of any singularity of curvature including big bang solutions. QG considerations predict resolution of big bang singularity at a bounce radius, called big bounce [5, 81, 82]. We expect similar effect from QFT corrections.”
Against-quote:
In the book An Introduction to General Relativity and Cosmology (p.231), physicist Jerzy Plebanski stated:
“A summary and overview of these theorems is presented in the book by Hawking and Ellis (1973) that caused a certain revision in the understanding of the relativity theory. The theorems were said to show that general relativity cannot be the ultimate theory of space and time. In order to avoid the singularities, one would have to resort to a more general theory that would be capable of describing the quantum effects taking place at great densities of matter.
However, the singularity theorems are not as general as it was initially claimed. Several interesting solutions of the Einstein equations that do not contain any singularities have been found by Senovilla and coworkers (for an extended review see Senovilla (1998)). They have not, so far, been shown to describe any actual astrophysical situation, but their very existence proves that singularities are an inevitable part not of relativity as such, but of the collection of models of matter defined by the assumptions of the singularity theorems.”
Thoughts on this?
You need to explain what you are asking me about. All I see here are quotes about why Hawking and Penrose abandoned the Hawking-Penrose theorem. There are no singularities; they are a physical impossibility on present physics. Which is what I’ve already been pointing out for years.
Sorry, my fault!
In the 2nd quote, the physicist wrote: “but their very existence proves that singularities are an inevitable part not of relativity as such, but of the collection of models of matter defined by the assumptions of the singularity theorems.”
He is basically saying General Relativity is just an assumption of the singularity theorems. He claimed there are solutions of GR which do contain singularities and this (I don’t know how) shows the Hawking-Penrose theorems do not require GR; singular states are “inevitable” consequences of the “collections of models of matter.”
What do you think about that? Remember this is not from some dishonest apologist or silly creationist website; it is from a physics textbook.
That there are hypothetical ways to maybe have singularities is not relevant to the question of what we know. Right now what we know is quantum mechanics (not relativity) renders singularities impossible. Any speculation about how to get them back with some sort of as-yet-undiscovered laws of physics is just that: speculation.
And they admit this: these speculative new physics “have not, so far, been shown to describe any actual astrophysical situation.”
Exactly.
That’s correct, Dr. Carrier. But Plebanski acknowledges that quantum effects may eliminate the singularity. However, it seems you’re focusing on the wrong argument. The argument is that General Relativity is just one assumption of the singularity theorems. The central assumption, according to Plebanski, is “the collection of models of matter.”
So, it seems to me that if we follow this reasoning, even if General Relativity is modified by a quantum gravity theory, singularities will still be inevitable because matter itself will continue the same!
That doesn’t matter to the point. The only way to “get singularities back” is to invent some new physics. Nothing Plebanski says reverses that fact. At most all he is saying is that new physics could get them back. Which is only trivially true. Hence this is just a speculation. It is not a statement about current science.
Maybe you don’t understand what he means by “the collection of models of matter”? He’s referring to models of matter before quantum mechanics was fully extended to singularity theorems (he’s talking about 1973, the year of the Hawking-Penrose theorem; not later, when Hawking and Penrose admitted the theorem is false). In other words, he is saying one could have deduced singularities from their working models of matter without relativity; but that’s all moot, because that model of matter he’s talking about has since been proved false. Now we know matter does not exist below a certain scale, nor do bosons, particularly gravitons. Thus, once you get matter shrunk to below the scale at which even gravitons function, gravity stops working. Consequently, matter cannot continue collapsing. No singularity. Additionally, below a certain scale, location does not even properly exist anymore, i.e. an object can only be smeared out over an area. There is no meaningful sense in which points of location in space exist below a Planck length; consequently, singularities are logically impossible. Unless there is something we don’t know about sub-quantum-scale physics. Hence, some new physics. But the most promising new physics, e.g. string theory, shores up this conclusion, rather than bypassing it (string theory entails a geometric bounce will occur before any singularity can form). So he needs to posit some truly alien physics not even presently plausible. That’s as speculative as speculation gets.
Though I don’t think he’s really even saying that. The Plebanski quote appears to be discussing the past history of physics. Not present physics.
I don’t wish to be nitpicky here, but Penrose didn’t admit his theorem is false. To my knowledge, he still thinks the theorems hold if the assumptions are correct. The only thing here is that he proposed his cyclic cosmology to get rid of the singularity by eliminating matter from the big bang. In other words, in his model, there is no matter density at the big bang, and for singularities to form, high density particles must be present. I’m sure Penrose will admit his CCC model is still speculative and so, the singularity theorems still hold — even though Inflation seems to violate the strong energy condition of the classical theorems. But Penrose doesn’t think Inflation is true.
Regarding String Theory, George Ellis et al. criticized it in their paper:
“Cosmological inflation and its realization within QG and, in particular, in string theory, was reviewed in [240]. Examples of string inflation include brane and axion inflation. There are also string inspired effective field theories. Since string theory is considerably more constrained, some effective field theories that are apparently consistent at low energies do not, in fact, admit ultraviolet QG completions (leading to improved predictivity). However, there are indications that it might not be possible to embed simple inflationary models in string theory [239, 240]…. In particular, there are well-known no-go theorems for the existence of stable de-Sitter vacua in critical string theory [239]. This is a real problem for inflation should string theory be the final theory of QG.”
Theoretical Cosmology (pp. 47, 48)
Regarding your argument that singularities can’t form because at the Planck length there is no definite position, I didn’t find any paper arguing this is the case. The only “article” where this was briefly discussed in the Hawking popular web page where he discusses the singularity is eliminated because of the Heinsenberg principle.
Further, there are people who argue gravity doesn’t have to be quantized like other fields (so perhaps there is no real graviton).
Sheers.
No, Penrose outright admits quantum mechanics nullifies the key premise of the original theorem. Just as I explained. It has nothing to do with cyclical or inflationary cosmologies.
See “The Nature of Space and Time,” Stephen W. Hawking and Roger Penrose, Scientific American 275.1 (July 1996), pp. 60-65. Penrose: “quantum field theory might ‘smear’ out the singularities of general relativity in some way,” “there must be small quantum fluctuations in the initial state and thus…the hypothesis that the initial Weyl curvature is zero at the initial singularity is classical,” not quantum mechanical, and Penrose explains both this point (precise locations cease to exist below the Planck scale) and that gravity stops working below the Planck scale owing to quantization of the gravitational field (and thus true singularities cannot form on present physics) in his 1991 paper “What does the Big Bang tell us about quantum gravity?” He there proposes “new physics” to get singularities back; but that’s back to speculation.
As Wikipedia puts it, unless gravity is not quantized (defying quantum mechanics by making gravity fundamentally different than every other force and energy vector), “there is a minimum distance beyond which the force of gravity no longer continues to increase as the distance between the masses becomes shorter” which violates the key premise in the Hawking-Penrose theorem that gravity continues working at all scales (see gravitational singularity); and “our usual picture of continuous commutative spacetime breaks down at Planck scale distances,” violating another of the key premises in the Hawking-Penrose theorem, that spacetime remains continuous to all scales (see quantum spacetime). Penrose has never disagreed with either conclusion; he has proposed speculative ways around them, but that’s just, again, speculation, and that he has to speculate ways around them is itself an acknowledgment of them.
“It is a known fact that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is only probabilistically true: given time, a Boltzmann event (a massive reduction in entropy) will inevitably occur—resetting the entropy state, refuting Vilenkin’s claim this is impossible (Vilenkin never addresses this).”
Actually, Professor Vilenkin did address that. In his 2007 book, he wrote:
“The problem with Boltzmann’s solution is that the ordered part of the universe appears to be excessively large. For observers to exist, it would be enough to turn chaos into order on the scale of the solar system. This would have a much higher probability than a fluctuation on the scale of billions of light-years that would be needed to account for the observed universe.” (Source: “Many Worlds In One”)
In other words, while a Boltzmann universe as large as ours will inevitably appear (if we accept the axioms/assumptions of the Poincaré theorem) it is extremely unlikely relative to smaller universes. Ergo, we should be observing a small universe right now. And yet, that is absolutely NOT what we observe. Ergo, it is more likely we’re not a Boltzmann fluctuation.
I’m not endorsing Vilenkin’s argument here. I’m just pointing out that he did address this potential objection.
That is erroneous.
First, a Boltzmann solar system would not observe itself as a micro-universe. It would observe itself in a sea of cold background radiation in a seemingly flat and infinite universe.
Second, a Boltzmann solar system is actually less probable than a Boltzmann Big Bang. Vilenkin is failing to calculate the actual absurd precision and assembly of events (extreme ordering, not just entropy reversal) required for a solar system, which is not required for a Big Bang, which only requires a concentration of energy density, and is otherwise completely disordered.
Scientists and philosophers often get this wrong.
For a corrective understanding of Boltzmann phenomena see my discussion in respect to Justin Brierley and more importantly my discussion just last month in respect to Andrew Loke (look for the bit about the tiger).
A Boltzmann solar system is more like the tiger and less like a spontaneous random inflation event, which only requires the assembly of a single inflaton, not the meticulous arrangement and bonding of trillions upon trillions of atoms in exactly the right arrangement so as to leave a self-sustaining solar system, planet and star, arranged just-so as to make life possible.
And third, that’s just to get the possibility. The likelihood of life then arising (so as to make observations) is still astronomically small (see Why Life Must Be Complex (and Thus Probably Won’t Be on Mars) and Could Be a 38% Chance We Are the Only Civilization in the Known Universe).
Which means the relevant statistic is not the frequency of Boltzmann solar systems, but the frequency of biogenesis (…on up to observing civilizations, per the Drake equation, but the improbability of that is negligible at the scale of probabilities already tackled by biogenesis, making a difference of at best a few orders of magnitude, compared to dozens, so we can assume biogenesis practically entails observations to within rounding error).
The number of natural biogenesis events will vastly exceed that of Boltzmann solar systems experiencing biogenesis. Because a large enough universe to generate it by cascade (i.e. Wong-Hazen process) will generate lots of them. But indeed, even if they generated only one, that would vastly exceed the ratio for Boltzmann solar systems. Because we are multiplying two probabilities:
P(Boltzmann Big Bang) x P(biogenesis|Big Bang universe) and P(Boltzmann solar system) x P(biogenesis|single solar system).
Both probabilities are astronomically larger in the first case over the second. P(Boltzmann Big Bang) is vastly (vastly) larger than P(Boltzmann solar system), for much the same reason as Boltzmann tigers. And P(biogenesis|Big Bang universe) is vastly (vastly) larger that P(biogenesis|single solar system), because Big Bang universes generate not just one but trillions of trillions of solar systems.
So we can expect, by hundreds if not thousands or millions of orders of magnitude greater frequency, to find ourselves arising in a spontaneous Big Bang universe than in a Boltzmann solar system.
Thank you for this detailed reply, Dr. Carrier.
I would just point out that Vilenkin would totally agree with you that “a Boltzmann solar system is more like the tiger and less like a spontaneous random inflation event, which only requires the assembly of a single inflaton..”
He is a big proponent of the inflaton idea. In fact, he thinks that the inflaton will continue decaying infinitely into the future, which implies that the system as a whole will never reach entropic equilibrium. So, he is totally on board on this point.
But Vilenkin was specifically referring to “the meticulous arrangement and bonding of trillions upon trillions of atoms in exactly the right arrangement so as to leave a self-sustaining solar system, planet and star, arranged just-so as to make life possible.”
That is the “Boltzmann solution”, i.e., the reduction of the entropy of the particles or molecules or atoms of the system. You even briefly touched this hypothesis in an old article of yours:
“And yes, there will inevitably be a completely random assembly of a whole working universe out to a visible horizon fourteen billion light years away that just by accident happens to look like it’s undergoing an accelerating expansion, and look like it began by a Big Bang but didn’t, and people in that world will be fooled.” (“The God Impossible”, 2012)
So, Vilenkin would agree that an inflaton decay is much more likely than a Boltzmann solar system, but that you’re not actually addressing his argument.
That literally is our argument.
That’s my point. You keep citing people as if they said anything that disagrees with or undermines anything I have said, from article through all the comments.
And I keep explaining to you that you have failed at that. Because not a single one of these people said anything that disagrees with or undermines anything I have said, from article through all the comments.