Christian historian Dr. Wallace Marshall and I are debating whether or not enough evidence points to the existence of a god. For background and format, and Dr. Wallace’s opening statement, see entry one. For subsequent entries, see index.

For now we are still focusing on the Kalam Cosmological Argument, now in response to my third reply.


That the Evidence Points to God (IV)

by Wallace Marshall, Ph.D.

The Kalam Cosmological Argument centers on the truth of two premises being more plausible than not: (1) that the universe—matter, space, time and energy—had a beginning in the finite past; and (2) that if this is the case, the universe had a cause, a cause that in the nature of the case must be immaterial, spaceless, timeless, and immensely powerful. 

In both of my previous entries (here and here), I have been very clear that the scientific evidence against a past-eternal universe applies regardless of whether our Big Bang was the first (single-verse), or was preceded by others (multiverse). I even pointed out, to underscore this point, that Vilenkin’s and Guth’s strong statements against a past-eternal universe come from scientists who themselves believe in a multiverse! 

It is strange, therefore, to hear Dr. Carrier objecting that “our” Big bang may very well not have been the first. I have never claimed that it was, because that is immaterial to the argument. Vilenkin and Guth would surely look nonplussed if Carrier gave such a reply when they told him, “All the evidence says the universe had a beginning,” or “We’ve been able to prove, mathematically, that it’s in fact not possible to extrapolate arbitrarily far into the past.” Does he suppose they are that ignorant?

Dr. Carrier further objects that the BGV theorem relies on some undemonstrated assumptions. What of it? Much of physics does. Einstein’s theory of general relativity relies on the undemonstrated assumption that the speed of light is constant in both directions (we can only measure its round-trip velocity). Indeed, one would be hard pressed to identify any cosmological model that does not rely partly on undemonstrated assumptions. 

Dr. Carrier’s complaint that the BGV “ignores quantum gravity” reveals his misunderstanding of theoretical physics. Physicists as yet have no theory of quantum gravity, so of course every cosmogonical theory is developed with an awareness of that. Carrier’s complaint would invalidate the entire discipline of cosmogony! 

Even so, the BGV theorem is independent of Einstein’s theory of gravity. As Vilenkin writes about the model he, Guth and Borde developed: “The remarkable thing about this theorem is its sweeping generality…. We did not even assume that gravity is described by Einstein’s equations. So, if Einstein’s gravity requires some modification, our conclusion will still hold.”[1]

Dr. Carrier’s belief that because “Big Bangs have a non-zero probability” of resulting from an indeterminist quantum state, “a past eternal quantum model is actually more supported by current evidence than the BGV,” shows that he does not understand the BGV or the central problem that plagues such proposals. It is precisely because of this instability that quantum vacuums cannot be past-eternal. As physicists Anthony Aguirre and John Kehayias explain, “It is very difficult to devise a system—especially a quantum one—that does nothing ‘forever,’ then evolves. A truly stationary or periodic quantum state, which would last forever, would never evolve, whereas one with any instability will not endure for an indefinite time.”[2]

This leaves Dr. Carrier only with the hope that cosmologists are “exploring” past-eternal models, or that such models are “possible.” But again, what of it? As I argued in my previous rebuttal, only when such theories are amply demonstrated and gain broader acceptance can they be considered legitimate rivals to the consensus.

So, even if one demurs from the emphatic “All the evidence says the universe had a beginning,” a fair-minded inquirer should at least concede that the preponderance of current scientific evidence points to the universe (or multiverse) having a beginning in the finite past, regardless of how many past Big Bangs there may have been. Why not admit what is obviously the case, unless it is for fear of where the rest of the Kalam argument leads?

Regarding my first philosophical argument against an infinite past, Dr. Carrier has yet to explain how he would propose to avoid the absurdities entailed by the real-world instantiation of an infinite quantity. Even the atheist philosopher Graham Oppy, who has written a great deal on this problem and whom Carrier cites with approval, has conceded that the actual existence of infinities entails a “huge range of difficulties … puzzles and paradoxes” that it is “hard to see” how we can “make our peace” with. Indeed, Oppy’s response to these quandaries is to bite the bullet and declare that “these allegedly absurd situations are just what one ought to expect if there were … physical infinities”[3]—which is simply to admit the force of the argument!

Dr. Carrier corresponds privately with atheist mathematician Herb Silverman and says Silverman told him, “There might have been infinitely many big bangs and big crunches.” But oddly, Carrier doesn’t say how Silverman replied when Carrier asked him (as one charitably assumes Carrier would) how Silverman reconciles this with what he told the Secular Crusader when he wasn’t thinking about how to answer the Kalam: “The most important lesson I learned was that infinity is a theoretical construct created by humans, and that the number ‘infinity’ does not exist in reality.”[4]

To my second philosophical argument against an infinite past, Dr. Carrier responds that “actual infinities’ existence in no way depends on their being counted or added up.” Of course—because they cannot be! And that is precisely the problem here, because if the past is infinite, it is a time series formed by adding one member after another; but it seems absurd, for the reasons I gave, to suppose that such a series could be formed and it still be ‘now’ now, or indeed at any time along the entire series.

To my four arguments in favor of the causal principle, Dr. Carrier has yet to explain his hypothesis of a “lawless minimum state” he claimed allowed him to avoid those arguments. 

He also declines to say whether “structural” means “physical” when he wrote, “Causal laws cannot exist in the absence of a structural cause of such laws.”

Finally, Dr. Carrier doubles down on his question-begging assertion that a thing cannot exist in the absence of space and time. Indeed, he now claims this is not merely metaphysically but “logically impossible”! This is to further beg a huge philosophical question about the ontology of mathematical objects, to say nothing of the existence of God or the soul. 

As Kant pointed out long ago, there is nothing incoherent about simultaneous causation.[5] Indeed, some philosophers argue that all causation is simultaneous because the beginning of any effect will coincide temporally with the beginning of its cause.[6]

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Such is Dr. Marshall’s latest response. 

Continue on to Dr. Carrier’s reply.

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Endnotes

[1] Alexander Vilenkin, Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes (New York: Macmillan, 2006), 175 (emphasis mine).

[2] Anthony Aguirre and John Kehayias, “Quantum Instability of the Emergent Universe,” 13 June 2013, rev. 19 Nov 2013. http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.3232

[3] Graham Oppy, Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 294-95, 48.

[4] Laura Paull, “South Carolina’s Secular Crusader,” Tablet Magazine, 21 June 2012. http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/103669/south-carolinas-secular-crusader?all=1 Accessed 9/18/2012. I’m not in favor of introducing private correspondences into public debate, but for what it’s worth, I know Silverman personally (we live in the same town and see each other regularly) and have pressed him with this very problem and never received a direct answer.

[5] Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1965), A203/B248 (pp. 227-28).

[6] See, e.g., Michael Huemer and Ben Covitz, “Causation as Simultaneous and Continuous,” The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 213 (Oct. 2003): 556-65.  

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