Christian historian Dr. Wallace Marshall and I are debating whether or not enough evidence points to the existence of a god. For background and format, and Dr. Wallace’s opening statement, see entry one. For subsequent entries, see index.

Now we are focusing on a broadly cast Argument from Evil, or as I prefer to call it, Argument from Indifference. Marshall is here responding to my eighth reply. After this, we will each have only one more reply (with Marshall’s the last), before we move on to another argument for or against God of Marshall’s choosing.


That the Evidence Points to God (VIII)

by Wallace Marshall, Ph.D.

I’ll begin by conceding Dr. Carrier’s point that if every piece of evidence were either equally likely on theism or atheism, or more likely on atheism (I don’t think either is the case, of course), then it would be correct to say there is “no evidence for the existence of God.” I had thought that the co-equal or minority side of a probability for a hypothesis was still entitled to the status of “evidence,” but after thinking on Dr. Carrier’s reply and studying Bayesian probability rules further, I now realize this cannot be the case when the competing hypotheses exhaust the logical possibilities, which in the case of theism vs. atheism, they do. 

It does seem that in instances where a piece of evidence (“Z”) “fits” with two mutually exclusive “pictures” of the world (“A” and “B”), only slightly better with A than with B, we need adequate terminology for expressing that that evidence still fits with Picture B, especially when each side proposes Z as positive evidence for its position. Perhaps “fitness” is just that word, and of course on Bayesian probability this degree of fitness with Picture B would be expressed by Z being correspondingly weaker evidence for Picture A. 

Returning to Dr. Carrier’s first argument for atheism:

To my counter that there are more moral evils than natural evils in the world, and that the natural evils that exist are therefore consistent with divine justice, Dr. Carrier replies with a simplistic “head count” of the number of people who have been killed or maimed by natural vs. moral evils. But obviously one must consider other evils besides being killed or maimed, such as the miseries inflicted by human avarice, pride, jealousy, infidelity, meanness, etc.; and one must evaluate these miseries quantitatively and qualitatively. 

A simple way to answer whether there is more natural evil than moral evil in the world is to ask which of the two you would choose to eliminate if you could only pick one. Suppose you had the choice of (1) eliminating all “serious” (Dr. Carrier’s word) diseases, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc., but leaving man just as he is; OR (2) retaining those natural evils but making every human being perfect in love, sincerity, charity, and all other moral virtues. Who in his right mind would pick the former? 

A world where human evil had been eliminated would seem almost like paradise, and the remaining sorrows we had to endure on account of natural evils would be hugely mitigated by the outpouring of sympathy, care and compassion sufferers would receive. There would even be some benefit from natural evils in that they would provide the opportunity for a richer and deeper complex of human virtues to manifest themselves. Moreover, the enjoyments of life would be enhanced by the banishment of envy and its replacement by a genuine empathy that entered into its fellow humans’ joys as much as their sufferings. 

Regarding animal suffering, the capacity animals of different orders have for experiencing pain is by no means clear. We know that in many species it is limited or even non-existent.[1] This is not, of course, to say that animals do not suffer, but only that the extent and severity of that suffering is considerably less than human anthropomorphizing imagines. 

As for why God would create the animal kingdom in its “red in tooth and claw” condition, I imagine it is partly to reflect the rapaciousness and selfishness of humanity, a “state of nature” that serves as a fearful contrast to how man ought to live (notice that when a person is really depraved, we will say, “He’s an animal”). There is also an undeniable grandeur and fascination to the drama of the animal kingdom. 

To my counter that the tit-for-tat, police-state divine justice Carrier desires wouldn’t do much to form our inward moral character, Dr. Carrier replies with the sweeping assertion that every nation with heavy policing has citizens who are less “criminal, violent, selfish and corrupt.” I doubt whether this proposed causal connection holds even with respect to criminality and violence, as there are numerous factors that contribute to those. But honestly, does Dr. Carrier believe that sociologists have explored the inward moral character of heavy police states and found them to be less selfish and sinful? Who needs to be told how selfish and mean a “law-abiding citizen” can be?

After three entries defending his argument, Dr. Carrier has yet to tell us what kinds of punishments he wishes God would supernaturally inflict, and for what crimes. He now seems to back off the idea of God punishing smaller sins (such as gossip) with light penalties (a clump of hair falling out), or severe offenses (such as rape or murder) with say, disease (which Dr. Carrier oddly deems “absurdly disproportionate”). 

How then, and for what crimes specifically, does he wish God would punish humans? The thrust of Carrier’s whole argument on this point is that God’s existence is unlikely because he doesn’t punish people the way Carrier would if he were God. To carry this argument, it’s incumbent on him to provide some specifics of the crimes and punishments he has in mind. In his last entry Dr. Carrier furnishes only one example, that God would punish people who claim God permits slavery; and even there it’s a half-example as Carrier doesn’t tell us how God should punish them.

Still more oddly (given his desire for divine punishments), Dr. Carrier says that even if human moral evils are greater than natural evils, a good God couldn’t “plausibly, much less probably” have a reason for punishing the human race with natural evils. This is contradictory on its face.

Brief points in my limited space remaining:

  1. “Marshall weirdly confuses ‘people believe x’ with ‘there must be evidence for x.’” Nonsense: my statement was that on most if not all significant questions people debate, there is at least some evidence on both sides, and that we should therefore expect to find this to be case on a hugely significant question like God’s existence.
  2. “Dr. Marshall claims humans have ‘always’ had right moral ideas,” is a blatant misrepresentation. My point was the unreasonableness of Dr. Carrier’s demand that God produce a “gospel” for humans preaching the virtues of “kindness, honesty, and reasonableness” (Carrier’s words) given that every human being already knows these are virtues.
  3. The bare existence of “aesthetic responses” that “improve differential reproductive success” is unremarkable, and a very different thing from the staggering beauty of nature, riches of art, and depth and joy of human relationships that life affords.  

-:-

Such is Dr. Marshall’s latest response. 

Continue on to Dr. Carrier’s reply.

-:-

[1] For a recent and extensive review of the literature on animal pain that covers both neuro-physiological and observational studies, see Brian Key and Deborah Brown, “Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusk,” Frontiers in Physiology 9 (2 August 2018).

Discover more from Richard Carrier Blogs

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading