Christian historian Dr. Wallace Marshall and I are debating whether or not enough evidence points to the existence of a god. For background and format, and Dr. Wallace’s opening statement, see entry one. For subsequent entries, see index.
Now we are focusing on a broadly cast Argument from Evil, or as I prefer to call it, Argument from Indifference. Marshall is here responding to my eighth reply. After this, we will each have only one more reply (with Marshall’s the last), before we move on to another argument for or against God of Marshall’s choosing.
That the Evidence Points to God (VIII)
by Wallace Marshall, Ph.D.
I’ll begin by conceding Dr. Carrier’s point that if every piece of evidence were either equally likely on theism or atheism, or more likely on atheism (I don’t think either is the case, of course), then it would be correct to say there is “no evidence for the existence of God.” I had thought that the co-equal or minority side of a probability for a hypothesis was still entitled to the status of “evidence,” but after thinking on Dr. Carrier’s reply and studying Bayesian probability rules further, I now realize this cannot be the case when the competing hypotheses exhaust the logical possibilities, which in the case of theism vs. atheism, they do.
It does seem that in instances where a piece of evidence (“Z”) “fits” with two mutually exclusive “pictures” of the world (“A” and “B”), only slightly better with A than with B, we need adequate terminology for expressing that that evidence still fits with Picture B, especially when each side proposes Z as positive evidence for its position. Perhaps “fitness” is just that word, and of course on Bayesian probability this degree of fitness with Picture B would be expressed by Z being correspondingly weaker evidence for Picture A.
Returning to Dr. Carrier’s first argument for atheism:
To my counter that there are more moral evils than natural evils in the world, and that the natural evils that exist are therefore consistent with divine justice, Dr. Carrier replies with a simplistic “head count” of the number of people who have been killed or maimed by natural vs. moral evils. But obviously one must consider other evils besides being killed or maimed, such as the miseries inflicted by human avarice, pride, jealousy, infidelity, meanness, etc.; and one must evaluate these miseries quantitatively and qualitatively.
A simple way to answer whether there is more natural evil than moral evil in the world is to ask which of the two you would choose to eliminate if you could only pick one. Suppose you had the choice of (1) eliminating all “serious” (Dr. Carrier’s word) diseases, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc., but leaving man just as he is; OR (2) retaining those natural evils but making every human being perfect in love, sincerity, charity, and all other moral virtues. Who in his right mind would pick the former?
A world where human evil had been eliminated would seem almost like paradise, and the remaining sorrows we had to endure on account of natural evils would be hugely mitigated by the outpouring of sympathy, care and compassion sufferers would receive. There would even be some benefit from natural evils in that they would provide the opportunity for a richer and deeper complex of human virtues to manifest themselves. Moreover, the enjoyments of life would be enhanced by the banishment of envy and its replacement by a genuine empathy that entered into its fellow humans’ joys as much as their sufferings.
Regarding animal suffering, the capacity animals of different orders have for experiencing pain is by no means clear. We know that in many species it is limited or even non-existent.[1] This is not, of course, to say that animals do not suffer, but only that the extent and severity of that suffering is considerably less than human anthropomorphizing imagines.
As for why God would create the animal kingdom in its “red in tooth and claw” condition, I imagine it is partly to reflect the rapaciousness and selfishness of humanity, a “state of nature” that serves as a fearful contrast to how man ought to live (notice that when a person is really depraved, we will say, “He’s an animal”). There is also an undeniable grandeur and fascination to the drama of the animal kingdom.
To my counter that the tit-for-tat, police-state divine justice Carrier desires wouldn’t do much to form our inward moral character, Dr. Carrier replies with the sweeping assertion that every nation with heavy policing has citizens who are less “criminal, violent, selfish and corrupt.” I doubt whether this proposed causal connection holds even with respect to criminality and violence, as there are numerous factors that contribute to those. But honestly, does Dr. Carrier believe that sociologists have explored the inward moral character of heavy police states and found them to be less selfish and sinful? Who needs to be told how selfish and mean a “law-abiding citizen” can be?
After three entries defending his argument, Dr. Carrier has yet to tell us what kinds of punishments he wishes God would supernaturally inflict, and for what crimes. He now seems to back off the idea of God punishing smaller sins (such as gossip) with light penalties (a clump of hair falling out), or severe offenses (such as rape or murder) with say, disease (which Dr. Carrier oddly deems “absurdly disproportionate”).
How then, and for what crimes specifically, does he wish God would punish humans? The thrust of Carrier’s whole argument on this point is that God’s existence is unlikely because he doesn’t punish people the way Carrier would if he were God. To carry this argument, it’s incumbent on him to provide some specifics of the crimes and punishments he has in mind. In his last entry Dr. Carrier furnishes only one example, that God would punish people who claim God permits slavery; and even there it’s a half-example as Carrier doesn’t tell us how God should punish them.
Still more oddly (given his desire for divine punishments), Dr. Carrier says that even if human moral evils are greater than natural evils, a good God couldn’t “plausibly, much less probably” have a reason for punishing the human race with natural evils. This is contradictory on its face.
Brief points in my limited space remaining:
- “Marshall weirdly confuses ‘people believe x’ with ‘there must be evidence for x.’” Nonsense: my statement was that on most if not all significant questions people debate, there is at least some evidence on both sides, and that we should therefore expect to find this to be case on a hugely significant question like God’s existence.
- “Dr. Marshall claims humans have ‘always’ had right moral ideas,” is a blatant misrepresentation. My point was the unreasonableness of Dr. Carrier’s demand that God produce a “gospel” for humans preaching the virtues of “kindness, honesty, and reasonableness” (Carrier’s words) given that every human being already knows these are virtues.
- The bare existence of “aesthetic responses” that “improve differential reproductive success” is unremarkable, and a very different thing from the staggering beauty of nature, riches of art, and depth and joy of human relationships that life affords.
-:-
Such is Dr. Marshall’s latest response.
Continue on to Dr. Carrier’s reply.
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[1] For a recent and extensive review of the literature on animal pain that covers both neuro-physiological and observational studies, see Brian Key and Deborah Brown, “Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusk,” Frontiers in Physiology 9 (2 August 2018).
“Suppose you had the choice of (1) eliminating all “serious” (Dr. Carrier’s word) diseases, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc., but leaving man just as he is; OR (2) retaining those natural evils but making every human being perfect in love, sincerity, charity, and all other moral virtues. Who in his right mind would pick the former?” Um…….Me.
OK, Vincent– so can you explain to us how your choice would make the world a better, happier place. I’ve argued above, I think convincingly, that absent human evil, the world would almost feel like a paradise.
“Every year natural disasters kill around 90 000 people”
Source: https://www.who.int/environmental_health_emergencies/natural_events/en/
“An estimated 385,000 people were killed in homicides in 2016”
Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/07/global-homicide-rate-rises-first-time-decade-venezuela-jamaica
I would call cancer a natural disaster so just in the USA…..
“609,640 people will die from the disease.”
Source: https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/understanding/statistics
You factor in the whole world and include all diseases, moral deaths are outweighed by natural disaster deaths by a far, far greater number.
Charles- You don’t seem to have read my argument above, which is that once can’t weigh moral vs. natural evil on the basis of a simple “head count” of people killed or maimed by one vs. the other. You have to look at the whole range of evils people suffer.
I provide an argument above for why the human race suffers more from moral evil than from natural evil. Could you interact with that and let me know your thoughts?
Is Marshall either proposing that natural evils harming the innocent is “just”, or else that natural evils actually only harm people who deserve them?
Am I missing something? Both of these possibilities are ridiculously false. It’s so primitive, like the dark-ages, or earlier (old testament).
Brian- My argument is that corporately considered, God doesn’t deal unjustly with the human race.
With the exception of infants and toddlers, there are no innocent members of the human race. As for how the suffering of the innocents is to be justified, it would be on the grounds of (a) sharing in the corporate guilt of the human race, and/or (b) a greater good that is accomplished by the suffering of the innocents.
(b) may require the the theist to posit a future state of rewards and punishments, which on the hypothesis of theism would obviously not be a problem.
I’m sorry, Dr. Marshall, but to imagine toddlers deserve to be maimed, horribly killed, tormented, inflicted with disease and starvation, eaten alive, drowned, raped, and everything else, because they are “bad” and thus “deserve it” is absolutely monstrous and convicts your entire religion of heartless barbarity in its very thinking.
There is really no excuse for this. I’m horrified you think such a monstrous thing.
You’re again being an inattentive reader, Dr. Carrier. I said no such thing.
Correction, children. It is monstrous to think toddlers deserve all that given that you even think them innocent. But it is also monstrous to think children are not innocent and thus do deserve all of that. The point stands. Your religion is disturbing. I honestly cannot fathom how you reconcile its barbarity with your conscience.
Correction again, he said “with the EXCEPTION of children”. Plus, he never said “deserve it” as you said and even quoted. You’ll of course say that if God is good and moral and able then He should intervene. Where is your evidence for that? You’ll no doubt say that this is what any good and moral person would do (which is not evidence but rather your emotional excuses). But are you saying God is just a “person” with the limitations of human reasoning and planning abilities? If you (or the society consensus) can dream up a set of moral values which we ought to conform to why can’t you go just a step further and reason out that God would certainly have objectives that requires that the universe operates the way it does with our best interest at the heart of His will? But in the end you wind up saying there’s no evidence for that God. You use abductive reasoning and say “if God existed I would expect Him to be like good people and halt the suffering. I, however, have a greater expectation of God with greater results. I would expect everything to happen exactly like you see it if we are being properly prepared for an eternal existence we can appreciate.
It certainly is a powerful weapon, to argue an emotional appeal and “therefore God certainly (or probably) does not exist”. You constantly weave in these emotional appeals into what you think are intellectually valid points refuting a personal Creator’s existence. You go further with the personal attacks, “heartless barbarity” who embraces such a “monstrous thing”. I hope you realize all of us theists are capable of the same level of descriptions (actually grossly more) of your views and atheists in general and much more validly so.
So why do you do that and why do you misrepresent Dr Marshall? Just doesn’t seem fair.
You haven’t stated any plausible reason why a good person with God’s resources would do less, rather than more, than any other good person.
And that’s why your desperately gerrymandered god concept is itself implausible.
There is no reason to believe it exists.
I’m in agreement with you that good “people”, (including myself) WOULD do more to end or at least extremely reduce the world’s EPS. But we’d screw things up, that is, with our limited planning and forecasting (having God’s propositional knowledge) abilities. Here I’m just showing that God may be restrained (because of His own plans and objectives to more perfectly prepare and build us) from interceding at this point. Nothing of what I’m saying here is to develop a gerrymandered concept (and certainly not in desperation as you try to paint that emotion on me) for God’s existence but rather to answer the question “why would or could God appear so indifferent to the world’s EPS”. Once an answer is presented for consideration as I did earlier (preparing us to know how to truly and deeply appreciate an eternity without evil, pain, suffering, anxiety, worry, fear, frustration etc, how to appreciate meaningful rewards and everything that would be provided for us, to truly know and appreciate the depth of God’s love for us as He demonstrates His patience, forgiveness, mercy etc) you can then decide if that offered answer is reasonable. BTW, if you conclude the answer makes good sense of the world that you observe then the answer itself would be the object for an abductive conclusion for God’s existence. Even though initially the answer wasn’t offered to make a case for the existence of God.
So there you go! You said I’ve not stated a reason why people would do any less (and I think you also mean “or do the same as we’re doing now”) rather than more than any other good person. I’ve never tried to make that case. I’m agreeing with you and you’ve not seen it. But IF what I’m saying is true, let me repeat, if THAT answer was true, then you can’t compare God’s actions with what God still expects of us. It’s a case of “do as I say and not as I do”. We, as parents, can rightfully say this to our children at times.
Also, if that presented answer was true then one can’t correctly logically conclude that God MUST be indifferent. If that answer wasn’t true then you can correctly conclude that God is indifferent (uncaring) or incapable of intervening. Is that answer plausible? It seems so to me since I recognize this answer as reasonable in connection with other evidences I conclude to be sufficient for a Creator.
Once upon a time many people thought Copernicus was gerrymandering (?) the concept of heliocentrism. Just not plausible they’d say.
Once again, you propose God has an excuse. And offer no evidence whatever that that excuse is even probable, much less true. That entails God is improbable.
You can’t escape that conclusion by continuing to make up undemonstrated excuses.
Sorry to drag this on but this is a case of not understanding what the other is proposing and concluding. I am proposing a “reason” for God not intervening in the world’s EPS. I am also making a distinction between the words “reason” and “excuses” which the word “excuses” could affect plausibility as you say. When you say “excuses” this implies that God SHOULD have intervened, didn’t, but now we are showing excuses for why He didn’t. Sort of like saying Joe was late for work but he overslept. Joe still SHOULD have been to work on time. I AGREE with you that IF God SHOULD have intervened but didn’t that improbability conclusion would be warranted. So we have some agreement here. I’m proposing if the “reasons” I proposed above are true then the case would be that He SHOULDN’T intervene (at least not yet). So now I don’t need “evidence” for an “excuse” because I’m not offering an excuse as I’ve demonstrated the distinction between reason and excuse (the distinction being the SHOULDNESS). I would also add that evidences for God are most likely to be found with other demonstrations, UNLESS, you see the world as it is and make an abductive connection to God and accept this as evidence of at least some weight.
I finally would agree that you are arguing “against” the existence of such an indifferent (uncaring) God and I AGREE that such a god does not exist. So if you are arguing against a god I’m not proposing, then you are arguing a straw man. I think other theists here in this forum would agree (if not, chime in). The probability of the God that is currently not intervening in the EPS, as WE are inclined to desire, would be found cumulatively in the internal, external and historical evidences for Christian theism. I can connect those reasons to Christian theism in particular but won’t now in order to stay focused on the particular points we’re currently wrangling with.
Would you at least agree that IF those “reasons” I listed were true, that God is not actually”necessarily” indifferent but rather effecting the outcome of those reasons?
ALL of this was to show that the AFI could fail. If the reasons were true then the probability for the the AFI would actually become zero. If you respond with “you still aren’t showing any evidences for those excuses” then go back and read my 10th sentence again and show some fault there. Give me a good reason to change my reasoning.
One you have no evidence is even probable, much less actual.
Ergo the God you just invented is improbable.
That’s the only relevant issue here.
So to show a fair probability for the God I’m proposing (you say inventing) I first need to demonstrate evidence for the existence of God (I guess His existence hinges somehow on whether or not we can successfully present the evidences). Then, second, somehow connect more evidence connecting to that God I’m proposing. Well, for so many people it comes back to what you are satisfied as reasonable evidence vs what God, if He exists, provides and deems sufficient evidence. Here we find that balance I described way earlier. On one side of the balance you have the proposed evidences and on the other side you have the capability to reject all the proposed evidences for whatever reasons you desire and go your own way and live this life as though He does not exist (this is where I suggested the coercion paradox and we went back and forth on what coercion was). Fair enough. The debate on evidence for God continues. Great discussion. I’m moving on to where you and Dr Marshall are currently in debate.
So is the debate just over? Dr. Marshall again offers no logical or demonstrable argument against Dr. Carrier’s AFI, nor even anything in support of his own position. Appeals to emotion and personal preference are not arguments, at least not arguments anyone else should accept.
Re: Moral vs Natural evils. Dr. Marshall implies moral evils have either a more widespread or qualitatively detrimental effect – that head counts aren’t all that matters. But that completely glosses over the way natural evils can ALSO have far-reaching effects on families, survivors, economies, and the world. Diseases and birth defects can alter entire lives and even be passed on to children. To say moral evils are greater has not been demonstrated in the slightest. And as Dr. Carrier pointed out, it wouldn’t even matter. That God causes indiscriminate destruction cannot be viewed as a moral punishment for crimes (one would need a warped sense of justice in the first place to think random attacks on disparate groups of people is just or somehow sending a viable message to sinners).
The hypothetical question is very interesting. Dr. Marshall is essentially asking whether someone would choose to get rid of natural evils or get rid or free will. He perhaps doesn’t see it that way, but it’s the reality of his question. And he should be careful, because it is the beginning of fascism. How much freedom are you willing to give up for moral safety?
Re: Animal Suffering. Dr. Marshall says the natural suffering of animals is some great lesson for humans to learn from. It’s completely ad-hoc.
Re: Tit-for-tat Police States. Dr. Marshall implies that inward moral character is unchanged and sociologists simply have never tested true beliefs. The first part isn’t an argument at all, it’s just Dr. Marshall’s feelings. Maybe people are still bad inside… ok, but what we care about is how they treat us and one another. Whether or not they are bad on the inside is pointless if it never manifests, and neuroscience can actually tell us that constant pressure actually does change our desires (to be good, for example) over time. The issue with sociology is basically just science denial. Scientists have used many methods to tease out internal beliefs/desires vs outward expression. It’s not perfect, but presuming it’s not been done or is all worthless is silly.
Re: Divine Justice from Dr. Carrier. This one seems to miss the point more than anything else. A moral god, wouldn’t be doling out punishment in the first place. A moral god would have created a moral world, and would have put barriers in place for immoral behavior. A moral god would have educated people on what moral actions are, would have encouraged moral behavior, and would have helped (not punished) when someone gets it wrong. Essentially, god would have been a good parent (but without all the human limitations of a parent). Dr. Marshall strikes me as the type of person who still thinks disciplining kids with a rod helps build character. The science is in, I’m afraid, and that’s just not the case.
Keith- Let me respond to your arguments in turn.
(1) Regarding moral vs. natural evils, the question of one’s preference for eliminating one vs. the other (if given the choice) is obviously relevant for deciding which is the greater evil. Almost any atheist I’ve ever talked to has said he would choose to eliminate moral evil—and that is, of course, taking into consideration all the emotional effects of natural evils upon us.
You don’t say above which you would choose to eliminate. If you say natural evils, than you can avoid the force of that particular argument. But it would also be incumbent upon you to explain how a “moral but not natural evils” world would be a happier place to live than a “natural but not moral evils” world. Assuming you would choose the former, what is argument for why it would be a happier state? I provided an argument above for why, absent moral evil, the world would feel almost like paradise.
(2) Faced with the stark reality of moral evil, yes, the atheist can argue that the goods resulting from free will, both in this life and (should it exist) the life of the world to come, don’t justify the evils resulting from free will, and that therefore, God shouldn’t have created creatures with free will. So what would your argument for that be?
(3) “Re: Animal Suffering. Dr. Marshall says the natural suffering of animals is some great lesson for humans to learn from.” What I said is that the violence, rapaciousness and selfishness of the animal kingdom “reflects” human evil. There certainly is a melancholy lesson in this. But there is also a justice, harmony and symmetry: Man is the king of creation, the chief and noblest species on the planet, the creature that (on the supposition of God’s existence, which is what the AFI is considering) joins together the physical and spiritual worlds. As such, it is fitting that the creation “underneath” man should reflect man’s own fallen condition.
I gave a second argument on this matter of the animal kingdom as well (see above).
(4) You write, “Maybe people are still bad inside… ok, but what we care about is how they treat us and one another. Whether or not they are bad on the inside is pointless if it never manifests.” First, it certainly would matter what they are on the inside—certainly to God, and even to us. Wouldn’t it matter to you if your neighbor hated your guts but simply never acted on it?
But of course, what people are on the inside DOES manifest. It may not manifest in violent assault on other’s people’s persons or properties, but it can and does manifest itself in hundreds of other ways that hurt and wound.
I don’t deny at all that sociologists can devise experiments for testing what people really feel/believe on the inside. I simply said that (a) making such a test for an entire population is another matter entirely, and (b) much more importantly, even if we can measure what Dr. Carrier calls the “moral markers” of the citizens of different countries, the factors contributing to those moral markers are far too varied for us to attribute them to policing methods. If anything, policing methods are more typically a RESPONSE to the moral uprightness (or lack thereof) of a state’s citizens, rather than a CAUSE of them.
That said, I don’t deny at all that discipline can help shape our moral sentiments for the better. My argument was that a “tit-for-tat” system of discipline won’t accomplish that. Just try it with your children (or if you don’t have children of your own, recommend it to some friends who have children and see what they respond). As I argue in my next (final) entry, God does in fact discipline the human race, albeit not in a police-state manner. That he does so is reflected in the numerous, cross-cultural maxims that take the form of, “What goes around comes around,” “You reap what you sow,” etc.
(5) You write, “A moral god, wouldn’t be doling out punishment in the first place. A moral god would have created a moral world, and would have put barriers in place for immoral behavior. A moral god would have educated people on what moral actions are, would have encouraged moral behavior, and would have helped (not punished) when someone gets it wrong.”
(a) Of course a moral God would punish evil–at least some evil. To fail to do so would be unjust, and if God is good, he must be just.
(b) God has put barriers in place to moral evil, as I explained in my answer to your (4) above.
(c) People have the basic education they need to act morally. All they would need to do is to not treat their neighbor in the ways that make them angry when they are treated the same way. But the tragedy of the human race is that we deal in a double standard and don’t in fact love our neighbor as ourselves. If we did there wouldn’t be any moral evil. So it’s not education that is the problem. It’s conviction for our sin (which we all have to some degree), repentance for it, and turning in a right direction.
(d) The moral economy God has established doesn’t just “punish us every time we get it wrong.” It is, on the contrary, chock-full of gentle directives that, if we would heed them, would set us in a better direction. Let any man be deeply in touch with his own heart and life, and he will find abundant encouragement for the good he does, as well as the dissatisfaction, and when necessary, bitter worm, for the evil choices he makes.
Thank you for the response. I will attempt to reply to each as succinctly as I can.
(1) Preference is not an argument. Even if I agree with your answer to the hypothetical, I may simply be a hypocrite in terms of the empirical data. It’s not that I’m making an argument for a different answer, it’s that your justification doesn’t establish your claim. And then further, there is no evidence that natural evils represent a just punishment from God. Saying that their “might” be just reason (or that victims might be equally deserving) is not in fact a point toward any probability of that being the case.
(2) I don’t think free will is logically coherent. I’m pointing out that your preference is somewhat hypocritical. God-based morality tends to require human free will for moral judgements/punishments to make sense. Indeed, you actually cheat the question from a God-framework, since by removing all moral evils God would have no reason to punish us with natural evils. You imply that people would be happier in a world essentially devoid of free will, but happiness (as far it is used in a Christian worldview) is impossible without free will.
(3) You’ve made a claim that animals suffer less than humans, which may be true. This does not counter the extreme timeframes involved in animal suffering prior to human existence. You’d have to establish that animal suffering is almost zero, which you haven’t. Your other argument amounts to preaching dogma. You haven’t justified any of your claims about animal suffering being a reflection of human immorality, that humans are kings of creation, or that they join spiritual and physical. None of those necessarily follow from the existence of a God in the first place.
(4) “But of course, what people are on the inside DOES manifest.” If that is the case, then it can be measured. And the best measures we have show that well-policed states show better measures of overall societal health. It should be easily inferred then that these groups are not manifesting as much, and are thus better on the inside as well.
I have children, and God’s form of discipline is by all scientific measures an incorrect form of parenting. Corporal punishment is bad for children, full stop. It provides short term obedience in exchange for greater likelihood of long-term problems. But it’s worse than that. God doesn’t even connect his punishments to specific actions, which only confuses children. Those maxims you cite are based on societal repercussions, and would hold true even in immoral societies.
(5a) You are incorrect. Discipline and punishment are different words. To discipline a child is to apply logical or natural consequences to a behavior in order to help them learn appropriate behavior. Punishment is a form of applied suffering in response to a behavior. Once again, the science is already in on this. Encouragement and discipline build character. Punishment builds resentment inhibits learning.
(5b) God created free will (in your view), which is the ultimate removal of barriers to immorality. As pointed out above, his punishment is at best not the correct way to inhibit immoral behavior. The God of the bible both sanctions and demands immoral actions. Your only defense of this is the dogma of Christianity (which hasn’t been established).
(5c) People LEARN morality. And some are taught incorrect moral precepts from the get-go which they carry throughout their lives. Love your neighbor as yourself had to be discovered, and even then is not fully accurate. So you’re claim “it’s not education” is wrong on its face. Attributing immorality to sin is just asserting your belief (which is still not in evidence). And it even ignores that God has created humans (sociopaths/psychopaths) who are incapable of being moral (sin did not convict them, God did).
(5d) The economy you are talking about here doesn’t require a God, just social creatures living in social settings. This has no bearing on the argument, and is just preaching.
This is such a confused post.
Well done for conceding the point on the nature of evidence… everything else is just, well…
Why would you choose to limit the “moral evil” over the “natural” ones (granting the false dichotomy here)? Moral evil is by its nature within our control to improve on; natural evil by its nature is out of our control. The obvious choice is to eliminate the evils we have no control over, and then to work on the evils we can control. The idea that opportunities for expressing sympathy is preferable to “no disease” is absurd. It is irrational, if given the choice, to choose to inflict harm simply so that they can view themselves in a better light. The idea of “human goodness” is not worth the sacrifice of life and limb.
To put it another way, these “higher orders of moral good” (to paraphrase) are only valuable if a state containing natural evils is inevitable; if it is even possible that natural evils could be eliminated, then the value of these good acts falls to zero. Given the thought experiment you propose allows us to eliminate natural evils, then we should not consider the lower order of moral goods when deciding which to eliminate.
Consider as well, the “real-world” example of “thoughts and prayers for the victims”. How often does this meaningfully reduce the suffering in the wake of, say a hurricane? Even if we consider, say, charity, which aids in the rebuilding after a hurricane, as a higher-order good which would not exist, we still net out at less total good after the hurricane after the charity workers have mitigated the result. There is no amount of human good that could completely mitigate natural evil.
I could go on…
BLOTONTHELANDSCAPE-
(1) You write, “Moral evil is by its nature within our control to improve on; natural evil by its nature is out of our control. The obvious choice is to eliminate the evils we have no control over, and then to work on the evils we can control.”
I just think this is naive in the extreme. Even a really righteous person who strives with all his might to live in charity and sincerity with his fellow man, will discern plenty of remaining imperfection in himself to where he should, if he is thinking clearly, desire to be made perfect over say, being assured that he will never get a terrible disease.
But even if a man were perfect himself, or so close to it that he felt he’d rather have a pass on natural evils affecting him than to be made completely perfect (and frankly, we would all judge such a person—and rightly—as self-deceived and pompous with regard to his own moral condition)—but waiving that aside, the fact remains that the question I pose above is not simply for one’s own self, but for the entire human race! Would you then, if choosing for the entire race, prefer the elimination of natural evil over making the human race perfect in love, sincerity and charity?
(2) You write, “There is no amount of human good that could completely mitigate natural evil.” Mitigation is by its nature incomplete, of course. Note also that you trivialize my point with the notion of mere “thoughts and prayers for the victims,” when in a morally perfect society the love and sweetness would extend way beyond that.
But say we take your trivializing away, put what I actually wrote in its place (“a genuine empathy that entered into its fellow humans’ joys as much as their sufferings”), replace “mitigate” with “make up for,” and then consider your statement, “There is no amount of human good that could completely mitigate natural evil.”
Here I simply disagree and think you are not weighing sufficiently the beauty, depth and sweetness of the manifestation of those compassionate virtues.
But maybe you just mean that such virtues don’t make up for the vast and broad extent of natural evils that human beings suffer. With that (more modest) claim, I’d agree, and that’s why the other, and central, part of my argument is essential, namely that natural evils are not there simply to test and manifest such virtues, but to manifest the displeasure of God (or “wrath of God,” if you prefer the classical phrase) against human evil. The breadth and depth and bitterness of natural evils is commensurate with (though actually in the divine mercy far less severe than) the breadth and depth and bitterness of human evil.
Not only are natural evils less than we deserve, but the immense natural goods we experience are better than we deserve.
Thank you for your response.
This all feels rather trivial, and I’d certainly concede that my answer is naive, because it’s in response to a contrived thought experiment built on a false dichotomy.
So let’s start by pointing out the following:
The vast majority of “moral evils” come about as a response to “natural ones”, and I’m not just talking about earthquakes and tsunami’s. The basic economic problem of scarcity is at its base a key reason people are driven to behave in morally evil ways. This is entirely natural (there is only so much land, and it can only be used n so many ways, to the maximal benefit of so many people).
I would propose that by eliminating “natural” evils (including scarcity), you would eliminate the key driver for many of the moral evils we inflict on each other, and insofar as humans continue to behave “immorally”, the impact is reduced, the policing can be more focused, and of course, we already have our existing capacity for empathy, compassion and beauty to fall back on.
On the other hand, even if we maximised the moral desire of humanity, we would still be limited in our ability to act on those desires. “Thoughts and prayers” becomes all that a morally good person can offer in the majority of situations; and no matter how strongly they feel empathy, they still only have so much to give to mitigate/”make up” for the loss.
And no amount of empathy will bring someone back from the dead. Whereas death, being a natural evil, would be eliminated if we chose that. For that matter, why not include pain? Toil? It seems theologically justified (cf Genesis), and I would certainly consider them. If those were eliminated, even some of the most extreme moral evils (e.g. the sadist who derives enjoyment from inflicting suffering) is untenable.
Which brings me to the ad hoc idea of divine justice. Divine justice must exist for natural evil to make sense in order to justify God allowing their existence, hence why it is ad hoc; but it simply does not make sense. As has already been pointed out on this thread and others, the indiscriminate, disproportionate nature of natural disasters makes it an extremely ineffective tool for keeping moral failings in check. What about the indiscriminate suffering of millions of people gives us an indication of exactly what behaviour displeased God?
On the other hand, natural disasters are predictable, at least on geographic lines; so we are left with a philosophical conundrum: What is it about living on the “Ring of Fire” in the Pacific ocean that makes people more prone to evil? What did people in Africa do to deserve the famines, the disease, the dangerous flora and fauna which afflict them? What is modern white Europe doing right in God’s eyes that can overcome the various evils.
Again, the point has been made well elsewhere, the belief that “we” “deserve” this is an absurd justification based on nothing but the theology of original sin, which has no basis in reality.
It almost seems like choice 2 must be assuming some variation of choice 1, with relatively benign natural evils.
A heavy storm that takes out the power, damages a few roof tiles and some windows, without horrifying consequences. No meaningless drowning of hundreds of victims in the flood caused by a heavier storm nor any damage that can’t be fixed in a few days. A heavy flu that takes you out for two weeks or a benign tumorous growth that can be removed, but nothing terminal.
In short, nice opportunities to bond together, to show love and compassion and be thankful, without any truly serious consequences.
Frans- I am taking the full extent of all natural evils into view, and asking you to compare that with the full extent of human evil. With those two things before you, which would you choose to eliminate if given the choice?
For where I live here and now in the Benelux, probably human evil. However, this is a privileged position, and it’s also not clear that it’s the best long-term plan. Globally speaking the majority of the world might well envy us on a relative lack of natural and human evil alike.
We only suffer the possibility of a devastating flood once a century or so, and seldom particularly serious droughts, earthquakes or other environmental problems. By and large that’s not something anybody else can learn from one way or the other. We may have created excellent water management, but that only improves on a fundamentally fairly good situation. We just don’t get Katrinas or Indian/Pacific Ocean tsunamis over here.
I don’t understand how human evil is obviously the one to pick if we don’t implicitly get rid of the Black Death, the Spanish flu, and the aforementioned tsunamis, just to mention a few of the worst natural disasters that spring to mind. It’s hardly an argument I feel comfortable writing down, but the Spanish flu alone may more than equal WW1 & 2.
If we don’t implicitly lessen the effects of natural evil to European levels, that seems to imply defining human evil as worse from the outset. Doing so could definitely make intuitive sense. In case of similar results, you have the intent of the perpetrator on top of whatever the results are, thus making human evil the unenviable winner. But it’s also begging the question, because if we assume God’s intent is responsible for natural evil, that argument requires defining God’s evil (partially) away. Alternatively or additionally, this might require defining God’s good as more good than human good.
Would that be a reasonable interpolation of the premises behind the statement that anybody would choose to do away with human evil?
Christ – as the secund Adam – has setl’d the outstanding det via His wurk on the cross.
why is natur still red in tooth n claw?
Sin can’t hav any furthr lejitimat claim on this wurld. the transaction is cumplete – the till has rung.
If adam switches the light off and we’r all in a red-in-tooth-and-claw wurld
Jesus switcht the light back on.
If sumwun setls a bill, there can be no furthr just penalty on me.
we shud NAU be in a evilless, problumless, dethless, illnessless, sorryless, upsetless, badless, cryless, painless, irkless purfikt wurld thanks t the
christ cross-act.
Sorry, that whole comment is unintelligible.
Let me try and makit mor intellijibl fr u, dr carrier.
If sumwun fully pays a bill on ur behalf, r u still liabl fr penalty?
Christ has alredy paid the sin det (he cudn’t forgiv but he paid).
so why arn’t we back in eden as we were orijinally?
why ar we still suffring in a fallen wurld?
Okay, thank you. That makes more sense.
You have a good point, IMO. Everything should be fixed now. The theology requires several more epicycles to get it to fit observations. Which is why it’s so improbable.
Capital.
And just t’ add, if I might – re free will thing.
Just as I wasn’t askt whethr I agreed with adam’s action, but was ‘unwillingly’ ixpel’d FROM Eden (as adam was my proxy)…
I shudn’t be askt about Jesus’ wurk repairing adam’s damage eithr ie we shud ALL be impeld TU Eden – becuz that is our original and natural abode – to deny god is nesasrily admitting u’r fallen.
ie if jesus switches the light back on, it is useless asking me whether I believ I’m in a lit room.
And will those in paradise post jujmunt hav free will
or be mindless automata?
I think Paul whu seems clevr realises the weakness’v his own argumunt when he parallels adam to Jesus.
Romans 5.19 where he must use the future…’will be made righteous’ not ‘..are made righteous’. a mark of authenticity of his letrs as per bart ehrman btw.
Regarding Marshall’s ad hoc excuse for why God would create natural evil: God doesn’t need to create evil for us to appreciate good. He could simply eliminate the evil and then design our minds so that they don’t adapt to the new state of affairs by taking the new state for granted.
This is exactly my problem with that line of thinking. Well put!
MJONCK (and BLOTONTHELANDSCAPE since you second the comment above):
My primary argument as to why natural evil exists is that it is the just desert of humanity for its greater moral evil. The point you are referencing above is in connection to God’s mercy even in administering this justice. So:
(1) The punishment of our moral evil (in the form of natural evil) is less severe than our moral evil itself.
(2) Although we suffer from natural evils, we also receive amazing goodness and sweetness in life.
(3) –and this is where your point particularly comes in–Even in our suffering of natural evil, there are other goods God accomplishes besides the administration of justice for our moral evil. This factor mitigates the severity of that justice.
(4) Re. the psychological connection between our experience of evil/suffering and our appreciation of the good: I agree that the former is not necessary in order to (a) not take for granted, or (b) even appreciate deeply. But it is undeniable, I think, that the appreciation is MUCH DEEPER after having experienced evil and loss. That’s just a fundamental part of a rational-aesthetic psychological framework, and thus not something God can just override, as it were.
But do remember that (4) is NOT my justification for God afflicting the human race with natural evils. It would, however, be part of the justification for why God would create a world where moral evil—and thus the consequent natural evil—is a possibility. But that’s a topic for another day.
You are either narrowing the broad or broadening the narrow in whichever way suits your worldview, and it’s incoherent.
Again, addressed elsewhere, but in this context:
“We” don’t suffer proportionately, nor do “we” enjoy life proportionately. My neighbour gets pancreatic cancer but I win the lottery. My beautiful daughter celebrates her 9th birthday this year, while my friends still mourn their stillborn child who was due only a few months later. I was born white in apartheid South Africa, just a few miles away from cholera-ridden shanty towns that stretch over the horizon. They “deserve” this? You can’t simply “average” suffering and pleasure over the population and give god a pat on the back for a job well done, but this is effectively what you are doing in (1) and (2) above.
(3) those goods are irrelevant in a world sans the need for them, and this is necessarily preferable (after all “Mitigation is by its nature incomplete”).
(4) It most certainly is deniable; as per the OP, “and then design our minds so that they don’t adapt to the new state of affairs by taking the new state for granted” goes for the full extent of removed evil. God could always encode us maximal appreciation for the good, rendering the experience of evil meaningless for this purpose. Far be it from me to tell people what God “can’t” do. #specialpleading.
Dr. Marshall states:
Response: This is the “silver lining” argument where the theist tries to suggest that the goodness that can come from tragedy makes it (or can make it) all worth while.
It is true that there can be some seemingly unfortunate circumstances or events in life where the person ultimately ends up all the better for it. But the greater the tragedy and the more people impacted lessen the likelihood of that happening. Such is the case with earthquakes, tsunamis, tornadoes, and volcanoes, mudslides, etc.
When these tragic events strike there are inevitably examples of compassion from those that attempt to rescue and assist those impacted. And while those can make for heartwarming stories on your local news channel I don’t think that any reasonable person would say that it makes it all worthwhile. I can’t imagine that any loving parent who lost a child in one of those tragic events, if given the option to (A) somehow undo what was done or (B) keep the feeling of love and appreciation for those who reached out to help and comfort them in their time of need would choose option B. I just can’t imagine that they would consider themselves (and the loved ones tragically lost) to be all the while better for it (such a tragedy) despite whatever “silver lining” or heart warming story might come from it.
OU812INVU-
I’ll refer to what I’ve now replied to several comments above regarding:
(a) what I propose as the PRIMARY justification for God afflicting the human race with natural evil; and
(b) that the hypothetical choice I propose is not for one’s individual life but for the whole race.
To address your point on a narrower level, though (I mean, with regard to how an individual feels in the aftermath of suffering severely from a natural evil): It is of course generally true that one would not “wish” for that evil to have happened, despite whatever benefits came from it. And yet paradoxically, people do often reflect that they are in fact better, deeper, more authentic human beings for having experienced these things. Listen to that Sam Harris podcast I reference in a footnote to my next (final) entry on Carrier’s AFI.
But again, that is a secondary, not primary, justification, for natural evils.
Marshall still seems quite confused about conditional probabilties:
Assuming B is ~A then we call Z evidence for A and against B.
It doesn’t matter if the odds are 2:1 or 1001:1000, Z is evidence against B (the latter would be weaker evidence however).
We also have terminology for people claiming that Z is evidence for B in the above case: they’re mistaken, in the wrong, lying, mislead, confused or deluded.