Imagine you just became a god. No, really. One second from now you become all powerful—for no reason at all; no one did this to you, you didn’t earn it, it literally just randomly happens. And by having all powers logically possible, you immediately also become all wise, all knowing, and all good. Because through total power you can will to acquire all wisdom and knowledge; and it occurs to you in an instant that that would be useful. And then you find out, you’re the only one of these god thingies there is or has ever been. And by knowing all things, and responding to that knowledge wisely, you recognize at once that the only wise and true thing to be is all good—because, tautologically: whatever would be the wisest way to behave in the light of knowing all truths, simply would be, by definition, the maximal good. If you know everything, you know all true moral propositions; and moral propositions can only be true if they describe what any fully informed and rational agent would do; and as it happens, you just became one of those (see The Objective Value Cascade).

Never mind the particulars. Yes, there are some contradictory states in there that will still limit you (some things you can’t know or do, because it is logically impossible to). And yes, one can quibble about what definition of “true” or “moral” we are talking about. And so on. But never mind that. You are now all powerful and all knowing, to only the obscurest of limits; and you now behave with perfect, fully informed rationality, no matter what we call that. What would you change? Remember, what “you” would change, as in you right now, does not answer this question. You right now are not all wise and all knowing. So what you would think of doing right now, might resemble not at all what you would think of doing when you actually have no gaps in your knowledge and no flaws in your thinking and no psychological baggage capable of altering what you know to be true, in that hypothesized circumstance. Of course, we are not, right now, all knowing and whatnot. So we can only speak of what you probably would do in that hypothesized circumstance. “But you don’t know for sure” is not a relevant objection to that. “But I can think of things that could be true, unbeknownst to us, that would change what’s probable” is not a relevant objection, either, because being merely possible does not alter what is probable (see Is a Good God Logically Impossible?).

The answer, as to what you would change, must simply be the same as the answer to what we expect to observe if any such God existed at all. And that answer will always be to some probability, never a certainty. And only facts, not mere possibilities, can ever lower that probability. This is just how evidence-based reasoning works. There’s no way around it (see First: How Evidence Works, disregarding its superfluous context here as only an example there of the application of general principles).

Honing the Thought Experiment

Now imagine that, instead of this happening in the next second, it happened fourteen billion years ago. You just pop into existence, uncaused, unaccompanied. No history. No upbringing. No genetic proclivities. No mammalian peculiarities. And nothing else exists but your mind and its thoughts. What then do you do?

Time now exists, because you are thinking, from one moment to the next. Space exists, too, albeit in the most minimal sense possible, because you have a location—it’s just that wherever you are is the only location there is (so far). You created neither of these. They simply must necessarily exist in order for you to exist. To exist, you must at some point exist, and you must exist somewhere. So your very existence entails the emergence of space and time as well. So as soon as you popped into existence, by logical necessity so did they (see The Problem with Nothing).

So you’re stuck with that. Nothing you can do. Except, maybe, will yourself (and all the rest) out of existence; but, let’s say, being all knowing and all wise and all good, you don’t see that as a good thing to do. To the contrary, you conclude it would be a grave injustice to throw away the gift of being and power, or to hoard the pleasures and possibilities (the innate wealth) of such self-consciousness selfishly only for yourself.

So you decide to create a world and to people it with diverse persons, to share the bounty. Maybe, indeed, you make all possible worlds, with all possible configurations, of all possible people. But regardless, all these worlds must have some construction guidelines. You don’t want them to be random hellholes. That would be awful (see How Not to Live in Zardoz). So you won’t create every logically possible world. Nor will you create every logically possible person. Rather, you will create every one of those that’s possible that is good. Because you do nothing but good now.

Okay. So. What then, in this alternative reality, would the world most probably be like?

Ten Examples

There are probably hundreds of ways the world we now find ourselves in would look different than it does. In fact, one for every argument against the existence of God; and since every argument for the existence of God is actually an argument against the existence of God, once you put back in the evidence each leaves out, every argument for the existence of God will also correspond to a way the world would actually, most likely, be different than it is. This is why atheism is true. If atheism were false, the world would look like a world made by such a god. That it doesn’t is how we know there is no god.

And yes, trying to vomit up a bunch of implausible, completely made-up excuses for why this God would choose to make only a world that looked exactly like a world with no God in it, will not help you here. Because that’s just a bunch of implausible shit you just made up. So far as we know, no such shit exists or happens or is the case. So, as far as we know, God has no such excuses. And we are only talking about what we know, which means here, what a rational person must conclude given the data available. Hence all we ever really “know” is a probability of any given thing, not the thing itself (see The Gettier Problem). And that probability follows necessarily from the data available; so, yes, we could be wrong, for want of data that would change everything, but we do not know this (there is no data making it likely), so we cannot rationally claim it is the case. We’re just left with what we can rationally claim to know. And that’s that the world looks exactly like a world would have to look if there was no God. This much is a fact (see Bayesian Counter-Apologetics: Ten Arguments for God Destroyed).

But that leads to the converse question: What if there were such a God? What (probably) would the world look like then? After all, what does a world look like that can’t be godless? (At least, “can’t” to any probability worth entertaining.) What would be any different between the only kind of world that can be observed if there is no God, and a world that actually was made by a God? Well, all we have to do is flip every argument the other way around. Here I’ll do the ten arguments I surveyed in Ten Arguments for God Destroyed, which are the most common and popular. But once you see the pattern, you can do it with any other argument as well. For a plethora of examples to work from, see my series on Plantinga’s ‘Two Dozen or So’ Arguments for God (and you might find more if you scan through my blog’s atheism category). But there are evidently over a hundred more, since Majesty of Reason found 150+ Arguments for God, and with the same Bayesian reasoning in Ten Arguments, you can invert every one into an argument against God, by simply adding what that argument had to leave out to get to God.

But here, I’ll just do my top ten.

1. The Cosmological Argument

Rhetorically it’s most effective to simply point out that none of the premises of any cosmological argument are sound (just as all ontological arguments are just re-deployments of the existential fallacy). We have never established “every thing that begins to exist must have a cause,” or “everything that exists had a beginning,” or “disembodied superminds somehow still violate one or both principles.” That pretty much ends the argument (apart from all the pearl-clutching desperation and delusional handwaving that theists engage in the moment you say that). So if that’s what you’re here for, then you want to read my cosmology debate with Wallace Marshall. Because we’re not doing that here. Here we’re flipping the script and asking: if God existed, what should we expect as pertains to the cosmological argument?

In truth, God does not need most of the cosmological argument’s premises to be true. God can pop into existence randomly, or exist as necessarily as a quantum mechanical vacuum might, and still exist; even be proved to exist. The universe can be past eternal and it still be the case that God exists and manifested that eternal timeverse (see Is Science Impossible without God?). But the third premise is essential to any cosmological argument for God: because in order for God to exist, and there remain any significant cosmological role for him in accounting for what exists, completely disembodied minds have to be possible. Because if you allow God to be an embodied mind, you’ve just allowed mindless things to explain everything instead (like a quantum mechanical vacuum: see The Myth That Science Needs Christianity); and, inconveniently, they perform better as explanations (as the other nine examples we’ll be covering here show).

Of course, that didn’t have to be the case. It could be that God is embodied, and he created us and the world we live in. It just won’t be necessary that he did, and thus we can’t argue for his existence this way. But if we want to be able to argue from cosmology to the existence of a God, we need it to be the case that God can have his fabulous mind even without any way to embody and thus structure it (see The Argument from Specified Complexity against Supernaturalism). And that has consequences. First, it means we don’t need to have embodied minds, either. But we’ll get to that (it’s example #4). Second, it means we should observe this to be the case. In other words, it should not be the case that Naturalism Is Not an Axiom of the Sciences but a Conclusion of Them.

We should observe things to be the other way around: the supernatural (as in, mental phenomena not reducible to nonmental phenomena, per Defining the Supernatural) should be well documented by now. We should have lots of examples of it being the case that minds and mentalities require no embodiment to “exist” and affect the world. There are many ways we could see that—sorcery could be a thing; or ghosts; or miracles accessibly provable; or we could lack an embodied mind ourselves. Miracle healing wings in hospitals. Hogwarts. Real parapsychological findings of any kind. Or any of countless other possible things. None of which “has” to be the case. There are countless different ways to occupy reality with the supernatural. Rather, that not even one is the case is simply improbable if a disembodied God exists. Because this means God went out of his way to rule out and prevent any provable manifestation of any supernaturalism whatever. He literally rigged the universe to look exactly like a universe with nothing supernatural in it (and hence no God in it, either). That’s weird. And weird means unusual. And unusual means infrequent. And infrequent means improbable. “But maybe God had some excuse…” does not escape the fact that such an excuse is not in evidence, much less even plausible, and therefore the improbability of all this remains. If you have to fabricate a weird excuse for God to do something weird, it remains thereby weird. And that simply means improbable.

But this means we should expect the universe to be different than this: more probably than not (again, not “absolutely certainly,” just “more probably than not”) the world should be much more routinely and provably supernatural than it is. And there are lots of ways that could be (as the next nine examples show). Film has explored countless examples of what actually God-inhabited worlds look and behave like, from Time Bandits to Constantine to Dogma, though these usually try to gerrymander in an explanation of why we somehow never notice any of this, and thus they remain exercises in convoluted excuse-making. A far more obvious example is simply: every depiction of heaven ever. Because in a real God-inhabited world, there would be no plausible reason for any other world but heaven. You can’t have any more or less free will there than here. And it can’t (by definition) “suck” to live there eternally. So that would, in all probability, simply be where we live.

One could still ponder whether it was all a computer simulation. Sure. But at some point of inquiry that would simply become the less probable hypothesis—never impossible, mind you. But once you’ve been hanging out with a Divine James Mason in What Dreams May Come long enough, the simverse hypothesis will start to epistemically resemble a far more convoluted and implausible conspiracy theory, like The Matrix, where “the perfect world was a dream that your primitive cerebrum kept trying to wake up from” is actually far more plausibly the actual world we’d live in (because only fools would assume Agent Smith was a reliable narrator). A cosmological argument would make sense then. Because then, how else could such a world have come to exist but as the conception of an all-powerful mind? Our world has numerous sensible explanations without any God at the bottom of it. But if God did it, it should be the other way around.

The bottom line is, if God existed, we’d live in a fantastical world. Not this one. For if you were God (as posited above), what good reason would you have to ever create any other? And that would go toward proving some God existed and created it all. Then we’d have a cosmological argument that actually worked.

2. The Fine-Tuning Argument

This one’s easy. If you made a world, you simply would not muck about with the Standard Model, or physical constants of any kind, much less waste billions of years fiddling idly and trash countless lightyears with lethal useless junk-and-radiation-filled vacuum just to share the prospect of life with the people you meant to make, and then make them so badly designed they are plagued with illnesses and vulnerabilities to a still-hostile environment even in the one microscopic place they are supposed to live. To the contrary, that is what the world would have to look like if there was no God; because then, that is the only universe that could produce observers to notice, as all that waste is necessary for a random chance accident to generate us.

But not if there’s a God. God does not need to roll dice. Literally. He can just make what he wants. Like, poof! It’s there. All this chucking more and more at the problem and waiting around for luck to finally get the result you want, all these needlessly convoluted metrics like the mass of the charm quark or the electromagnetic moment or the expansion constant, and all to end up with a sloppy result plagued with design failures and injustices, would have no reason to exist. God doesn’t need them. Only godless worlds do. This is so fantastically bizarre a result, so inexplicably exactly what we expect if God does not exist, that there simply is no plausible explanation for why God would choose to build us and our world this way.

If God existed, we’d have pretty much something like what Aristotle or the Bible imagined: a fully inhabited cosmos, top to bottom, no larger or older than it needed to be, everything in existence and working together right out of the gate, Day One. Genesis would have been confirmed to be literally true by now. Or something the like. Space would be a breathable, inhabitable area, void of murderous radiation and meteoric missiles. People would already live there, as they will have done, like us down here, since the first instant of creation. The world would work exactly as needed, without hitch, simply by God’s will. There’d be no need of gravity. Things would just fall where he wanted. There would be no nuclear physics. Substances would just have the properties he wanted. There would be no electromagnetism. Light would just shine where he wanted, matter would just cohere as he wanted, and if he still wanted magnets, he’d just will them into existence and to work as he pleased.

Again, heaven, or something comparably nice and fantastical, is simply where we’d live. God would have no need of making any other world.

Desperate pearl-clutching will vomit itself forth the moment you point this out, and a thousand implausible, ad hoc excuses will be made up on the spot to try and deny this obvious point. But they all fall apart on any honest examination. “But we need some danger in our lives or the opportunity to exercise our free will, or some such whatever,” changes nothing. A more morally governed, more fantastical, and thoroughly life-designed cosmos—which no godless physics could credibly explain—can have as much of that as God wants. So that doesn’t get you to this world. “But God can’t violate our consent by making it impossible to deny his existence,” also changes nothing. The world and its facts God made already do that, so obviously that is no concern of God’s (“How dare God make it impossible to deny we’re mortal or that our neighbor exists, or for our free will to not be able to dodge a bullet yet able to dodge a rock! He’s so immoral!!”), but more to the point, it is not his existence that we are supposed to choose to believe in, but his sovereignty. If Satan can be certain God exists and still reject him, so can we; especially as God made us, so he can make us however susceptible or open to that choice under any conditions whatever as he wants. There can still be willful villains in a fantastical world.

All such excuses thus fall to the same fact: if you were God, this is not the world you would make. No moral entity would, who had the option not to. And God, as defined here, is maximally moral and has every logically possible option open to him. It is simply improbable that we’d find ourselves here (see, again, Is a Good God Logically Impossible?). Because it is far more probable we’d find ourselves in a fantastical world of Aristotle or Genesis or any film ever that lets gods actually do what gods would actually do. And that would go to proving it. A fantastical world that cannot be explained with cosmological and particle physics is not only what you, too, would build; it would also be a world we could not credibly argue was not made by a god (or something near enough).

If you wanted evidence to prove God exists, you can’t get it from Fine Tuning. But exactly the thing you want Fine Tuning to do for you, you would get if God made the kind of world only gods could make. And that would be a fantastical one, possessed of moral governance and morally conscientious design, not horrific or capricious, and held together not by any godless physics but by God’s very will. It would not be fourteen billion years old, but only however many years humans existed. It would not be billions of lightyears across, but only however many as God wished to colonize with life. It would not be almost entirely life-killing garbage, but an almost entirely life-bearing expanse. It would be designed for purpose—life. And it would be designed morally—not recklessly and irresponsibly and murderously and unjustly and indifferently as our world is.

And it would be designed—it would leave nothing to chance. You, as God, would ensure nothing else. Indeed, your very conscience would forbid you doing anything else. If despite your unlimited means the world you build is not a safe and good and well-ordered place to live, you have not only failed as a moral being—but even just as an engineer (see, again, How Not to Live in Zardoz and Is a Good God Logically Impossible?, and again points below). We expect a successful and moral engineer to produce a successful and moral world design. And so that is what we would have seen. “Theism predicts a universe directly governed by justice-laws, or a kind and just stewardship.” And it predicts a world that is actually designed, engineered, governed, thoroughly fit to purpose—not a junkyard where life is an extraordinarily rare and merely emergent byproduct of a capricious and inconvenient chaos.

Then we’d have a design argument that actually worked.

3. The Argument from Biogenesis

Even easier. Life as we observe it just isn’t what you would make were you God. Not only because it’s a shitty way to do it (not only morally but just from a basic perspective of elegance of design), but also, quite simply, because you have no need of all that bullshit. You’re frackin God.

[T]he only way we could exist without a God is by an extremely long process of evolution by natural selection, beginning from a single molecule, through hundreds of millions of years of single cells, through hundreds of millions of years of cooperating cells, to hundreds of millions of years of multicellular organisms; so atheism predicts essentially that; theism does not (without, again, piling on excuses).

Now reverse this. You’re God. Why muck about with billions of years of evolution? You would just make everything. Boom! OOTB. And why build complex animals and people out of single cells, vastly multiplying catastrophic replication error and making possible countless other destructive failure modes? You would just make animals and people. No cells. Just bodies. You’d imbue them with whatever properties you wanted. Animation. Warmth. Self-repair. Viruses and cancer then wouldn’t even be possible, much less exist. And so if God existed, this is what we’d observe: life would not be explicable as a byproduct of a long, messy, random walk of happenstance experimentation; it would just instantly exist. Life would not be explicable as an inevitable cascade of chemical metabolism, it would just magically work.

Perfect design, from a perfect designer. Exactly as God willed. No error modes. No cheats. No Rube Goldberg contraptions. And that would be evidence for God. Then we’d have an argument from biogenesis that actually worked.

4. The Argument from Consciousness

Even easier. If you were God, consciousness would work completely differently, for everyone. And here’s why:

[T]hat we need brains to generate conscious phenomena is quite unexpected if God exists. Because if God exists, disembodied minds can exist, and are the best minds to have, therefore we should also have disembodied minds. Indeed, there is no inherent reason it would even occur to a god to make our minds out of brains at all (without, again, a pile of convenient excuses). Whereas if God does not exist, the only way minds could exist is as the output of a complex physical machine that evolved slowly by natural selection over hundreds of millions of years from ultra-simple worm-brains to fish-brains, lizard-brains, mammal-brains, monkey-brains, ape-brains, hominid-brains, and eventually human brains. Just as we observe.

Brains disprove God. They “inefficiently exhaust oxygen and energy, and place us in needless risk of injury and death, and intellectual malfunction, due to their delicate vulnerability and badly organized structure.” All pointless. If you were God, this is the last thing you’d try. To the contrary, you’d not muck about with such crap contraptions. You would simply give people souls. Exactly as theists believe. And you’d simply will that those souls have the property of controlling their assigned bodies, and the property of experiencing sensations from those bodies, and in whatever particular ways. Done and dusted. No convoluted, wasteful, malfunction-prone meat boxes. That way, nothing would interfere with anyone’s free will or rational thought. That design would be vastly superior to what we have now. And therefore it’s what a vastly superior designer would design. Which couldn’t easily be explained with godless physics.

Perfect design, from a perfect designer. Exactly as God willed. No error modes. No cheats. No Rube Goldberg contraptions. And that would be evidence for God. Then we’d have an argument from consciousness that actually worked.

5. The Argument from Reason

This one should already have been obvious:

If God did not design us, our innate reasoning abilities should be shoddy and ad hoc and only ever improved upon by what are in essence culturally (not biologically) installed software patches (like the scientific method, logic and mathematics, and so on), which corrected our reasoning abilities only after thousands of years of humans trying out different fixes, fixes that were only discovered through human trial and error, and not communicated in any divine revelation or scripture. But if God did design us, our brains should have worked properly from the start and required no software patches, much less software patches that took thousands of years to figure out, and are completely missing from all supposed communications from God.

The theists hilariously try to argue that we can’t be perfectly rational beings without intelligent design—completely missing the joke: that we aren’t perfectly rational beings; yet, indeed, could have been, exactly as they themselves think we should! This means their own argument disproves God, precisely because their own assumption is correct: if God existed, we’d be perfectly rational from Day One. Not shit reasoners who needed millennia to fumble our own way into finding workarounds.

And so it would be. If you were God, you would not make broken people whose susceptibility to cultural biases and mental illnesses and whose natural ineptitude at thinking, reasoning, and judging would be so ubiquitous—or even possible at all. That’s a design failure. And an immoral one at that. Because you’d have no excuse. You could have made us solid, reliable reasoners right out of the gate—no neurological biases and standard error-modes, no need of figuring out and manually installing scientific, logical, mathematical, and critical reasoning. And so choosing not to do that makes you culpable for every consequence resulting from your choice. But, remember…you’re All Good. Your conscience would thus forbid you doing anything else for the people you took upon yourself the responsibility to create.

It is therefore far more probable—vastly more probable—that if you, as God, existed, then we’d have these well-engineered minds that already are free of built-in error modes and already pre-installed with a complete suite of top-notch critical-thinking firmware. Godless hypotheses would actually struggle to explain that. Then we’d have an argument from reason that actually worked.

6. The Argument from Religious Experience

Likewise:

We have evidence of divine communications going back tens of thousands of years (in shamanic cave art, the crafting of religious icons, ritual burials, and eventually shrines, temples, and actual writing, on stone and clay, then parchment, papyrus and paper). Theism without added excuses predicts that all communications from the divine would be consistently the same at all times in history and across all geographical regions, and presciently in line with the true facts of the world and human existence, right from the start. Atheism predicts, instead, that these communications will be pervasively inconsistent across time and space, and full of factual errors about the world and human existence, exactly matching the ignorance of the culture “experiencing the divine” at that time. And guess what? We observe exactly what atheism predicts; not at all what theism predicts. And again, adding excuses for that, only makes theism even more improbable.

So, turn that around, and we’d be observing instead what theism predicts: substantially consistent communications with and experiences of the divine across all times, cultures, and places the world over, and exhibiting remarkable knowledge, not locally congruent ignorance. We’d also be able to talk to God whenever we wanted, and he could tell us why he can’t or won’t answer any given question we ask, and answer all the rest. Because God, being God, is not limited in time resources (you can’t overwhelm or distract him), and, like any other sentient being, can more effectively accomplish his goals through cooperation, communication, persuasion, and the sharing of information. It is simply improbable that he’d behave any other way, or even allow the world to end up any other way.

Again, godless hypotheses would actually struggle to explain all that, or indeed even one of those two things. So then we’d have an argument from religious experience that actually worked.

7. The Argument from Miracles

It simply isn’t true that God would refrain from performing miracles to our benefit and edification. Indeed, theists contradict each other repeatedly on this point, constantly insisting he would never do that, then the next day insisting he did and therefore miracles prove he exists and that he even wanted them to. Pick a lane. In any event, if you were God, “hands off” is not how you would behave; it’s not even morally how you could behave. Sit idly by and watch children be raped, slaves be whipped, trenches be gassed, workers accidentally fall to their death, volcanoes burn villagers, plagues end millions of lives in misery? That’s grossly immoral. And you are All Good, remember? And you are not limited by anything (time, resources, wisdom). You can mete out rescue in sensible measure, precisely as much as is right and good, neither too meddling nor too neglectful. So no excuses theists give answer here.

Quite simply, “theism predicts miracles will be commonplace and physically inexplicable (e.g. Christian healing wings in hospitals would exist where amputees have their limbs restored by prayer, or anything like that; yet we observe not a single thing like that).” As I already mentioned, science should have confirmed the world is awash with the supernatural. It found the opposite. But if God existed, that’s not what we’d have found. We’d have found the supernatural abundant, reliably verifiable, and well-studied. A government can only be claimed to exist if it governs. In the total absence of any government, the only conclusion is that a government does not exist. Whereas, in the regular demonstrable presence of a government—taking action and meeting its responsibilities as shepherd and protector and teacher—then we’d have evidence of one. And then we’d have an argument from miracles that actually worked.

8. The Moral Argument

The theists eat their own foot on this one. They insist morality proves God. But the moralities that come from “gods” are provably barbaric and false. Reality would not work that way if there really were a God:

[A]theism predicts that moral rules will only come from human beings, and thus will begin deeply flawed, and will be improved by experiment over a really long time (each improvement coming after empirically observing the social discomfort and dissatisfaction and waste that comes from flawed moral systems). And atheism also predicts that will happen only slowly over thousands of years, because humans are imperfect reasoners. And that is exactly what we observe. Just look at the examples of slavery and the subordination of women in the Bible.

By contrast, theism predicts a universe directly governed by justice-laws, or a kind and just stewardship, or the enacting and teaching of divine justice and mercy, everywhere, from the start. But we observe no such laws built into the universe, and no stewards or law-enforcers but us, and no perfect moral code has existed anywhere throughout history. The best moralities have always just slowly evolved from human trial and error

We already covered the expectation that, if you were God, you’d give us “a universe directly governed by justice-laws, or a kind and just stewardship,” earlier. Here the second point piles onto that one: you would also ensure “the enacting and teaching of divine justice and mercy, everywhere, from the start.” Slavery would be outlawed from Day One. Likewise equality of the sexes, human rights, and democracy everywhere taught (see Justin Brierley on Moral Knowledge & the Problem of Evil). And all Holy Books everywhere would say so. And if anyone tried deleting that from any, you’d defend yourself against that crime of slander and subversion by simply undoing it, making Holy Books impossible to alter, thereby alone proving God existed, and does indeed endorse what’s in those books. You, being a rational and good person of unlimited means, could not countenance doing anything else. And that would be evidence for God. And then we’d have an argument from moral facts that actually worked.

9. The Argument from Meaning of Life

This one might be harder to grasp, given that theists have so twisted around what life is even good for (pro tip: it’s not “obedience”). If you were God, you’d not even think of death as a thing to design-in to any world. You’d simply ensure no one was left in despair over boredom or ennui or whatever is supposed to be the “negative” of eternal life. Christians already assume this is the case—otherwise living forever in Heaven would be a dreadful prospect for them. Obviously if living forever in Heaven is good, then living forever simply is good. And any excuse you try to vomit up or pull out of your ass for why it wouldn’t be, will at once both refute your own religion (by condemning your own Heaven to be Hell) and the existence of your God (who, being All Powerful, can simply solve every “problem” you purport holds for eternal life).

Wingeing about the meaning of life is only a thing in godless worlds. If God exists, there would be no issue to winge about. You’d live forever and be told, whenever you choose to ask, by the wisest of your friends what’s good about life and how to make the best of it; and you’d find, upon testing their advice, that it was true. And that would be evidence for God. And then we’d have an argument from life’s meaning that actually worked.

10. The Argument from Superman

This one is weird because it’s actually kind of stupid. Gods have no more need of supermen than of starships. Why muck about with Jesus? God can just do everything Jesus does, skipping a needless step. I suppose that’s why Christians are wont to insist upon the completely incoherent nonsense of The Trinity, but even then, that’s another stupidly convoluted Rube Goldberg contraption no real God would ever have any need of. Supermen just are a dumb concept. And if you were God, you’d never even contemplate such a stupid idea. You have unlimited means. You’d sort everything out you needed yourself.

But even if you were just whimsical, and thus made a JesusBot to side-handle your workload for funsies, you still would not “produce stories” about them “that look just like they were made up, and then present no adequate evidence for them being true.” They’d be fit for purpose. No one builds a bot and then hides it so no one can use it. JesusBot would be everywhere we needed, to consult with, seek comfort from, play racketball with. And there’d be only one of them. Since time began. Or, sure, perhaps not “just one,” but maybe even a team of them, depending on the scale of your whimsy. But even then all would vouch for each other and agree with the One True God, not contradict each other fundamentally and deny the reality or legitimacy of the others (much less hide, evade being useful, and rest on implausibly written, unsourced mythologies).

There is simply no other probable way the world would turn out than that (other than God not wasting time on such needless extravagences altogether). But then we’d have an argument from our superman that actually worked.

Conclusion

That’s just ten examples. Like I said, count up “150+” arguments for God, and I guarantee you, all can be flipped back into an argument against God by adding in the evidence they leave out—and it is that evidence that would therefore not exist if really there were a God; and hence it would be the absence of that evidence that proved it. There are thus countless more ways the world would have been different. And you know this. Because you are a person capable of moral and rational thought. You know what is probable and what is not, whenever you might be given unlimited means and wisdom. All attempts to argue otherwise are illogical, because they attempt to disprove a probability with mere possibilities—usually possibilities that are extremely improbable, but always possibilities that you do not know to be true. And therefore no conclusion you reach with them is anything you can claim to know to be true. And therefore you cannot justify believing any of those excuses. But you can justify believing the conclusions gone through here. Given the information available to you now, they are in fact the most probable things we’d be seeing if there ever really were any God worth the bother of knowing about.